equal and free as herself: for, true to principle, she has always preferred liberty to power.

The State of New York possesses great natural advantages, improved by the enterprise of her citizens and the wisdom of her councils: at this I rejoice. Her position is most felicitous: extensive in territory, with the lakes on one border and the Atlantic ocean on the other; binding to her closely, by ties of interest, whole States of the confederacy, she is possessed of commercial advantages to which she is fairly entitled, and of which I would not wish to deprive her. But I would not swell her prosperity by political regulations calculated to give her a fearful preponderacy; for, should the political power of the President drift to a union with the commercial power of New York, they will present a combination ominous to freedom.

You

There is another consideration which has induced me to offer this amendment. We may all very plainly see that the contest for the executive office is the rock on which the permanency of this Republic is likely to be wrecked, and the vehemence of this contest will ever be in proportion to the executive patronage. But for this, the office would have no allurements but for virtuous ambition; but, with this concomitant, it exerts an influence which may one day prove fatal to the federal part of our system. If we do not separate the influence of the Executive from the interest of banking incorporations, we shall have another controversy on the subject of banks. The political will be united with the money power. The contest must come-it will come. will witness a struggle in this Capitol between State banks and federal banks, and the combatants for the President's chair will be found contending in different ranks of interest and influence, whilst they mar the peace of the country and shake the pillars of the constitution. Separate, then, I beseech you, Representatives of the American people, if you wish to put down this fearful contest for the presidential chair-I had almost said presidential throne-separate, I entreat you, banking and politics. Let the banks facilitate the exchanges of commerce and further the interests of trade; but let them, I pray you, have nothing to do with the Government.

Mr. Speaker, I know and feel under what disadvantages the proposition I have offered comes before the House. Sir, I am not the first or the only man who has attempted to arrest the course of power, and I know at what a hazard that attempt is usually made. Sir, the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means has told us that the plan I propose has not escaped the notice of the Secretary of the Treasury. Yet, though that officer has presented us with a ponderous, I wish I could add luminous, report on the fiscal concerns of this Government, he has passed this proposition with a single glance. When the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GAMBLE] introduced a resolution calling upon the Secretary of the Treasury for a plan to collect and disburse the public revenue without the agency of banks, the House voted it down. The proposition met with no favor. The arrangement was made; the bargain was concluded; the banks had got the money; they hold it now; and the present bill is little more or less than a form, a ceremony, ratifying the bargain concluded between the organized capital of the country and the Secretary of the Treasury. No wonder that officer declined entering into the details of a scheme which he himself admitted to be of a practical character, but which did not suit the purposes of power. Sir, the scheme is practicable; and, further, I say that it is more simple and more efficient than that proposed by this bill. It is true, the amendment is elementary only; it proposes the germe, the distinguishing measure only, of the plan I propose; but were this agreed upon, how easy would it be to go on and perfect

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the details. Let these collectors be put under bond, with sufficient security, and let them keep the revenue they may collect until called for by the Government. The chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means thinks that this would keep too much specie unemployed. Sir, the day has not long gone by when this hall, ay, sir, and the whole country, rang with the cry of “ specie! specie!" "Jackson money!" "yellow jackets!" "down with bank rags!" Well, sir, I propose a plan by which the business of Government will be done in specie, and in specie only; and then the gentleman tells us that by law it is done in specie already. Such, it seems, is now the law of the land. Sir, I am glad, exceeding glad, to hear it. If the fact be so, I have proposed no innovation; and ought not the practice of the Government to correspond with the law? I am not for altering such a law. But what does this bill do? It makes it indispensable to any bank's becoming the depository of the Government funds, that it have at all times a large amount of specie in its vaults. It appoints a system of search and inspection to ascertain the fact; and if it shall be discovered that the bank does not keep locked up from circulation a certain large amount of specie, the Government deposites are withdrawn, and the bank ruined.

