that the road to high preferment was an "uncompromising hostility to the bank," and no man had a better start than I had, for I had opened against it long before I came to Congress, and long before the President himself. But because I could not say the seizure of the public money from the bank, the wresting it from Congress, the proper guardians of the people's money, and placing it under the control of the executive branch of the Government to increase its power and patronage, was right and proper-a proceeding that every real friend of the President, some of the ablest presses that supported him, and most of his confidential advisers, condemned at the time as unwise, unnecessary, unjust, and unjustifiable behold! I was bank bought, and had changed my opinions.

And, Mr. Speaker, who are they that have accused me of this delinquency? Would you believe it, they are some of the old quondam friends of the bank, who have all at once got their minds enlightened upon the subject, and have now become the warmest enemies of that institution. So much so, they have lately, as members of the Legislature of Georgia, declared the bank a highly dangerous establishment, and given some instructions to their Senators about it, though they would not say it was unconstitutional; a matter of much more concern to the republican party. Some of these very men, and all the party to which they belong, formerly believed this bank was highly useful and necessary, and, as I will show you presently, were very anxious to obtain a branch of it in Georgia, saying it would have "a salutary tendency to keep the local banks within a sound is sue of their paper." A celebrated paper in Georgia,* belonging to this party, and known to be their leading paper, reprobated, in the strongest manner, three years ago, my opposition to the bank, said I was no "financier," that I was meddling in business I did not understand; I had better come away, and cease my opposition, for I would find nothing wrong in the institution; that it was constitutional and necessary, and ought to be rechartered. Now, sir, this was the cry of this press and its party, and these are the very people who are now charging me with changing my opinions with regard to the bank. Indeed, I could not incur much blame for inconsistency if I were to confess the fact, especially if I rested my justification on their own change of opinion, for a man cannot well be wrong who keeps himself well balanced on the opposite side of any question these gentry may advocate. But, sir, as to the application for a branch in Georgia, permit me to read you the following letter, dated Milledgeville, Georgia, December 25, 1831:

"The Bank of the United States having lately sent agents to Augusta and Columbus, in Georgia, to understand the benefits that might accrue to that institution in the establishment at each of a branch bank, and also to understand whether such establishments would conflict with public opinion, or be in accordance therewith, we the undersigned, members of the present Legislature of Georgia,† do hereby express our opinions on the subject as aftermentioned, viz:

Yclept the Federal Union.

[FEB. 11, 1835.

"That if the Bank of the United States shall come to a decision that it is interesting to establish at either or each [both] of these places a branch of its bank, the measure will advance a majority of the interests of the inhabitants of the circumjacent country within the State of Georgia, as also that of South Carolina on the one side, and that of Alabama on the other. We give two of the reasons in favor of this assertion:

"First, because money borrowers can there procure loans at six per cent. per annum; and, second, because the operations of the Bank of the United States have the salutary tendency to keep the local banks within a sound issue of their paper. And, therefore, if the Bank of the United States decide that the places in question are of sufficient consequence to induce the establishments in question, the sooner, in our opinion, it is done, both for the bank and the country, the better."

I have now done with this branch of my subject, and thank the House for the very indulgent and attentive hearing which they have afforded me on this truly unpleasant topic, and shall proceed to the other part of the question, viz: the reasons for my vote.

In presenting my reasons for voting against the bill on your table, and sustaining the substitute offered by the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. GORDON,] I shall briefly urge what I have always done against the Bank of the United States, viz: that any concern on the part of the general Government, with banks of any description, is not only unconstitutional, but inexpedient.

I do not intend to argue the constitutional question at large, and what I do say on that subject is wholly intended for those who have always thought with me that the Bank of the United States was unconstitutional, and who have aided in putting it down on that ground. The bill reported by the Committee of Ways and Means designs to substitute State banks for the United States Bank; and I shall attempt to show that whatever renders the latter unconstitutional will apply with equal force to the former.

The friends of the United States Bank have always maintained, and so it was decided by the federal court, that it was an instrument "necessary and proper" to carry into effect certain powers of the constitution. The whole argument is summed up in this remarkable statement, found at the head of Mr. McDuffie's able report: "The earliest and principal objection urged against the constitutionality of the bank was, that Congress had not the power to create corporations. That Congress has a

Thos. Young, Representative from Irwin.
Thos. Hilliard,
John R. Kittles,*
James R. Jones,

do.

do. Ware.

do.

do. Scriven.

do.

do. Jones.

