which are imposed by natural causes.

Thus, men placed in certain circumstances, are, from necessity, the subjects of particular sensations: they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; and, involuntarily, have those feelings which the exercise of the senses occasion in the mind.

Moral necessity, on the other hand, is that inseparable connexion' which exists between moral causes and their effects. Thus, the Deity, in consequence of the perfection of his nature, is under the moral necessity of acting from the best motives, and of always doing what is best.

We are said to be naturally unable to do any thing when we want the physical power of doing it. A blind man is physically unable to see, and a lame man to walk. The distinction between natural and moral inability may be illustrated thus: a servant has had his leg broken, and is physically prevented from doing his master's service. A fellow-servant has a grudge against his master, and cherishes the worst dispositions towards him; he is reluctant to do his master's will, and is, in a certain sense, unable to do it; but his inability consists in the want of inclination. In this way a drunkard may be incapable of forbearing to take strong drink; and a malicious man may be unable to desire or to promote the prosperity of an enemy.

But it is clear that the word inability, when applied in this way, is used in a sense different from its original signification. It cannot be literally and truly said, that a malicious man cannot hold his hand from striking, or, that he is unable to shew his enemy kind

ness. Whatever a man has in his choice, he has, strictly speaking, in his power; and he cannot be truly said to be unable to do what, if he will, he can perform.

CHAPTER XI.

PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE ADMITTED ALIKE BY THE ADVOCATES OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

It should be remarked, that there are many principles which, when divested of technical language, are admitted alike by those called Necessarians, and by those who contend for an unqualified freedom of the will. I see nothing to which either party can make any material objection in the following statement.

Liberty supposes the agent to have understanding and will: for the determinations of the will are the sole object about which this power is employed; and there can be no will without, at least, such a degree of understanding as gives the conception of that which we will. The liberty of a moral agent implies, not only a conception of what he wills, but some degree of practical judgment, or reason.-For, if he has not the judgment to discern one determination to be preferable to another, either in itself, or for some purpose which he intends, what can be the use of a power to determine? His determinations must be made perfectly in the dark, without reason or motive, or end*."

* Reid's Essays.

This statement of Doctor Reid substantially accords with the views of President Edwards, the most acute and powerful reasoner on the opposite side of the question. "A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives exhibited to the view of the understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty.

"The brute creatures are not moral agents: the actions of some of them are very profitable and plea-. sant; others are very hurtful; yet seeing they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from choice, guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not sinful or virtuous. They may be noxious, but they cannot be criminal.

"The essential qualities of a moral agent, are in God in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding to perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to

his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy."

It is proper to remark, that those who contend, that there is a self-determining power in the will of man, admit that this power is entirely dependent on Him by whom it has been given: that it may at his pleasure, whose gift it is, be enlarged, or diminished, continued or withdrawn. No power in the creature can be independent of the Creator. "His hook is in its nose; he can give it line as far as he sees fit, and, when he pleases, can restrain it, or turn it whithersoever he will. Let this always be understood when we ascribe liberty to man, or to any created being. Supposing it, therefore, to be true that man is a free agent, it may be true, at the same, that his liberty may be impaired or lost by vicious habits: it may, in particular cases be restrained by divine interposition."

That we are moral agents and accountable for our conduct, is maintained by the parties on both sides of the question. And the following considerations adduced in proof of the moral agency of man, will, I apprehend, be admitted alike by the advocates of the doctrines of liberty and by the Necessarians.

Man, by his constitution, has a conviction that he acts freely; he is conscious of many voluntary exertions. His deliberating, whether to perform an action, or to refrain from it, implies a conviction that it is in his power. His promising or contracting to act at some future period agreeably to his engagement, shews that he himself believes it to be in his power to perform what he promises. He feels himself to be

blameworthy when he violates his word. But were he impelled by an irresistible necessity, why should he criminate himself. With as good reason might he blame himself for being a man, or for dying. Blame supposes a wrong use of power; and when a man does as well as it was possible to do, wherein is he to be blamed?

There are, besides, many proofs of the great selfcommand which it is possible for man to acquire. The Canadian savage can acquire the power of defying death in its most dreadful forms, and of braving the most exquisite torments. The martyr can look unappalled on the instruments of torture, and can say, None of these things move me." The existence of this magnanimity in any case is a proof of its possible existence in all.

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Further; that man is endowed with moral liberty, is proved by those principles that are proclaimed by every man's conscience: such as, that there is a real and essential distinction between right and wrong conduct, between just and unjust; that the most per fect moral rectitude is to be ascribed to the Deity; that man is a moral and accountable being, capable of acting right or wrong, and answerable for his conduct to him who made him, and who has assigned him a part to act on the stage of life. These are principles upon which the systems of morality and natural religion, as well as the system of revelation are grounded, and which have been generally acknowledged by those who hold contrary opinions on the subject of human liberty.

Another argument adduced to prove that man has