1

As to our moral sentiments concerning the conduct and character of our fellow creatures, Mr. Belsham is of opinion that the doctrine of necessity conciliates good will to men. 66 By teaching us to look up to God as the prime agent, and the proper cause of every thing that happens, and to regard men as nothing more than instruments which he employs for accomplishing his good pleasure, it tends to suppress all resentment, malice, and revenge; while it induces us to regard our worst enemies with compassion rather than with hatred, and to return good for evil."*

From these extracts it appears that Mr. Belsham is not only himself convinced of the truth of the doctrine of necessity, considered as a philosophical dogma, but that he conceives it would be for the advantage of the world, if all mankind were to become converts to his way of thinking. In this respect his system is certainly much more of a piece than that of Lord Kames, who, although he adopts zealously the doctrine of necessity, and represents the argument in support of it as demonstrative, yet candidly acknowledges that our natural feelings are adverse to that doctrine; and even goes so far as to say, that without such a feeling the business of society could not be carried on. In this dilemma he attempts to reconcile the two opinions, by the supposition of a deceitful sense of liberty. We are so formed as to believe that we are free agents, when in truth we are mere machines, acting only so far as we are acted upon. †

Perhaps no opinion on the subject of necessity was ever offered to the public which excited more general opposition than this hypothesis of a deceitful sense; and yet, if the argument for necessity be admitted, I do not see any other supposition which can possibly reconcile the conclusions of our reason, with the feelings of which every man is conscious. Not that I would insinuate any apology for a doctrine, the absurdity of which is not only obvious but ludicrous, inasmuch as it involves the supposition, that the Deity intended that his creatures should believe themselves to be free agents; and that, while the great mass of mankind were thus deceived to their own advantage, a few minds of a superior order had the metaphysical sagacity to detect the imposition. Nor is this all. If the doctrine of necessity be just, it must one day or another become the universal and popular creed of mankind, as every doctrine which is true, and more especially every doctrine which is supported by demonstrative evidence, may be expected to become in the progress of human reason. What will then become of the great concerns of human life? Will man, as he improves in knowledge, be unfitted for the ends of his being, and exhibit an inconsistency between his reasoning faculties and his active principles, contrary to the invariable analogy of that systematical and harmonious design which is every where else so conspicuous in the works of nature?

P. 316. "The doctrine of necessity," says Dr. Hartley, "has a tendency to abate all resentment against men. Since all they do against us is by the appointment of God, it is rebellion against him to be offended with them."

†The very same hypothesis is adopted by the Abbé, Galiani, as the only satisfactory solution of the difficulties connected with this subject. "Voudriez vous savoir," says he to one of his correspondents, Madame de l'Epinay, "mon avis sur cette question? La persuasion de la liberté constitue l'essence de l'homme. On pourroit même définir l'homme un animal qui se croit libre, et ce seroit une définition complète. Il est absolument impossible à l'homme d'oublier un seul instant, et de renoncer à la persuasion qu'il a d'être libre. Voilà donc un premier point: être persuadé d'être libre est-il la même chose qu'être libre en effet? Je reponds: ce n'est point la même chose, mais elle produit absolument les mêmes effets en morale. L'homme est donc libre, puisqu'il est intimément persuadé de l'être, et que cela vaut tout autant que la liberté. Voilà donc le mécanisme de l'univers expliqué clair comme de l'eau de roche! S'il y avoit un seul être libre dans l'univers, il n'y auroit plus de Dieu; il n'y auroit plus de liaisons entre les êtres. L'univers se détraqueroit; et si l'homme n'étoit pas essentiellement, intimément convaincu d'être libre, le moral humain n'iroit plus comme il va. La conviction de la liberté suffit pour établir une conscience, un remords, une justice, des récompenses, et des peines. Elle suffit à tout. Et voilà le monde expliqué en deux mots."Correspondance inédite de l'Abbé Galiani, T. I. pp. 339, 340. A Paris, 1818.

I record this as a precious specimen of the flippant metaphysics of a once fashionable Philosophe and Abbé in the Salons of Paris. See a lively and amusing portrait of him in Marmontel's Memoirs, Vol. II. pp. 121, 122, 123.

This argument is very ably and forcibly stated in a small pamphlet on Liberty and Necessity, by the late learned and ingenious Mr. Dawson of Sedbergh.

Lord Kames, who was a most sincere inquirer after truth, abandoned in the last edition of his Essays on Morality and Natural Religion, the doctrine of a deceitful sense of liberty; and in so doing gave a rare example of candor and fairness as a reasoner. But I am very doubtful if the alterations which he made in his scheme did not impair the merits which, in its original concoction, it possessed in point of consistency. The first edition of this work appeared when the author was in the full vigor of his faculties. The last when he was approaching to fourscore.