Daniel Hopkins,

B. Exum,

† Names of the undersigned:

Sowel Woolfolk,* Representative from Muscogee.

do. Twiggs.

Senator from De Kalb.

distinct and substantive power to create corporations, without reference to the objects intrusted to its jurisdiction, is a proposition which never has been maintained; but that any one of the powers expressly conferred upon Congress is subject to the limitation, that it shall not be carried into effect by the agency of a corporation, is a proposition which cannot be maintained." Here, then, it is admitted that Congress has no right to create corporations unless they are intended to carry into effect certain expressed powers of the constitution.

[H. OF R.

to grant charters, if they can take those granted by States as instruments for the execution of any purpose they may wish? The argument leads to this result: you cannot make Governors, Legislatures, and judges, for the States; but you can take them, after the State has made them, for your use. So far from this being true, it has been determined that you cannot use State courts to carry any of your judicial powers into effect. But what appears to me conclusive upon this subject, if the mere creation of a corporation is all that stands in your way to use them for any purpose you may think proper, and that you can take a bank corporation created to your hand by a State, that you may take any other State corporation for enlarging your powers, You cannot create turnpike, railroad, canal, or manufacturing companies, for the ob

Now, if we deny that Congress cannot create a bank for these purposes, who can? Can a State do it? No one will contend for this. But it is gravely maintained that, if a State has created a bank for other purposes, Congress may take that bank to do what she cannot create a bank to do herself! If Congress cannot create a bank to execute its powers, it is because, we say, there is no such expressed right to be found in the constitution. Nor is it such an implied power as is "necessary and proper" to carry into effect other powers. The power must be expressed or implied which Congress can use. How is it possible to evade the force of this argument as against State banks. Where is the authority, expressed or implied, to use a State bank for executing those very constitutional powers which a federal bank cannot do? Take, for instance, the power "to collect and disburse the revenue.' 99 Congress cannot incorporate a bank to do this; but then it is contended it may take a bank already incorporated by a State for that purpose; and you give as a reason, that a corporation is a person in law which you can employ as you would any other person. And pray are they any thing more than a person in law after you have created them? If there is no other consequence in creating a corporation but making it a person in law, where is the harm of corporations? Is there any difference between your creation of a person in law for your your own purposes, and a person in law created by a State? But, to test this matter still further, if you can execute one power with a State bank, you can another. Will it be contended that you can regulate commerce or the currency with State banks? Remember these are, also, two of the powers which it was said the United States Bank was intended to execute. If you make a distinction between these and the first power mentioned, you give up the question. You must take all or none. If you say that State banks cannot execute these powers, it must be because the constitution confers no such right, and then you virtually admit that, "to collect and disburse the public revenue," is such a power as the constitution does confer, and, if conferred upon a State bank, it is equally so upon any other bank: exactly what has been contended for by the United States Bank. It always maintained that, if there was one single power it could be instrumental in executing, it was a constitutional institution.

But mark the consequences of the reasoning which gives to the federal Government the right to use State corporations for objects which they cannot accomplish by corporations of their own creation. What was gained by withholding the power from the general Government

made them, you can take them and go to work. You cannot incorporate colleges and academies for the purposes of education, but, when the States have done it, then you can come in for the use of them to any extent your love of implied powers may prompt. It will not do to say you have a constitutional right "to collect and disburse your revenue," and therefore to use the means necessary and proper to that end. This was the grand argument of the Bank of the United States. If you can use means already provided, you can provide means yourself. But if it be granted that you can use means already provided, to execute one power of the constitu tion, you can for any other: and recollect you claim the power to effect internal improvements, and to encour age domestic manufactures. Now, where are you to be stopped in the use of all the companies I have just named for these last-mentioned great objects, if you can take banking companies to execute any other power of the constitution? It is impossible to draw a distinction be tween the two cases, and more fearful and important consequences may flow from this measure than can well be conceived by the most far-reaching forecast.