Surely, sir, the specie in the vaults of a bank is as much withdrawn from circulation among the people as in the coffers of a collector of the revenue. It lies there merely as a source of credit to the bank. But there would but an inconsiderable amount lie thus idle at any time. The money would, in effect, be as useful as if deposited in the State banks themselves. It would be moving in a constant stream into and out of the depositories. The banks might possess themselves of the drafts of Government, which, being drawn on specie in the actual possession of these agents of the Treasurer, in favor of all public creditors, would be held as so much specie. Such drafts, or I am mistaken, would soon be at a premium. There would be no difficulty whatever on that score. The plan would probably require the creation of a few additional officers, I admit, but they would not be many; possibly there might none be need ed; but in point of patronage they would be nothing, compared with this fearful connexion between the organized capital of the State banks and the power of the Treasury of the Union. If gentlemen will only aid me by bestowing on the proposition I have submitted a small share of the labor and thought applied to carry into effect the State bank system, if they will turn their minds earnestly to perfecting its details, they will find imagined difficulties fade before them. They will soon be convinced that honest and responsible men are to be found in this country, who may safely be intrusted with the custody of the public treasure. The Treasurer, by his drafts, will relieve all difficulties on the subject of exchange; and the entire system of managing the public revenue will be reduced to the simplest and easiest form.

I desire to limit and restrain the executive patronage; I seek to keep it free from the corroding influence of banks and banking. Sir, I desire no longer to have it openly charged upon members of Congress that they have been bought and bribed by a bank. Let the proposed plan of the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means go into effect, and the day is not far distant when gentlemen will be charged in the selfsame manner with having been bribed by the State banks. When a new war of interest and ambition shall arise, between a renewed effort to make a Bank of the United States and the existing State banks, those who oppose the measure will then be told that they are bribed by the State banks. Sir, the times are portentous; all feel it, all know it to be so. Every body knows that a pervading anxiety agitates the bosoms of the best and wisest

the beginning of the present session, to which he would beg leave to call the attention of the House.

[Here Mr. M. read the following paragraph from the message:

"The power of Congress to direct in what places the Treasurer shall keep the moneys in the treasury, and to impose restrictions upon the executive authority, in relation to their custody and removal, is unlimited, and its exercise will rather be courted than discouraged by those public officers and agents on whom rests the responsibility for their safety. It is desirable that as little power as possible should be left to the President or Secretary of the Treasury over these institutions; which, being thus freed from executive influence, and without a common head to direct their operations, would have neither the temptation nor the ability to interfere in the political conflicts of the country."]

If the House would consent to make the bill before it conform to the recommendation he had just read, he would give his vote for its passage. It was perfecly apparent, from the statements made by the chairman who had reported the bill, that the House had in its possession all the information necessary to enable it to make a judicious and safe selection of banks to be used as the depositories of the public money. The gentleman had exhibited a list to the House, of a number of banks, in which he stated the public money was now deposited, and in which he assured the House he had abundant evidence to show that it was perfectly safe, and of the ability of which to render all the services required by the Government he is entirely satisfied. Let the gentleman, then, propose to fill the blank, which would be created if his (Mr. M's) amendment prevailed, with the names of the banks in which the money of the Government is now deposited. Other gentlemen could propose the insertion of the names of other banks if they thought proper. The House would then have it in its power to fill the blank with the names of the banks now used as public depositories, and he had no doubt they would insert them all, unless it would be satisfied that some of them were not safe institutions. They could choose those which were safe, and leave out those, if any, the solvency of which appeared doubtful. It was so obvious that the House could make a safe and proper selection of banks, in which the deposites should be made, that he could not conceive of any well-founded objection which could be urged against the amendment he proposed. If the selection of the deposite banks is left to the Secretary of the Treasury, it would evidently be done as a matter of choice, not of necessity.

The danger of investing the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other officer of the Government, with unlimit ed power of selecting and changing the deposite banks at his pleasure, was great, obvious, and acknowledged. The President, in the portion of the message just read, warned us of the necessity of guarding against it, and he was gratified to find the bill under consideration had imposed a salutary restriction on the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to change the places of depositing the public money. But it gives, without any necessity for it, and contrary to the recommendation of the President, the power of selecting the deposite banks, in the first instance, to the Secretary of the Treasury. It was a dangerous power; and, without meaning to make any imputation against the present Secretary, he would af firm that this power of selecting the deposite banks might be used for improper purposes now, as readily as at any future time. We were on the eve of an election for the highest officer in the Government, the election of a President of the United States. Let us suppose (said Mr. M.) that that election is to be made, as he believed would be the case, between two candidates, (and he earnestly hoped there would be no other candidates in the

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field,) the one a man whose motto is "the spoils of the vanquished belong to the victors;" one who regards the patronage of the Government as a fund out of which the person possessing power is to reward the services of those who contributed to his election; one who is the acknowledged head of that party which acts upon the principle that all is fair in politics; and another man, of opposite principles; one whose motto is "honesty is the best policy;" one who maintains that the public patronage is never to be dispensed for any other purpose than that of securing the greatest possible benefit to the people; one who would rather sacrifice his life than purchase a vote for himself by the promise of conferring an office.