SECTION VI.

Is the Evidence of Consciousness in favor of the Scheme of Free Will, or of that of Necessity?

IN what I have hitherto said upon the subject, I have proceeded on the supposition, that the doctrine of free will is consistent with the common feelings and be

* It has been lately said by a very ingenious and acute writer, that "in the controversy concerning liberty and necessity, the only question at issue between the disputants related to a matter of fact, on which they both appealed to the evidence of consciousness; namely, whether, all previous circumstances being the same, the choice of man be not also at all times the same."-Edinburgh Review, Vol. XXVII. p. 228.

If the author of this observation had contented himself with saying that this question concerning the matter of fact, as ascertained by the evidence of consciousness, ought to have been considered as the only point at issue between the contending parties, I should most readily have subscribed to his proposition. Indeed, I have expressed myself very nearly to the same purpose in a former work.-(Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. II. pp. 74, 75. 3d edit.) But if it is to be understood as a historical statement of the manner in which the controversy has always or even most frequently been carried on, must beg leave to dissent from it very widely. How many arguments against the freedom of the will have been in all ages drawn from the prescience of the Deity! How many still continue to be drawn by very eminent divines from the doctrines of predestination and of eternal decrees! Has not Mr. Locke himself acknowledged the impression which the former of these considerations made on his mind! "I own," says he, " freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, and though I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing than that I am free, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truth I most firmly assent to; and therefore I have long since given off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion, that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it."

A still more recent exception to the general assertion, which has given occasion to this note, occurs in Lord Kames's hypothesis of a deceitful sense of liberty, as maintained in the first edition of his Essays on Morality and Natural Religion. Here, upon the faith of some subtile metaphysical reasonings, the very ingenious author adopts the scheme of necessity in direct opposition to the evidence which he candidly confesses that consciousness affords of our free agency. Even the latest advocates for necessity, Priestley and Belsham, as well as their predecessor, Collins himself, while they appealed (in the very words of the learned critic) to the evidence of consciousness in proof of the fact, that all previous circumstances being the same, the choice of man is also at all times the same, yet thought it worth their while to strengthen this conclusion by calling to their aid the theological doctrines already mentioned. I cannot, therefore, see with what color of plausibility it can be said that "this matter of fact has been the only question at issue between the disputants."

It may, however be regarded as one great step gained in this controversy, if it may henceforth be assumed as a principle agreed on by both parties, that this is the only question which can be philosophically stated on the subject, and that all arguments drawn from the attributes of the Deity are entirely foreign to the discussion. I shall accordingly devote this section to an examination of the fact, agreeably to the representation of it given by our modern Necessitarians.

lief of mankind. That "all our actions do now, in experience, seem to us to be free, exactly in the same manner as they would do upon the supposition of our being really free agents," is remarked by Clarke in his reply to Collins: And consequently," he adds, "though this alone does not amount to a strict demonstration of our being free, yet it leaves on the other side of the question nothing but a bare possibility of our being so framed by the Author of Nature, as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter by every experience and every action we perform. The case is exactly the same," continues Dr. Clarke, "as in that notable question, whether the world exists or no. There is no demonstration of it from experience. There always remains a bare possibility, that the Supreme Being may have so framed my mind, as that I shall always necessarily be deceived in every one of my perceptions, as in a dream, though possibly there be no material world, nor any other creature whatsoever, existing, besides myself. Of this I say there always remains a bare possibility, and yet no man in his senses argues from thence, that experience is no proof to us of the existence of things." In further confirmation of this remark of Clarke's, let us attend to the inconsistency of the scheme of necessity, with the feelings of which we are conscious, while under the influence of remorse. The argument arising from this consideration is very forcibly stated by Cicero. "Si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causâ antecedente; et, si appetitus, illa etiam que appetitum sequuntur: ergo etiam assensiones. At si causa appetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse quidem appetitus est in nostrâ potestate. Quod si ita est, ne illa quidem quæ appetitu efficiuntur sunt sita in nobis. Non sunt igitur neque assensiones neque actiones in nostrâ potestate: ex quo efficitur, ut nec laudationes justæ sint, nec vituperationes, nec honores, nec supplicia. Quod cum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi putant, non omnia fato fieri quæcunque fiant."

If the scheme of necessity had never received another answer, this alone would have been a sufficient one, admitting only the propriety of introducing into the other sciences the same kind of indirect demonstration which is employed in mathematics. In this case our reasonings on the supposition of necessity lead to a conclusion directly contrary to the most irresistible of all evidence, that of our own consciousness.

But this appeal to consciousness in proof of free agency proceeds altogether (according to some late writers) on a partial and superficial view of the subject; the evidence of consciousness, when all circumstances are taken into the account and duly weighed, being decidedly in favor of the scheme of necessity.

