In some instances pleasure is used in the same sense with will, as in this sentence of Locke. "We can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies; and in the following line of Pope will is used for pleasure.

"Go then, the guilty at thy will chastise."

It is very remarkable that the two words are used as synonymous by Collins, in stating the very proposition which it is the object of his tract to establish. "I contend for liberty," says he, "as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills or pleases."

Dr. Johnson on this, as on every other occasion where logical precision of ideas is called for in a definition, is strangely indistinct and inconsistent. Will he defines

to be "that power by which we desire a purpose; " and he gives as its synonyme the scholastic word velleity. On turning to the article velleity, we are told that "it is the school term used to signify the lowest degree of desire;" in illustration of which Dr. South is quoted, according to whom the wishing of a thing is not properly the willing it, but it is that which is called by the schools an imperfect velleity, and imports no more than an idle inoperative complacency in, and desire of the end, without any consideration of the means."

Dr. Priestley's language on this subject is as loose as that of Dr. Johnson. "What is desire but a wish to obtain some apprehended good? And is not every wish a volition?"

In the next page he tells us, that "the determinations of what we call the will are in fact nothing more than a particular case of the general doctrine of association of ideas, and, therefore, a perfectly mechanical thing."

In another paragraph of the chapter quoted above, Locke justly objects to the terms in which the question concerning liberty and necessity is commonly stated, whether man's will be free or no? This question he pronounces to be "unreasonable and unintelligible; inasmuch as liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or mcdification of the will, which is also but a power." t

To this remark of Locke it may be added, that, instead of speaking (according to common phraseology) of the influence of motives on the will, it would be much more correct to speak of the influence of motives on the agent. We are apt to forget what the will is, and to consider it as something inanimate and passive, the state of which can be altered only by the action of some external cause. The habitual use of the metaphorical word motives, to denote the intentions or purposes which accompany our voluntary actions, or, in other words, the ends which we have in view in the exercise of the power intrusted to us, has a strong tendency to confirm us in this error, by leading us to assimilate in fancy the volition of a mind to the motion of a body; and the circumstances which give rise to this volition, to the vis motrix by which the motion is produced.

It was probably in order to facilitate the reception of his favorite scheme of necessity that Hobbes was led to substitute, instead of the old division of our faculties into the powers of the understanding and those of the will, a new division of his own, in which the name of cognitive powers was given to the former, and that of motive powers to the latter. To familiarize the ears of superficial readers to this phraseology was of itself one great step towards securing their suffrages against the supposition of man's free agency. To say that the will is determined by motive powers, is to employ a language which virtually implies a recognition of the very point in dispute. Accordingly, Mr. Belsham is at pains to keep the metaphorical origin of the word motive in the view of his readers, by prefixing to his argument, in favor of the scheme of necessity, the following definition.

"Motive, in this discussion, is to be understood in its most extensive sense. It expresses whatever MOVES or influences the mind in its choice." ‡

According to Mr. Locke, the ideas of liberty and of power are very nearly the same. "Every one," he observes, "finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity." And a few sentences afterwards: The idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, where

* Illustrations on Phil. Necess. p. 45.

†This remark had been previously made by Hobbes. + Elem. 228.

by either of them is preferred to the other. Where either of them is not in the power of the agent, to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty but under necessity.' That these definitions are not perfectly correct will appear hereafter. They approach, indeed, very nearly to the definitions of liberty and necessity given by Hobbes, Collins, and Edwards; whereas Locke, in order to do justice to his own decided opinion on the subject, ought to have included also in his idea of liberty, a power over the determinations of his will.

It is owing in a great measure to this close connexion between the ideas of free will and of power, and to the pleasure with which the consciousness of power is always accompanied, that we feel so painful a mortification in perusing those systems in which our free agency is called in question. Dr. Priestley himself, as well as his great oracle, Dr. Hartley, has acknowledged, that "he was not a ready convert to the doctrine of necessity, and that he gave up his liberty with great reluctance."t But whence this reluctance to embrace a doctrine so "great and glorious," but from its repugnance to the natural feelings and natural wishes of the human mind?

In addition to the foregoing considerations, the following detached hints may be of use in guarding us against some logical oversights which have misled a large proportion of the ingenious men who have engaged in this controversy.