I come now to the last thing proposed, an inquiry into the expediency of the law; and I lay down this propo sition, and boldly affirm that it cannot be contradicted, that, whatever reasoning is used against the expediency of the United States Bank, it will apply with equal force to State banks. I challenge the most acute ingenuity, and defy the rigor of the most discriminating intellect, to frame an argument against a federal bank, upon the ground of expediency, that will not immediately exert a like authority over State institutions.

I presume it is well recollected, for the fact is dignified with a place in the annual message, besides its repetition in numerous other State papers, that the principal charges against the United States Bank are: 1. Too much power. 2. Interfering with elections. 3. Buys up the press; and 4. Corrupts the public morals. Does any one remember any other objections besides these, or such as would naturally classify themselves with these? If not, let us now examine how it is possible for State banks to escape from the operation of these objections? What is meant by too much power? or what is this power? Is it not money? Is not this the great instrument by which banks operate? by which they exercise their immense control over the wants and wishes of society? by which they regulate the value of every thing; and, operating upon the varied interests of men, with an influence as fixed as destiny, and as certain as death, they have a most tremendous power? But is the power confined alone to the United States Bank? Is money less powerful in a State bank than in a federal bank? Is it managed differently? by people of a different character? for different objects? Are five hundred State banks, united in a political league, less able or less inclined to the exercise of power than one bank and its twenty-four branches? No: just as true as was the fact

them an equal reputation with the most distinguished upon this floor, have been put aside after the most faithful services, and such as had acquired for their State the very highest character. I could not have expected to have shared a different fate, because with them I have felt and acted; and our principles of action, to every useful purpose, have been the same. I was, therefore, extremely anxious, under circumstances like these, in retiring, perhaps for ever, into private life, to leave, as a memorial to my children, the pleasing reflection that, if I had done no good for their country, I had done no harm to a reputation, which, in after times, it may be their pride to honor and to imitate.

When Mr. CLAYTON had finished,

Mr. MANN, of New York, rose and said that he had not designed to trouble the House with any remarks upon this subject; and he should not have done so but for some observations which had fallen, in the course of the debate, from the two honorable gentlemen from Virginia [Messrs. GORDON and ROBERTSON] who addressed the House yesterday and to-day, which Mr. M. said he felt himself constrained, as a Representative from New York, to notice. He must, therefore, ask a few moments' indulgence. If, sir, I have not mistaken the scope of their remarks, the honorable gentlemen object to the passage of this bill because about thirteen millions of the revenues of this Government are collected in the State of New York, to be deposited in her State banks, and used in the promotion of her already overgrown commerce; thus operating like a pecuniary tariff in her favor. The gentlemen then go on to speak of that State, which, by courtesy, they denominate the empire, with an army of forty Representatives on this floor, possessing population, facilities, resources, and political power, presenting to the vision of gentlemen ideal dangers to the prosperity and welfare of the other States of this Union; and therefore it is argued that great circumspection should be used here in respect to our national legislation, so as not to increase those advantages and facilities which New York is always so ready to embrace and improve. The inference which it appears to me necessarily follows from the scope of the remarks of the gentlemen, taken altogether, (and I state it as an inference,) is, that the power of New York is not only too great in the Union, but that she will use it for political and improper purposes of self-aggrandizement.

[Here Mr. M. yielded the floor to the gentlemen from Virginia, [Messrs. GORDON and ROBERTSON,] who explained, and said that they had not intended to utter a word disrespectful to the State of New York; that they admired that State, and its rapid progress and improvement; and Mr. GORDON protested against any inferences being drawn by the gentleman from New York [Mr. MANN] which his language did not warrant.]

Mr. MANN resumed, and said that he had not understood the gentlemen as using disrespectful or unparliamentary or uncourteous language towards his State or her Representatives; and he had not misunderstood the scope of their remarks, from which he had drawn the inference which he had stated as necessarily following from their propositions and premises. This inference (said Mr. M.) seems constantly to disturb the imagination of gentlemen in both wings of the Capitol, presenting a vision continually before their eyes, insomuch that, judging by the observations which a seat on this floor for a single session has enabled me to make, I conclude that no question of general or national importance can be considered and discussed here without involving considerations and allusions appertaining to the State of New York, and her career as a member of the confederacy. Her advantages, her institutions, her legislative and political policy, are arrayed and reviewed, censured, and sometimes freely condemned, on this floor. Her VOL. XI.-84

[H. OF R

public men, charged with the administration of her local and State affairs, have sometimes been attacked with epithets as senseless as they are unjust. Her banking system seems to have the misfortune, with gentlemen, to meet with no favor, except distrust and disapproval.

