tain the social order. Nature has provided for human happiness, in this instance, in a manner precisely analogous to her general economy. Those simple and indispensable rules of right and wrong, of just and unjust, without which the fruits of the earth could not be converted to the use of man, nor his existence maintained even in the rudest form of the social union, she has engraved on the heart as an essential part of the human constitution, leaving men, as society advances, to employ their gradually improving reason in fixing, according to their own ideas of expediency, the various regulations concerning the acquisition, the alienation, and transmission of property, which the more complicated interests of the community may require.

It is also beautifully ordered, that, while a regard for legal property is thus secured, among men capable of reflection, by a sense of general utility, the same effect is accomplished, in the minds of the multitude, by habit and the association of ideas; in consequence of which all the inequalities of fortune are sanctioned by mere prescription; and long possession is conceived to found a right of property as complete as what, by the law of nature, an individual has in the fruits of his own industry.

In such a state of things, therefore, as that with which we are connected, the right of property must be understood to derive its origin from two distinct sources; the one is, that natural sentiment of the mind which establishes a moral connexion between labor and an exclusive enjoyment of the fruits of it; the other is the municipal institutions of the country where we live. These institutions every where take rise partly from ideas of natural justice, and partly (perhaps chiefly) from ideas of supposed utility,-two principles which, when properly understood, are I believe always in harmony with each other, and which it ought to be the great aim of every legislator to reconcile to the utmost of his power. Among those questions, however, which fall under the cognizance of positive laws, there are many on which natural justice is entirely silent, and which, of consequence, may be discussed on principles of utility solely.

Such are most of the questions concerning the regulation of the succession to a man's property after his death; of some of which it may perhaps be found that the determination ought to vary with the circumstances of the society, and which have certainly, in fact, been frequently determined by the caprice of the legislator, or by some principle ultimately resolvable into an accidental association of ideas. Indeed, various cases may be supposed in which it is not only useful but necessary that a rule should be fixed; while, at the same time, neither justice nor utility seem to be much interested in the particular decision.

In examining the questions which turn on considerations of utility, some will immediately occur of which the determination is so obvious, and at the same time so universal in their application, that the laws of all enlightened nations on the subject may be expected to be the same. Of this description are many of the questions which may be stated with respect to the effects of priority of occupancy in establishing permanent rights. These questions are of course frequently confounded with questions of natural law; and in one sense of that phrase they may not improperly be comprehended under the title, but the distinction between them and the other class of questions is essential; for wherever considerations of utility are involved, the political union is supposed; whereas the principles of justice, properly so called, (of that justice, for example, which respects the right of the laborer to enjoy the fruit of his own industry) is inseparable from the human frame. It is necessary (as I already said) to maintain the social union even in its simplest form; and in its most improved state it operates as a principle of morality to guard the rights of individuals, and to maintain the order of society, in numberless instances to which the laws of the magistrate cannot extend.

I have insisted the longer on this distinction, because, obvious as it may appear, it has been seldom attended to by writers on jurisprudence. Confining their views to the state of their own ideas and feelings, as modified by artificial habits, they have neglected to draw the line

between the right of property as recognised by the law of nature, and the right of property as created by municipal regulations. In their speculations, accordingly, on this subject, they have searched for one general principle into which all the different phenomena might be resolved; and in this manner, while they have perverted the history of mankind in the early stages of society, they have weakened the foundations on which property rests when considered as a part of the political system.

CHAPTER THIRD.

OF VERACITY.

THE important rank which Veracity holds among our social duties appears from the obvious consequences that would result if no foundation were laid for it in the constitution of our nature. The purposes of speech would be frustrated, and every man's opportunities of knowledge would be limited to his own personal experience.

Considerations of utility, however, do not seem to be the only ground of the approbation we bestow on this disposition. Abstracting from all regard to consequences, there is something pleasing and amiable in sincerity, openness, and truth; something disagreeable and disgusting in duplicity, equivocation, and falsehood. Dr. Hutcheson himself, the great patron of that theory which resolves all moral qualities into benevolence, confesses this; for he speaks of a sense which leads us to approve of veracity, distinct from the sense which approves of qualities useful to mankind. "Facultatis hujus, sive orationis, comes est et moderator sensus quidam subtilior, ex veri etiam cognoscendi appetitione naturali non parum confirmatus, quo vera omnia, simplicia, fidelia comprobamus; falsa, ficta, fallacia odimus."*" Sensu enim cujusque proxime commendatur is sermonis usus, quem communis exigit utilitas. Hoc vero stabile consilium eo tantum utendi sermone, qui cum animi sententiâ congruit, quique alios non decipit, comprobant et animi sensus per se, et utilitatis communis ratio." + As this, however, is at best but a vague way of speaking, it may be proper to analyze more particularly that part of our constitution from which our approbation of veracity arises.

Philosophiæ Moralis Institutio compendiaria, Lib. ii. cap. 9.

† Ibid. Lib. ii. cap. 10.

Aristotle expresses himself nearly to the same purpose. Καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦ λον καὶ ψεκτόνο, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν.—Aritsot. Ethic. Nicomach. Lib. iv. cap. 7. Various passages of a similar import occur in Cicero.

That there is in the human mind a natural or instinctive principle of veracity, has been remarked by many authors; the same part of our constitution which prompts to social intercourse, prompting also to sincerity in our mutual communications. Truth is always the spontaneous and native expression of our sentiments; whereas falsehood implies a certain violence done to our nature, in consequence of the influence of some motive which we are anxious to conceal.

With respect to the nature of TRUTH various metaphysical speculations have been offered to the world, and various definitions have been attempted, both by the ancients and moderns. These, however, have thrown but little light on the subject, which is not surprising when we consider that the word truth expresses a simple idea or notion, of which no analysis or explication is possible. The same observation may be made with respect to the words knowledge and belief. All of them express notions which are implied in every judgment of the understanding, and which no being can form who is not possessed of a rational nature. And, by the way, these notions deserve to be added to the list formerly mentioned, as exemplifications of the imperfection of the account commonly given of the origin of our ideas. They are obviously not derived from any particular sense; and they do not seem to be referable to any part of our constitution, but to the understanding; or, in other words, to those rational powers which distinguish man from the brutes. This language, I know will appear to be very loose and inaccurate to those who have familiarized their minds to the common doctrine; but it is a plain and indisputable statement of the fact.

To acquire knowledge or to discover truth, is the proper object of curiosity; a principle of action which is coeval with the first operations of the intellect, and which in most minds continues through life to have a powerful influence in one way or another on the character and the conduct. It is this principle which puts the intellectual faculties in motion, and gives them that exercise which is necessary for their developement and improvement; and which, according to the direction it