In the case of inanimate matter, when I say that the motion produced is proportional to the impressed force, I only assert an identical proposition; for my only notion of the quantity of a force is from the effects it produces. In like manner, in the case of motives, I may, if I choose, define the strength of a motive by its prevailing over other motives in determining the will, and then lay it down as a proposition, that the will is determined by the strongest motive. In this case likewise it is evident that I only assert an identical proposition,—a proposition, however, extremely apt to mislead, in consequence of its applying to mind the word strength, which, from its ordinary and proper application to the forces that move inert matter, suggests a theory concerning the influence of motives which takes for granted the thing to be proved.

Let us consider what is meant, when it is said that the will is necessarily determined by motives. Is it to be understood that the connexion is similar to that between a force impressed on a body and the subsequent motion? But of the nature of this connexion I am as ignorant as of the other. In both cases I only see the fact. It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have attempted to explain the actions of voluntary agents by the phenomena of motion, and that some other metaphysicians (in particular Kepler and Lord Monboddo) have attempted to explain the phenomena of motion by the operations of voluntary agents. In both cases philosophers saw the difficulties attending that set of phenomena to which they confined their attention, and endeavoured to explain them by the analogy of another class of facts not so immediately under their consideration at the moment, without recollecting that both the one and the other are equally placed beyond our comprehension.

Although, however, the connexion between an impressed force and the subsequent motion be as inexplicable as the connexion between the motive and the subsequent action, I would not be understood to insinuate that the two cases are at all parallel. In the case of motion, although I cannot trace the necessary connexion between it and the impressed force, I am certain that the motion is the effect of some cause with which it is necessarily connected; for every change that takes place in an inanimate object suggests to me the notion of a cause. But in the case of the determinations of a voluntary agent, he is himself the author of them; nor could any thing have led philosophers to look out for any other causes of them, but an apprehended analogy between volition in a mind and motion in a body. The argument for necessity derives all its force from the inaxim, "that every change requires a cause." But this maxim, although true with respect to inani

* Locke's Works, 8vo. Edit. Vol. I. 224.

† Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity illustrated. Preface, page xxvii. Biriningham, 1732.

This maxim is generally stated in too unqualified a form. "In the idea of every change," says Dr. Price, "is included that of its being an effect."—(Review, &c. p. 30. 3d. edit. Lond. 1827.) He should have said every change in inanimate matter. That he himself understood it under this limitation is evident, from the zeal with which he always combats the scheme of necessity.

mate matter, does not apply to intelligent agents, which cannot be conceived without the power of self-determination. Upon an accurate analysis, indeed, of the meaning of words, it will be found that the idea of an efficient cause implies the idea of mind, and consequently, that it is absurd to ascribe the volitions of mind to the efficiency of causes foreign to itself. It is curious that Mr. Hume, who has in one part of his system denied the certainty of the maxim just now mentioned, has, in another part of it, adopted the scheme of necessity, although that scheme derives all its plausibility from an undue and unwarrantable extension of this very maxim.

Before quitting this part of the subject, there remains to be considered another argument for the necessary connexion between motives and actions, which has been lately proposed by Dr. Priestley, and on which that very ingenious writer seems to lay considerable stress.

This argument proceeds on the supposition that man is wholly a material being, and that the power of thinking is the result of a certain organization of the brain. But, if man be wholly material, does it not follow that all his functions must be regulated by the laws of mechanism, and that, of consequence, all his actions proceed from an irresistible necessity? According to this argument, therefore, the doctrine of necessity is an obvious corollary from that of materialism.

As this reasoning takes the scheme of materialism for granted, it is they alone who have adopted that scheme who are interested in examining whether the reasoning be conclusive or not. The only question, therefore, before us at present is, whether the author's conclusion be a logical consequence of his premises. That it

From these observations it seems to me to follow, that, whatever may be the nature of the relation between a motive and an action, there is no reason for concluding it to be at all analogous to that between a cause and its effect. In further proof of this some authors have remarked, that the latter connexion is always constant and uniform, whereas we know that the same motive may at different times lead to very different actions.-See the very ingenious Essays, Philosophical and Literary, of the late learned and excellent Dr. James Gregory.)-But this answer is not satisfactory; and as it places the point in dispute on an improper ground, it may be useful to show in what its fallacy consists. By giving up an argument which will not bear examination we strengthen a good cause, no less than by producing additional evidence in its support.