Sir, if gentlemen who discourse so largely about New York, her laws and institutions, her wealth and commerce, would take the trouble to examine them more closely, and learn more of their nature, extent, and utility, I trust they would find more to merit their commendation, and less to denounce and condemn. I do not know that it is proper to arraign the legislative or local policy of any State of the Union upon this floor; yet I have, perhaps too often, been a silent witness of the exhibition here, and in the other branch of the national Legislature, in respect to the State which, in a very humble part, I have the honor to represent. I have supposed that the States, keeping within the boundaries established by the constitution of the United States, had the power to manage their own affairs in their own way. But if honorable gentlemen are disposed to look into New York, for good or for evil, I will join them in aid of the most scrutinizing examination into her political history, her public policy, laws, and institutions. I would ask their particular attention to her systems and provisions for public education; to her social and moral condition; to her jurisprudence and legislation; to her system of internal improvements; to her proud financial condition; to her banking and monetary system; to her internal resources; to her intelligent, industrious, and enterprising population-in which, at last, they will find the secret of the power, the wealth, and expansive greatness, of New York, apparently so much dreaded. Let me ask gentlemen in what State or country will they find the affairs of a local Government better conducted to secure the ends of good government, the happiness, rights, and liberties, of the people, than are those of New York? Are her finances and resources wasted or perverted to improper objects? I will not here make invidious comparisons, but invite gentlemen, in their own States, to imitate rather than to indulge in unreasonable or unfounded jealousies of the legislation and power of New York.

But, Mr. Speaker, when has New York used her commercial or political power in the Union for selfish or improper purposes? When has she endangered the Union of these States, or swerved from the political faith and principles which she derived from Virginia through those apostles of political liberty, Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe? For thirty-two years since the adoption of the constitution, the vaunted "Ancient Dominion" has held the control of the executive and legislative policy of this Government, during all which time New York has stood firmly by her side, advocating her faith and practice under the constitution, without having dreamed of the alternative" which might permit her to change her course or her principles. Let the history of her action during the late war-pouring out her best blood and treasures upon the altar of the country, while another portion of the Union occupied a position at Hartford more than equivocal, while the very Capitol in which we are assembled was a heap of smoking ruins under the eyes of the "Ancient Dominion"-shield the State of New York from any inferences of a purpose or intention to use her dreaded political power in the confederacy for selfish or improper purposes. Sir, what has been the recent position of New York in the trials to which the strength of our institutions have been subjected? Has she stopped to consider "any alternatives," or has she stood by the constitution and the principles which she derived from the fathers of the "Ancient Dominion,"

even though the gallant sons of those fathers may have doubted and hesitated as to whether the path of their sires led on to the fountains of patriotism? She has maintained the firm and even tenor of her way through all the vicissitudes and changes which have been going on around her, and she will continue to adhere to the ancient republican faith promulged from Virginia, even though the talented public men of the latter may, in some instances, indulge their fears that such adherence will lead her to a position in the Union which will not permit those who "discourse of Rome to say that her wide walls contain but one man.' 39