If, sir, the contest shall be between two such men as these, and if it shall turn out that the person who is to exercise the power of selecting the deposite banks is the friend of the former, and belongs to the political school in which the doctrine that all is fair in politics is taught, what is to be the effect of giving him the power with which this bill proposes to invest the Secretary of the Treasury? Will it not enable him to command the whole influence of all the banks in the Union, with their host of officers, their bank directors and debtors, in favor of the man whose election he wishes to promote? Will it not enable the Secretary to do, through the instrumentality of the State banks, all that the United States Bank is charged with having done, in influencing and controlling elections among the people?

Mr. M. said he hoped the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. POLK] would consent to act upon the same principle, and in the same spirit, he had recommended to others to act. He (Mr. M.) had consented to abstain from making any attempt to obtain the passage of a bill, in conformity to his own ideas, as to the most proper mode of disposing of the public deposites, from a knowledge of the fact that such a bill could not become a law of the land, and out of a disposition to pay a proper respect to the views of other branches of the Government. He hoped the gentleman who, from his situation as chairman of a committee, had charge of the bill before the House; would also consent to respect the known feelings and opinions of other branches of the Government, so far at least as to consent to an amendment which may perhaps ensure the passage of the bill; especially when that amendment is in conformity to the recommendation of the Chief Executive Magistrate, and not incompatible with any opinion expressed by the advocates of the bill.

Mr. M. said he felt no disposition to reply to any of the gentleman's [Mr. POLK's] remarks in reference to the alleged misconduct of the Bank of the United States. He should leave the defence of the bank entirely to its friends. He had never undertaken to advocate the cause of that institution. The business before the House was to make the bill for regulating the deposites in the State banks as perfect as possible, and he was disposed to lend all the assistance in his power to accomplish that end.

Mr. EWING said he rejoiced that, after having in vain endeavored at the last session of Congress to obtain the floor on the subject-matter of the present bill, he was now able to exercise that privilege. But at that period he should have gone more extensively into the subject than he now intended. Reflection had convinced the people, he believed, that the system contemplated by the provisions of this bill was founded in error; that its action would prove injurious to the great interests of the country, as well as to public liberty itself; and that a very brief examination would prove that many of the arguments by which it was attempted to be sustained on that floor were utterly fallacious. He viewed the system of State banks, thus linked, as unconstitutional; and, were it not so, he viewed the policy of the bill as in