In considering the connexion between cause and effect, there are three things to be attended to; the cause, the subject on which it operates, and the effect. While the cause and the subject continue the same, we expect the same effect with the utmost confidence; but if either the cause or the subject vary we expect that the effect will be different. When we speak of the constant conjunction between cause and effect in physics, we always take for granted that the cause operates in the same circumstances. A variety of cases might be mentioned in which we see the operation of the same cause, but are unable to predict with certainty what the effect will be, in consequence of our ignorance concerning the state of the subject. This is the case with respect to the medicines which we apply to the human body. Now, the fact may be supposed to be somewhat analogous with respect to the mind. It always indeed retains a consciousness of its personal identity; but notwithstanding this circumstance it is constantly undergoing very important alterations,--insomuch that the character may be changed in a considerable degree by the acquisition of new information, or the acquisition of new habits, (both of which it may derive from external circumstances in a way altogether independent of its choice.) Indeed it may be doubted whether the mind can be considered as exactly the same subject in any two instants of its existence. We are not therefore entitled to conclude that the relation between motive and action is different from the relation between cause and effect in physics, merely from the want of constant conjunction, unless it could be shown that the same motive was followed by different actions when operating upon the same precise subject. Nor is this all. The same verbal proposition, when stated at different times to the same individual, cannot be considered as the same motive, unless it is always apprehended in the same light by the understanding, the conclusions of which plainly do not depend on our choice. Allowing, therefore, that the relation between motive and action were the same with the relation between cause and effect, it might happen that no constant conjunction between them should be observable, in consequence either of some alteration in the state of the intellectual powers, or of the active principles.

is not a consequence of his premises, but a mere play on words, will appear obvious from the following consideration.

That matter is incapable of acting, excepting in so far as it is acted upon, is a principle universally admitted by the soundest philosophers, and perfectly agreeable to the common apprehensions of mankind. But this principle is founded on the supposition, that matter is inert and insentient, incapable of thought, or of changing its state either of rest or of motion till it is acted on by some foreign power. If we reject this supposition, as Dr. Priestley has done, and consider matter as consisting of certain powers of attraction and repulsion, and requiring nothing but a particular arrangement or organization to exhibit the phenomena of sensation and of thought, we are certainly not entitled to apply any inference from our common notions concerning matter to the functions of a being, organized as Dr. Priesley supposes man to be. If our ideas of matter imply nothing more than certain powers of attraction and repulsion, and if matter properly organized may produce a being capable of sensation and of thought, why may not the same organization produce a being capable of acting from his own free will, and without the necessary influence of any motive imposed on him from without? In this instance, therefore, Dr. Priestley's zeal for a favorite opinion has betrayed him into a sophism very unworthy of his abilities, and which derives the very slight plausibility it possesses entirely from an ambiguity in the meaning of the word matter, occasioned by his own peculiar speculations on its nature and properties.

It is amusing enough that this very argument of Dr. Priestley's, or at least one extremely similar to it, was long ago proposed ironically by Dr. Berkeley, in his ingenious dialogues, entitled the Minute Philosopher,-a book which, (notwithstanding a few paradoxical passages connected with the author's system of idealism) may be safely recommended as one of the most instructive, as well as entertaining works, of which English philosophy has to boast. "Corporeal objects strike on the organs of sense, whence ensues a vibration in the nerves, which being communicated to the soul or animal spirit in the brain or root of the nerves, produceth therein that motion called volition; and this produceth a new determination on the spirits, causing them to flow in such nerves as must necessarily, by the laws of mechanism, produce such certain actions. This being the case, it follows that those things which vulgarly pass for human actions are to be esteemed mechanical, and that they are falsely ascribed to a free principle. There is therefore no founda tion for praise or blame, fear or hope, reward or punishment, nor consequently for religion, which is built upon and supposeth those things." The alteration which Dr. Priestley has made on this argument is certainly far from an improvement; for his peculiar notions concerning the nature of matter render it much more inconsequential than it must appear to those who retain the common opinions on that subject.

SECTION II.

Statement of the common Argument for Necessity.

BEFORE proceeding to an examination of this question I shall premise a few principles in which both parties are agreed, or which at least appear to me to be concessions, which the advocates for free will may safely make to their antagonists without any injury to their general argument.

