Page images
PDF
EPUB

tical writers, are yet perfectly confiftent with the genius of true philofophy, and with the practice and principles of thofe who are univerfally acknowledged to have been the most fuccefsful in the investigation of truth: concluding with fome inferences or rules, by which the more important fallacies of the fceptical philofophy may be detected by every person of common fenfe, even though he fhould not poffefs acutenefs or metaphyfical knowledge fufficient to qualify him for a logical confutation of them.

THIRDLY, I fhall anfwer fome objections; and make fome remarks, by way of Eftimate of fcepticifm and fceptical writers.

I divide difcourfe in this manner;

my

chiefly with a view to the reader's accommodation. An exact arrangement of parts is neceffary to confer elegance on a whole; but I am more ftudious of utility than of elegance. And though my fentiments might have been exhibited in a more fyftematic order, I am apt to think, that the order in which they firft occurred to me is the most natural, and may be the most effectual for accomplishing my purpose.

PART

25

PART I.

OF THE
THE

STANDARD OF TRUTH.

T

HE love of truth has ever been accounted a good principle. Where it is known to prevail, we expect to find integrity and steadiness; a temper of mind favourable to every virtue, and tending in an eminent degree to the advancement of public utility. To have no concern for the truth, to be falfe and fallacious, is a character which no perfon who is not utterly abandoned would chuse to bear; it is a character from which we expect nothing but levity and inconfiftence. Truth feems to be confidered by all mankind as fomething fixed, unchangeable, and eternal; it may therefore be thought, that to vindicate the permanency of truth is really to difpute without an adverfary. And indeed, if these queftions were propofed in general terms,— Is there fuch a thing as truth? Are truth and

D

and falfehood different and oppofite? Is truth permanent and eternal?-few perfons would be hardy enough to answer in the negative. Attempts, however, have been made, fometimes through inadvertence, rarely (I hope) from defign, to undermine the foundations of truth, and to render their stability questionable; and thefe attempts have been fo vigorously. forwarded, and fo often renewed, that they now conftitute a confiderable part of what is called the philofophy of the human mind.

It is difficult, perhaps impoffible, to give a logical definition of Truth. But we fhall endeavour to give fuch a description of it, as may make others understand what we mean by the word. The definitions of former writers are not fo clear, nor fo unexceptionable, as could be wifhed. These therefore we shall overlook, without feeking either to explain or to correct them; and fhall fatisfy ourselves with taking notice of fome of the mental phenomena that attend the perception of truth. This feems to be the fafeft way of introducing the fubject.

CHAP

CHAPTER I.

Of the perception of Truth in general.

N hearing these propofitions,-I ex

ON

that

my

ift, Things equal to one and the fame thing are equal to one another, The fun rofe to-day, There is a God, Ingratitude ought to be blamed and punished, The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, &c.-I am confcious, mind readily admits and acquiefces in them. I fay, that I believe them to be true; that is, I conceive them to exprefs fomething conformable to the nature of things. Of the contrary propofitions I should fay, that iny mind doth not acquiefce in them, but difbelieves them, and conceives them to exprefs fomething not conformable to the nature of things. My judgement in this cafe, I conceive to be the fame which I fhould form in regard to these propofitions, if I were perfectly

προσθ ̓ ἔκασον ὡς ἔχει τι είναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.

Ariftot. Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 1.

[blocks in formation]
[ocr errors]

acquainted with all nature, in all its parts, and in all its laws *.

If I be afked, what I mean by the nature of things, I cannot otherwife explain myfelf, than by faying, that there is in my mind fomething which induces me to think, that every thing existing in nature, is determined to exift, and to exist after a certain manner, in confequence of eftablished laws; and that whatever is agreeable to thofe laws is agrecable to the na ture of things, becaufe by those laws the nature of all things is determined. Of thofe laws I do not pretend to know any thing, except fo far as they seem to be intimated to me by my own feelings, and by the fuggeftions of my own understanding. But these feelings and fuggestions are fuch, and affect me in fuch a manner, that I cannot help receiving them, and trusting in them, and believing that their intimations are not fallacious, but fuch as I fhould approve if I were perfectly acquainted with every thing in the universe, and fuch as I may approve, and admit of,

[ocr errors]

*This remark, when applied to truth in general, is fubject to certain limitations; for which fee part 2. chap. 1. fect. 3.

and

« PreviousContinue »