*De Fato, cap. 17.

The above quotation leads me to take notice of what I considers a very remarkable and important distinction between the reasonings of the ancient and of the modern Necessitarians. Among the latter the argument commonly begins with a scholastic discussion concerning the motives of our actions, and the influence of these motives in determining the will; an influence which they assert to be precisely the same with that of any other cause in producing its effect. And it is from these premises that the inference is drawn in favor either of the scheme of necessity or of that of fatalism, according to the theological views of their respective abettors. By the ancient Necessitarians, on the other hand, the scheme of fatalism, which was closely interwoven with the whole texture of Pagan mythology, was assumed as a first principle; and it was from this principle they deduced their proof that man must be a necessary agent. Their process of reasoning, therefore, was precisely the reverse of that of the moderns, the former employing fatalism to prove the necessary influence of motives,-(" Ne Appollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset.") (De Fato, cap. 14.)-and the latter urging the necessary influence of motives in proof of fatalism. Accordingly, in the passage just quoted from Cicero, the consequences which the scheme of fatalism involves, and the repugnance of these consequences to the universal sentiments of mankind, are represented as a demonstration, in the form of a reductio ad absurdum, that this scheme cannot be true. This clear perception, however, of the inconsistency of fatalism with man's accountableness or moral agency, there is good reason to believe, was confined to a very few enlightened inquirers, while fatalism continued to be the professed creed of the priesthood, and the real creed of the multitude. Cicero tells us expressly, that in his time it was an article of faith among all the old women in Rome, "Aniculis fato fieri omnia videntur." (De Nat. Deor. ii, 15.) The remark, I am inclined to suspect, is equally applicable to the old women (male and female) of modern Europe.

Dr. Hartley was, I believe, one of the first (if not the first) who denied that our consciousness is in favor of our free agency. "It is true," he observes, "that a man by internal feeling may prove his own free will, if by free will be meant the power of doing what a man wills or desires; or of resisting the motives of sensuality, ambition, &c., that is, free will in the popular and practical sense. Every person may easily recollect instances where he has done these several things, but these are entirely foreign to the present question. To prove that a man has free will in the sense opposite to mechanism, he ought to feel that he can do different things while the motives remain precisely the same. And here, I apprehend, the internal feelings are entirely against free will, where the motives are of a sufficient magnitude to be evident where they are not, nothing can be proved." * "When men," says

Mr. Belsham has enlarged still more fully on this subject. he, "who have been guilty of a crime, review the action in calmer moments, when the strength of passion has subsided, and the contrary motives appear in all their force, and perhaps magnified by the evil consequences of their vice and folly, they are ready to think, that they might at the time have thought and acted as they now think and act: but this is a fallacious feeling, and arises from their not placing themselves in circumstances exactly similar." We are elsewhere told by Mr. Belsham, that the popular opinion, that in many cases it was in the power of the agent to have chosen differently, the previous circumstances remaining exactly the same, arises either from a mistake of the question, from a forgetfulness of the motives by which our choice was determined, or from the extreme difficulty of placing ourselves in imagination in circumstances exactly similar to those in which the election was made." And still more explicitly and concisely in the following aphorism: "The pretended consciousness of free will amounts to nothing more than forgetfulness of the motive." To the same purpose Dr. Priestley has expressed himself. "A man when he reproaches himself for any particular action in his past conduct, may fancy that, if he was in the same situation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere deception, and if he examines himself strictly, and takes in all circumstances, he may be satisfied that, with the same inward disposition of mind, and with precisely the same views of things that he had then, and exclusive of all others that he has acquired by reflection since, he could not have acted otherwise than he did." ||

If these statements be accurately examined, they will be found to resolve entirely into this identical proposition, that the will of the criminal, being supposed to remain in the same state as when the crime was committed, he could not have willed and acted otherwise. This proposition, it is obvious, does not at all touch the cardinal point in question, which is simply this; whether, all OTHER circumstances remaining the same, the criminal had it not in his power to abstain from willing the commission of the crime. The vagueness of Priestley's language upon this occasion must not be overlooked; the words inward disposition of mind admitting of a variety of different meanings, and in this instance being plainly intended to include the act of the will as well as every thing else connected with the criminal action. In the above strictures on these two redoubtable logicians, I have been partly anticipated by the following very acute remarks of Dr. Magee on the definitions of volition and of philosophical liberty, prefixed to Mr. Belsham's discussion of the doctrines now under our consideration.

"Volition," says Mr. Belsham," is that state of mind which is immediately previous to actions which are called voluntary." "Natural liberty, or, as it is more properly called, philosophical liberty, or liberty of choice, is the power of doing an action or its contrary, all the previous circumstances remaining the same."-" Now here," says Dr. Magee, "is the point of free will at once decided; for volition itself

† Elements, p. 279.

