as they were to the last extremity. In this condition to see an enemy's fleet give way to another with reinforcements from England, the sea at the same instant covered with little vessels, crowded with greater succours; what was there wanting to complete the glorious scene, but what the general had projected, a fight at sea, under the very walls of the invested city, and the ships of the enemy sinking, or towed in by the victorious English! But night, and a few hours, defeated the latter part of that well-intended landscape.

King Philip, and the Mareschal of France, had not failed to push on the siege with all imaginable vigour; but this retreat of the Count de Tholouse, and the news of those reinforcements, soon changed the scene. Their courage without was abated proportionably, as theirs within was elated. In these circumstances, a council of war being called, it was unanimously resolved to raise the siege. Accordingly, next morning, the first of May, 1706, while the sun was under a total eclipse, in a suitable hurry and confusion, they broke up, leaving behind them most of their cannon and mortars, together with vast quantities of all sorts of ammunition and provisions, scarce stopping to look back till they had left all but the very verge of the disputed dominion behind them.

King Charles looked with new pleasure upon this lucky effort of his old deliverers. Captivity is a state no way desirable to persons however brave, of the most private station in life; but for a king, within two days of falling into the hands of his rival, to receive so seasonable and unexpected a deliverance, must be supposed, as it really did, to open a scene to universal rejoicing among us, too high for any words to express, or any thoughts to imagine, to those that were not present and partakers of it. He forthwith gave orders for a medal to be struck suitable to the occasion; one of which, set round with diamonds, he presented to Sir John Leake, the English admiral. The next orders were for recasting all the damaged brass cannon which the enemy had left; upon every one of which was, by order, a sun eclipsed, with this motto under it: Magna parvis obscurantur.

I have often wondered that I never heard anybody curious enough to inquire what could be the motives to the King of Spain's quitting his dominions upon the raising of this siege; very certain it is, that he had a fine army, under the command of a mareschal of France, not very considerably de

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creased, either by action or desertion; but all this would rather increase the curiosity than abate it. In my opinion, then, though men might have curiosity enough, the question was purposely evaded, under an apprehension, that an honest answer must inevitably give a higher idea of the general, than their inclinations led them to. At first view, this may carry the face of a paradox; yet, if the reader will consider, that in every age virtue has had its shaders or maligners, he will himself easily solve it, at the same time that he finds himself compelled to allow, that those who found themselves unable to prevent his great services, were willing, in a more subtile manner, to endeavour at the annulling of them by silence and concealment.

This will appear more than bare supposition, if we compare the present situation, as to strength, of the two contending powers. The French, at the birth of the siege, consisted of five thousand horse and dragoons, and twenty-five thousand foot; effective men. Now, grant that their killed and wounded, together with their sick in the hospitals, might amount to five thousand, yet as their body of horse was entire, and in the best condition, the remaining will appear to be an army of twenty-five thousand at least. On the other side, all the forces in Barcelona, even with their reinforcements, amounted to no more than seven thousand foot, and four hundred horse. Why then, when they raised their siege, did not they march back into the heart of Spain, with their so much superior army? or, at least, towards their capital? The answer can be this, and this only; because the Earl of Peterborow had taken such provident care to render all secure, that it was thereby rendered next to an impossibility for them so to do. That general was satisfied, that the capital of Catalonia must, in course, fall into the hands of the enemy, unless a superior fleet removed the Count de Tholouse, and threw in timely succours into the town; and as that could not depend upon him, but others, he made it his chief care and assiduous employment to provide against those strokes of fortune to which he found himself again likely to be exposed, as he often had been; and, therefore, had he recourse to that vigilance and precaution which had often retrieved, him, when to others his circumstances seemed to be most desperate.

The generality of mankind, and the French in particular,

were of opinion, that the taking Barcelona would prove a decisive stroke, and put a period to the war in Spain; and yet at that very instant, I was inclined to believe, that the general flattered himself it would be in his power to give the enemy sufficient mortification, even though the town should be obliged to submit to King Philip. The wise measures taken induced me so to believe, and the sequel approved it; for the earl had so well expended his caution, that the enemy, on the disappointment, found himself under a necessity of quitting Spain; and the same would have put him under equal difficulties, had he carried the place. The French could never have undertaken that siege without depending on their fleet for their artillery, ammunition, and provisions; since they must be inevitably forced to leave behind them the strong towns of Tortosa, Lerida, and Taragona. The earl, therefore, whose perpetual difficulties seemed rather to render him more sprightly and vigorous, took care himself to examine the whole country between the Ebro and Barcelona; and, upon his doing so, was pleasingly, as well as sensibly satisfied, that it was practicable to render their return into the heart of Spain impossible, whether they did or did not succeed in the siege they were so intent to undertake.