1. Every action is performed with some view, or, in other words, is performed from some motive. Dr. Reid indeed denies this with zeal, but I am doubtful if he has strengthened his cause by doing so; † for he confesses that the actions which are performed without motives are perfectly trifling and insignificant, and not such as lead to any general conclusion concerning the merit or demerit of moral agents. I should therefore rather be disposed to yield this point than to dispute a proposition not materially connected with the question at issue. One thing is clear and indisputable, that it is only in so far as a man acts from motives or intentions, that he is entitled to the character of a rational being.

2. The merit of an action depends entirely on the motive from which it was performed. Dr. Reid remarks, that some necessitarians have triumphed in this

principle as the very hinge of the controversy, whereas the truth is, that no reasonable advocate for free will ever called it in question.

So far, I think, we are justified in going. The great question is, How do these motives determine the will? In answer to this question the Necessitarians reason as follows:

Every change in nature, we are told, implies the operation of a cause; and this maxim, it is pretended, holds not only with respect to inanimate matter, but with respect to the changes which take place in the state of a mind. Every volition, therefore, must have been produced by a motive with which it is as necessarily connected as any other effect with its cause; and when different motives are presented to the mind at the same time, the will yields to the strongest, as necessarily as a body urged by two contrary forces moves in the direction of that which is most powerful.

The foregoing argument goes to prove, that all human actions are as necessarily produced by motives as the going of a clock is necessarily produced by the weights, and that no human action could have been otherwise than it really was. Nay, it applies also in full force to the Deity, and indeed to all intelligent beings whatever; for it is not founded on any thing peculiar to the human mind, but on the impossi bility of free agency; and, of consequence, it leads to this general conclusion, that no event in the universe could have happened otherwise than it did.

When the scheme of necessity is pushed to this length, it involves the supposition, "that every created being, and every event, even the most trifling, has an existence as necessary as that of the Deity; a supposition which forms one of the fundamental principles of the system of Spinoza. On this subject, I confess, it appears to me that Spinoza reasons well, and that, if we admit his principles, we cannot deny his conclusion. The conclusion, at the same time, is such as every unprejudiced understanding must revolt at the instant it is mentioned, and which may serve as a demonstration, in the form of a reductio ad absurdum, of the erroneousness of the principle from which it is deduced. "It does not indeed appear possible," as Mr. Maclaurin has observed, "to invent another system equally absurd, amounting (as it does in fact) to this proposition, that there is but one substance in the universe endowed with infinite attributes (particularly infinite extension and cogitation) which produces all other things, necessarily as its own modifications, and which alone is, in all events, both physical and moral, at once cause and effect, agent and patient." Accordingly, Dr. Clarke has been at much pains to prove, that the Deity must be a free agent, and, therefore, that free agency is not impossible; from which he infers, that there must be some flaw in the reasonings just stated to prove that man is a necessary agent. If this reasoning of Clarke's be admitted as conclusive, where is the absurdity (I would ask) of supposing, that God may have been pleased to place man in a state of moral discipline, by imparting to him a freedom of choice between good and evil, in like manner as he has imparted to him various other faculties and powers essentially different from any thing we observe in the lower animals? Is not the contrary assertion a presumptuous attempt to set limits to the Divine Omnipotence?

Among the various forms which religious enthusiasm assumes, there is a certain prostration of the mind, which, under the specious disguise of a deep humility, aims at exalting the Divine perfections by annihilating all the powers which belong to human nature. Nothing is more usual for fervent devotion," says Sir James Mackintosh, in speaking of some theories current among the Hindoos, "than to dwell so long and so w mly on the meanness and worthlessness of created things, and on the all-sufficiency of the Supreme Being, that it slides insensibly from comparative to absolute language, and in the eagerness of its zeal to magnify the Deity, seems to annihilate every thing else." †

This excellent observation may serve to account for the zeal displayed by many devout men in favor of the scheme of necessity. "We have nothing," they frequently and justly remind us, "but what we have received." But the question here is simply a matter of fact, whether we have or have not received from God the gift of free will; and the only argument, it must be remembered, which they have yet been able to advance for the negative proposition, is, that this gift was impossible even for the power of God; an argument, we may remark, which not only annihilates the power of man, but annihilates that of God also, and subjects him, as