Sir, what is the position of New York at present on this floor? Is it equivocal or alternative? Is it in opposition to the constitutional doctrines so long cherish ed in favor of strict construction? Is it opposed to the rights of the States? When have her Representatives arraigned at this bar the admitted constitutional legislation, the policy or measures, of one of the State Governments of this Union? And when, sir, after having done so, have they then maintained that the State Governments have the power to review and nullify the constitutional measures of the national Government? Sir, the State of New York may present to the views of some honorable gentlemen the political enigma, about which they discourse, but cannot understand; yet, sir, she has never been found to be a political meteor, traversing the abstruse regions and metaphysical mazes of the political firmament. But, Mr. Speaker, the sin of New York is her physical and numerical greatness--her overgrown external commerce and her internal trade, resources, and advantages. Sir, I know not how to reply to the position that my native State is physically too strong already, and that greater dangers are to be apprehended from its increasing strength and multiplying facilities and resources. I cannot regret it; that would be a "treason most foul." I cannot profess its weakness; the facts would not sustain me. I do most sincerely desire its increasing prosperity, and I must be admitted to enjoy this natural desire. New York, sir, has never been the recipient of your bounty. She has never asked at your hands more than strict justice in the distribution of your favors, and has not received even that. Her commercial advantages depend upon the laws of nature, and of these she cannot be deprived by legislation. Transfer your public revenues from the natural aids they afford to her commerce, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia proposes, and you will not materially affect the progress of New York in her commercial career, since she does not rely upon adventitious advantages. She has, however a right to demand at your hands equal and impartial justice. She asks nothing more. While New York is the medium and instrument by which so large a portion of the public revenues are collected, can you, in common and equal justice, deprive her of the advantages which her situation confers? You cannot, and ought not. For many years past those revenues have been under the selfish and odious control of the United States Bank, with interests opposed to those of New York; and has this circumstance arrested the commerce and prosperity of that State? We have, sir, I confess, sometimes inconveniently felt the power of an unseen hand striking at our welfare, but not sufficiently to retard permanently our progress.

Mr. Speaker, allow me to express the hope that we may hereafter be able to discuss and consider the various questions presented here, without drawing into review the local affairs and legislative policy of any of the States of the confederacy, unless it shall be to derive useful lessons to guide us in the path of duty by their example or experience; and let me add the hope that the various amendments proposed to the bill under

[FEB. 11, 1835.

consideration may be rejected, and the bill passed into a law.

Mr. WILSON, of Virginia, addressed the House in opposition to the motion to commit the bill as made by his colleague, [Mr. ROBERTSON] He was also opposed to the amendment of Mr. GORDON. Believing that the Bank of the United States would not be rechartered, he was satisfied that it would be necessary to employ the State banks as the fiscal agents of the Government. He was, therefore, in favor of perfecting the present bill; and although he had some doubts on the subject, still he should probably vote for the amendment which had been suggested by another colleague, [Mr. MOORE,] to insert the names of the State banks in the bill, so as to leave as little discretion as possible to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. VANCE asked what was now the question before the House? He expressed his wish to offer an amendment, when in order, which proposed a distribution of the revenue among the banks of the different States in proportion to their relative population. The amendment, by permission, was read, and is as follows:

"SEC.-. Be it further enacted, That in all cases where the amount of revenue collected in any State is greater than what would be its due proportion, estimated by a comparison between the whole revenue of the United States collected on imports, and the number of the members of the House of Representatives, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to cause to be credited, at the commencement of each month, by the deposite banks in the districts where such excess shall be collected, to the deposite banks in States where no collections are made, or where no such excess exists, an amount in ratio equal to their representation in the House of Representatives, as aforesaid. And the amount to be deposited shall be charged to the banks in whose favor such deposites are made; and the amount of the sum so charged be forthwith communicated to the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall cause the same to be so regulated and adjusted as to assign to the depositing banks, in the States where a deficiency exists, the just proportion, by the standard aforesaid, to which such States are entitled. And the said depositing banks shall not charge on drafts to individuals or companies, for the moneys thus placed to their credit, to exceed one fourth of one per centum. And it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to see that the provisions of this section be carried into effect in good faith, and that he cause to be made out all forms and instructions necessary to accomplish that object."

Mr. HANNEGAN, after adverting to the bills pending before the House, and expressing his extreme reluctance to make the motion, moved the previous question.

The CHAIR having stated the question,

Mr. WILLIAMS moved a call of the House.

The CHAIR stated that, according to a decision of the House at its last session, this motion could not be interposed between a motion for the previous question and a question on its being seconded by the House; and though his own convictions were opposed to the decision, he should, out of respect to the authority of the House, submit to it, and he therefore pronounced the motion for a call to be out of order.

Mr. McKINLEY, thinking with the Speaker, took an appeal to try the question. Mr. BRIGGS demanded the yeas and nays; which were ordered.

Mr. MERCER sustained the appeal, on the ground that, should it be decided that no call could be permitted till after a vote on the seconding of the previous question, and should the members brought into the