There were but three ways they could attempt it: the first of which was by the sea-side, from Taragona towards Tortosa; the most barren, and consequently the most improper, country in the universe to sustain an army; and yet to the natural, the earl had added such artificial difficulties, as rendered it absolutely impossible for an army to subsist, or march that

way.

The middle way lay through a better country indeed, yet only practicable by the care which had been taken to make the road so. And even here there was a necessity of marching along the side of a mountain, where, by vast labour and industry, a highway had been cut for two miles, at least, out of the main rock. The earl, therefore, by somewhat of the same labour, soon made it impassable. He employed to that end many thousands of the country people, under a few of his own officers and troops, who, cutting up twenty several places, made so many precipices, perpendicular almost as a wall, which rendered it neither safe, or even to be attempted by any single man in his wits, much less by an army. Besides, a very few men, from the higher cliffs of the mountain, might

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have destroyed an army with the arms of nature only, by rolling down large stones, and pieces of the rock, upon the enemy passing below.

The last and uppermost way lay through the hilly part of Catalonia, and led to Lerida, towards the head of the Ebro, the strongest place we had in all Spain, and which was as well furnished with a very good garrison. Along this road there lay many old castles and little towns in the mountains, naturally strong; all which would not only have afforded opposition, but at the same time have entertained an enemy with variety of difficulties; and especially as the earl had given orders, and taken care that all cattle, and everything necessary to sustain an army, should be conveyed into places of security, either in the mountains or thereabouts. These three ways thus precautiously secured, what had the earl to apprehend but the safety of the archduke; which yet was through no default of his, if in any danger from the siege?

For I well remember, on receipt of an express from the Duke of Savoy (as he frequently sent such to inquire after the proceedings in Spain), I was showed a letter, wrote about this time by the Earl of Peterborow to that prince, which raised my spirits, though then at a very low ebb. It was too remarkable to be forgot; and the substance of it was, that his highness might depend upon it, that he, the earl, was in much better circumstances than he was thought to be. That the French officers knowing nothing of the situation of the country, would find themselves extremely disappointed, since, in case the siege was raised, their army should be obliged to abandon Spain; or, in case the town was taken, they should find themselves shut up in that corner of Catalonia, and under an impossibility of forcing their way back, either through Arragon or Valencia: that, by this means, all Spain, to the Ebro, would be open to the Lord Galoway, who might march to Madrid, or anywhere else, without opposition. That he had no other uneasiness or concern upon him, but for the person of the archduke, whom he had nevertheless earnestly solicited not to remain in the town on the very first appearance of the intended siege.

CHAPTER VI.

THE KING BEGINS HIS JOURNEY TO MADRID, AND PETERBOROW TO VALENCIA-SAD ACCIDENT AT ST. JAGO-PETERBOROW LEAVES VALENCIA-SAVAGE CRUELTY OF THE SPANIARDS AT CAMPILIO-AMOURS OF TWO ENGLISH OFFICERS WITH NUNS-SAINT VINCENT'S PROCESSION- -CURIOUS CUSTOMS OF THE VALENCIANS DURING LENT.

BARCELONA being thus relieved, and King Philip forced out of Spain, by these cautious steps taken by the Earl of Peterborow; before we bring him to Valencia, it will be necessary to intimate, that, as it always was the custom of that general to settle, by a council of war, all the measures to be taken, whenever he was obliged for the service to leave the archduke; a council of war was now accordingly held, where all the general officers, and those in greatest employments at court, assisted. Here everything was in the most solemn manner concerted and resolved upon; here garrisons were settled for all the strong places, and governors appointed; but the main article then agreed upon was, that King Charles should immediately begin his journey to Madrid, and that by the way of Valencia. The reason assigned for it was, because that kingdom being in his possession, no difficulties could arise which might occasion delay, if his majesty took that route. It was likewise agreed in the same council, that the Earl of Peterborow should embark all the foot not in garrisons, for their more speedy, as well as more easy conveyance to Valencia. The same council of war agreed, that all the horse in that kingdom should be drawn together; the better to ensure the measures to be taken for the opening and facilitating his majesty's progress to Madrid.

Accordingly, after these resolutions were taken, the Earl of Peterborow embarks his forces, and sails for Valencia, where he was doubly welcomed by all sorts of people, upon account of his safe arrival, and the news he brought along with it. By the joy they expressed, one would have imagined that the general had escaped the same danger with the king; and, in truth, had their king arrived with him in person, the