* Observations on Man, Vol. I. p. 507. Ibid. p 306. § Ibid. p. 278. Illustrations of Philosophical Necessity, p. 99. The very same view of the subject has been lately taken by the Comte de la Place in his Essai Philosophique sur les Probabilités. "L'axiome counu sous le

nom de principe de la raison suffisante s'étend aux actions inême que l'on juge indifférentes. La volonté la plus libre ne peut sans un motif déterminant leur donner naissance, &c.-l'opinion contraire est une illusion de l'esprit qui perdant de vue les raisons fugitives du choix de la volonté dans les choses indifférentes, se persuade qu'elle s'est déterminée d'elle-même et sans motifs."-Essai. Phil. &c. p. 5.

being included among the previous circumstances, it is a manifest contradiction to suppose the power of doing an action or its contrary, all the previous circumstances remaining the same;' since that supposes the power to act voluntarily against a volition." After this Dr. Magee justly and pertinently adds, " Mr. Belshan. might surely have spared himself the trouble of the ninety-two pages which follow."

But why have recourse with Belsham and Priestley, in this argument, to the indistinct and imperfect recollection of the criminal, at a subsequent period, with respect to the state of his feelings while he was perpetrating the crime? Why not make a direct appeal to his consciousness at the very moment when he was doing the deed? Will any person of candor deny, that, in the very act of transgressing an acknowledged duty, he is impressed with a conviction, as complete as that of his own existence, that his will is free; and that he is abusing, contrary to the suggestions of reason and conscience, his moral liberty?

Sometimes, indeed, when we are under the influence of a violent appetite or passion, our judgment is apt to see things in a false light; and hence a wise man learns to distrust his own opinion when he is thus circumstanced; and to act, not according to his present judgment, but according to those general maxims of propriety, of which his reason had previously approved in his cooler hours. All this, however, evidently proceeds on the supposition of his free agency; and, so far from implying any belief on his part of fatalism or of moral necessity, evinces in a manner peculiarly striking and satisfactory, the power which he feels himself to possess, not only over the present, but over the future determinations of his will. In some other instances it happens, that I believe bona fide an action to be right, at the moment I perform it, and afterwards discover that I judged improperly;-perhaps from want of sufficient information, or from a careless and partial view of the subject. In such a case I may undoubtedly regret as a misfortune what has happened. I may blame myself for my carelessness in not having acquired the proper information before I acted; but I cannot consider myself as criminal in acting at that moment according to the views which I then entertained. On the contrary, if I had acted in opposition to these views, although my conduct might have been agreeable to the dictates of a more enlightened understanding than my own, yet with respect to myself the action would have been wrong.

If the doctrine of necessity were just, what possible foundation could there be for the distinction we always make between an accidental hurt and an intended injury, when received from another; or for the different sentiments of regret and of remorse that we experience, according as the misfortunes we suffer are the consequences of our own misconduct or not. What an alleviation of our sufferings when we are satisfied that we cannot consider ourselves as the authors of them; and what a cruel aggravation of our miseries, when we can trace them to something in which we have been obviously to blame!

I shall only add further on this head, (and it is a consideration which deserves the serious attention of all those who are inclined to the scheme of necessity, from an idea that it overturns the doctrine of a future retribution,) that the connexion between the premises and the conclusion in this hypothesis is far from being so indisputable as they may imagine. On a superficial view of the subject, indeed, it may appear that the Deity cannot, in consistence with his justice, punish us for what it was not in our power to prevent. But it must be remembered, that the same necessity which destroys moral evil on the part of man, subverts all the received notions concerning the moral attributes of God; and makes it quite nugatory to speak of what is to be expected either from his justice or goodness. This argument is stated with great force and ability in one of the chapters of Butler's Analogy; and although it was originally proposed with a very different view by that profound and excellent writer, I once heard it urged from the pulpit (with the authority of Bishop Butler's name) as a defence of the doctrines of predestination and absolute decrees. I have no where, however, seen it proposed in a form so bold as in a historical article of the Edinburgh Encyclopædia, from which I shall quote a few sentences in the author's own words. "While the king" (James the Second of Great Britain) " was involved in the deepest distress, in consequence of the desertion of his army, and the success of the Prince of Orange, he was doomed to suffer from the conduct of his daughter, the Princess Anne, (married to Prince George of Denmark,) a species of distress still more severe If Heaven, in this world,

ever interposes its avenging arm between guilt and happiness, may we not consider the loss of seventeen children as the penalty which it exacted from the mother, who had broken the heart of the most indulgent father; and, as if this exaction had