jurious to the public interest, and indirectly arraigning the Secretary of the Treasury for a deliberate violation of the law. For if (said Mr. E.) the Secretary of the Treasury is justified by any law of the land, in exercising his present discretionary power over the people's money, it is evidently an act of supererogation now to make another law; inasmuch as it would only tend to lessen his responsibility, without materially lessening the discretionary power now exercised, and so far diminish the existing security of the public funds. If the present places of deposite selected by the Secretary of the Treasury be legal and secure, nothing more is required; and if not, this act will only increase the evil. If the great source of our national prosperity and revenue can exist without a uniform currency, founded on the credit and faith of the Union, then all the great statesmen and polit ical economists of this nation who bave preceded us were unworthy of the reputation they enjoyed. But can this be so? Where are the evidences by which such an idea can be sustained-evidence that can convince the public? Do the bill and arguments of the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means [Mr. POLK] afford such evidence? A bill giving the control of power specially granted to Congress by the constitution to executive officers, substituting a local State corporation currency beyond our control, and always subject to depreciation and loss, for a general and uniform currency subject to our control, and at all times equal, if not superior, to gold or silver. This runious change, too, is to be effected, accompanied with a cry that a specie currency is intended! which all know to be impracticable. One corporation monopoly under the control of Congress is a monster, while possibly one hundred issuing paper at will, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treas ury, are to be as innocent and harmless as lambs. Why, sir, (said Mr. E.,) when the security and protection provided by the constitution for the regulation of the currency shall be taken from the people and their representatives, and placed in the hands of the Executive, I can see no means by which the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. POLK] will be able to accomplish his avowed purpose. He says he wishes to limit and define the discretionary power of the President; but is it by usurping that power, and exercising it at his own discretion, which the constitution vests exclusively in Congress, that this is to be effected? Prudence pointed to the period when the charter of the present Bank of the United States would expire, as the proper time to provide that a substitute should go into operation. This fiscal agency should be of such a character as to regulate the currency, facilitate and secure a safe collection and disbursement of the public money, and promote the various interests of the country. That the constitution grants to Congress the powers of effecting these great public interests will not be denied; and that it is proper and necessary to exercise them, it is folly for the Treasury advocates to deny. The President recommended such a currency in his message to the 21st Congress; but he had never seen the sanction of the President for any such plan as that contemplated by the bill. The only State bank plan that the Presi dent ever recommended was one of mutual guaranty; but that is known to be utterly impracticable; and whether he then contemplated acquiring the power conferred on the Treasury, by the bill now before us, is a matter of no consequence. Mr. E. did not view the powers vested in Congress by the constitution as transferable to the Treasury or State bank corporations under any nominal guarantee. Still less did he view it expedient to disjoint the interest blended in a general currency, by sanctioning the local and conflicting interests to be created by the plan proposed by the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. POLK.] He had now on his table a substitute for the bill, which, when in order, he should offer

[FEB. 10, 1835.

In order to secure favor to his plan, the gentleman would impress a belief that the great loss of the people's money, formerly sustained when the deposites were made in State banks, was a misapprehension; that, up to the charter of the present bank, there were no losses known, and that the final loss was inconsiderable.

[Mr. POLK here rose and explained. He said, from the creation of the old Bank of the United States up to the establishment of the new, the loss to the Government was very inconsiderable.]

Mr. EwING proceeded. He was incapable, he said, of doing the gentleman injustice. His explanation did not alter the fact he was about to argue from. He hoped the gentleman would exercise a little patience until he had concluded the argument on this point. The gentleman says the loss to the Government was inconsiderable. Perhaps he supposes that our Government consists of a unit, and as a unit it lost nothing; but he (Mr. E.) considered the three departments of our Government equally omnipotent in their spheres of action, and that the constitution and laws control all. The actual loss of the people's money, during that period, was nearly a million and a half of dollars. But that was only a trifle, compared to the loss sustained by our citizens in their various commercial transactions, and the loss of confidence essential to trade. The loss to trade and to the industry of the States are losses to the whole people; and, as ours is not a Government of party, but a Government of the whole people, al! the losses and sacrifices inflicted on them are to be taken into the account. The estimate of these would show an enormous amount; but an accurate estimate is impossible. no loss was discovered from the falling of the old to the establishment of the present Bank of the United States is accounted for by the fact that no settlement was demanded of them by any fiscal agent of the Government during that period; and their inability to refund the deposites could not be discovered till they were required to make a final settlement. It was then only that their insolvency could become known; and the amount of it, at that period, has been since lessened, and the accounts closed on the books of the Treasury, by compromises for property, which, in some instances, has been sold by the Government for one tenth of what it cost the nation. Such are the facts bearing on the delusive arguments the gentleman presents to influence the decision of the House and the opinions of the people. He desired all to consult better authority.

That

The ideal loss the gentleman estimates as being sustained by the country through the Bank of the United States, he would leave to be noticed by friends of that institution who were better acquainted with its transactions than he could be. But the loss to the aggregate wealth of the West, in the exchanges of trade under a local bank system; the delay, hazard, and inconvenience, to which the West will be subjected without a general currency of easy transmission; the loss of a bonus to the Treasury by the establishment of the plan he [Mr. POLK] contemplates, together with the uncertainty, trouble, and contention, which it must inevitably generate, are not to be overlooked; nor is the unconstitutional heresy, that the Executive should control the people's money, which (if he can control the Secretary of the Treasury) this bill would confer upon him, to be left out of the estimate of consequences. The present