-during the Peloponnesian war, and for many ages after its conclusion,-all the different republics of Greece were at home almost always distracted by the most furious factions, and abroad involved in the most sanguinary wars, in which each sought not merely superiority or dominion, but either completely to extirpate all its enemies, or, what was not less cruel, to reduce them into the vilest of all states-that of domestic slavery. The smallness of the greater part of those states, too, rendered it to each of them no very improbable event, that it might itself fall into that very calamity which it had so frequently inflicted or attempted to inflict on its neighbours. In this disorderly state of things the most perfect innocence, joined to the highest rank and the greatest services to the public, could give no security to any man, that even at home and among his fellow citizens, he was not, at some time or other, from the prevalence of some hostile and furious faction, to be condemned to the most cruel and ignominious punishment. If he was taken prisoner of war, or if the city of which he was a member was conquered, he was exposed, if possible, to still greater injuries. As an American savage, therefore, prepares his death song, and considers how he should act when he has fallen into the hands of his enemies, and is by them put to death in the most lingering tortures, and amidst the insults and derisions of all the spectators, so a Grecian patriot or hero could. not avoid frequently employing his thoughts in considering what he ought both to suffer and to do in banishment, in captivity, when reduced to slavery, when put to the torture, when brought to the scaffold. It was the business of their philosophers to prepare the death song which the Grecian patriots and heroes might make use of on the proper occasions; and of all the different sects it must, I think, be acknowledged, that the Stoics had prepared by far the most animated and spirited song." * After all, it is impossible to deny that there is some foundation for a censure which Lord Bacon has some VOL. V. * Moral Sentiments, Vol. II. p. 236. "Certainly," where passed on this celebrated sect. says he," the Stoics bestowed too much cost on death, and by their preparations made it more fearful." At least, I suspect this may be the tendency of some passages in their writings, in such a state of society as that in which we live; but in perusing them we ought always to remember the circumstances of those men to whom they were addressed, and which are so eloquently described in the observations just quoted from Mr. Smith. The practical reflection which Bacon adds to this censure is invaluable, and is strictly conformable to the spirit of the Stoical system, although he seems to state it by way of contrast to their principles. "It is as natural," says he, "to die as to be born; and to a little infant perhaps the one is as painful as the other. HE THAT DIES IN AN EARNEST PURSUIT IS LIKE ONE THAT IS WOUNDED IN HOT BLOOD, WHO FOR A TIME SCARCE FEELS THE HURT; AND THEREFORE A MIND FIXED AND BENT UPON SOMEWHAT THAT IS GOOD DOTH BEST AVERT THE DOLORS OF DEATH." Upon the whole, notwithstanding the imperfections of this system, and the paradoxes which disgrace it in some accounts of it that have descended to our times, it cannot be disputed, that its leading doctrines are agreeable to the purest principles of morality and religion. Indeed, they all terminate in one maxim: That we should not make the attainment of things external an ultimate object, but place the business of life in doing our duty, and leave the care of our happiness to him who made Nor does the whole merit of these doctrines consist in their purity. It is doing them no more than justice to say, that they were more completely systematical in all their parts, and more ingeniously, as well as eloquently, supported, than any thing else that remains of ancient philosophy. us. I must not conclude these observations on the Stoical system, without taking notice of the practical effects it produced on the characters of many of its professors. It was the precepts of this school which rendered the supreme power in the hands of Marcus Aurelius a blessing to the human race; and which secured the private happiness, and elevated the minds of Helvidius and Thrasea under a tyranny by which their country was oppressed. Nor must it be forgotten, that in the last struggles of Roman liberty, while the school of Epicurus produced Cæsar, that of Zeno produced Cato and Brutus. The one sacrificed mankind to himself; the others sacrificed themselves to mankind. -"Hi mores, hæc duri immota Catonis The sentiment of President Montesquieu on this subject is well known. "Never," says he, "were any principles more worthy of human nature, and more proper to form the good citizen, than those of the Stoics; and if I could for a moment cease to recollect that I am a Christian, I should not be able to hinder myself from ranking the destruction of the sect of Zeno among the misfortunes that have befallen the human race."† III The doctrine of the Peripatetics on this subject appears to have coincided with that of the Pythagorean school, who defined happiness to be "the exercise of virtue in a prosperous life;” (χρῆσις ἀρετῆς ἐν εὐτυχία) ; a definition like several others transmitted to us from the same source, which unites in a remarkable degree the merits of conciseness and of philosophical precision. In confirmation of this doctrine, the Pythagorean school observed, that it was not the mere possession but the exercise of virtue that made men happy. And for the proper exercise of virtue, they thought that good Lucan. Phars. Lib. ii. 1. 380. "Les diverses sectes de philosophie chez les anciens étoient des espéces de religion. Il n'y en a jamais eu dont les principes fussent plus dignes de l'homme et plus propre à former des gens de bien, que celle des Stoïciens; et si je pouvois un moment cesser de penser que je suis Chrétien, je ne pourrois m'empêcher de mettre la destruction de la secte de Zénon au nombre des malheurs du genre humain." -Esprit des Loix, Liv. xxiv. chap. 10. See the Fragments of this School, published in Gale's Opuscula Mythologica, Physica, et Ethica. Amstel. 1688. fortune was as necessary as light is for the exercise of the faculty of sight. The utmost length, accordingly, which they went was to say, that the virtuous man in adversity was not miserable; whereas the vicious and foolish were miserable in all situations of fortune. In another passage they say, that the difference between God and man is, that God is perfect in himself, and needs nothing from without; whereas the nature of man is imperfect and defective, and dependent on external circumstances. Although, therefore, we possess virtue, that is but the perfection of one part, namely, the mind; but as we consist both of body and mind, the body also must be perfect of its kind. Nor is that alone sufficient; but the prosperous exercise of virtue requires certain externals; such as wealth, reputation, friends, and, above all, a well constituted state; for without that the rational and social animal is imperfect, and unable to fulfil the purposes of its nature. The difference between the Peripatetics and Stoics in these opinions is beautifully stated by Cicero, in a passage strongly expressive of the elevation of his own character, as well as highly honorable to the two sects, whose doctrines, while he contrasts them with each other, he plainly considered as both originating in the same pure and ardent zeal for the interests of morality. Pugnant Stoici cum Peripateticis; alteri negant quidquam bonum esse nisi quod honestum sit; alteri longe longeque plurimum se attribuere honestati; sed tamen et in corpore et extra esse quædam bona. Certamen honestum, et disputatio splendida." 66 On a general review of the preceding articles in this section, it appears (to use the words of Dr. Ferguson) that all these sects acknowledged the necessity of virtue, or allowed, that, in every well directed pursuit of happiness, the strictest regard to morality was required. The Stoics alone maintained that this regard itself was happiness; or that to run the course of an active, strenuous, wise, and beneficent mind, was itself the very good which we ought to pursue. SECTION III. Additional Remarks on Happiness. FROM the slight view now given of the systems of philosophers with respect to the Sovereign Good, it may be assumed as an acknowledged and indisputable fact, that happiness arises chiefly from the mind. The Stoics undoubtedly expressed this too strongly when they said, that to a wise man external circumstances are indifferYet it must be confessed, that happiness depends much less on these than is commonly imagined; and that, as there is no situation so prosperous as to exclude the torments of malice, cowardice, and remorse, so there is none so adverse as to withhold the enjoyments of a benevolent, resolute, and upright heart. If, from the sublime idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, we descend to such characters as the world presents to us, some important limitations of the Stoical conclusions become necessary. Mr. Hume has justly remarked, that, "as in the bodily system, a toothach produces more violent convulsions of pain than phthisis or a dropsy, so, in the economy of the mind, although all vice be pernicious, yet the disturbance or pain is not measured out by nature with exact proportion to the degree of vice; nor is the man of highest virtue, even abstracting from external accidents, always the most happy. A gloomy and melancholy disposition is certainly to our sentiments a vice or imperfection; but as it may be accompanied with a great sense of honor and great integrity, it may be found in very worthy characters; though it is sufficient alone to embitter life, and render the person afflicted with it completely miserable. On the other hand, a selfish villain may possess a spring and alacrity of temper, a certain gayety of heart, which is rewarded much beyond its merit; and when attended with good fortune, will compensate for the uneasiness and remorse arising from all the other vices." Abstracting even from these considerations, and supposing a character as perfect as the frailty of human na |