Thou mad'st all nature beauty to his eye
And music to his ear!"

"The whole frame of the universe," says Epictetus, "is full of the goodness of God; and to be convinced of this important truth nothing more is necessary than an attentive mind and a grateful heart."

It is however true, as Dr. Paley has remarked in by far the finest passage of his work on Moral Philosophy, "That the contemplation of universal nature rather bewilders the mind than affects it. There is always a bright spot in the prospect upon which the eye rests; a single example, perhaps, by which each man finds himself more convinced than by all others put together. I seem for my own part to see the benevolence of the Deity more clearly in the pleasures of very young children than in any thing in the world. The pleasures of grown persons may be reckoned partly of their own procuring, especially if there has been any industry, or contrivance, or pursuit to come at them, or if they are founded, like music and painting, upon any qualification of their own acquiring. But the pleasures of a healthy infant are so manifestly provided for by another, and the benevolence of the provision is so unquestionable, that every child I see at its sport affords to my mind a kind of sensible evidence of the finger of God, and of the disposition which directs it.

"But the example which strikes each man most strongly is the true example for him, and hardly two minds hit upon the same;-which shows the abundance of such examples about us."

Of the Evidences of the Moral Government of the Deity.

From the observations made on the foregoing subject it sufficiently appears that the constitution of the universe, and the general laws which regulate the course of human affairs, are wisely and beneficently contrived for the happiness of man; that the sufferings which occur in human life furnish no direct evidence of ill inten

361 tion in the Author and Governor of the world; and that our own moral constitution (which we cannot help conceiving to have some conformity to the moral attributes of God) affords the strongest presumption that these sufferings are all subservient to beneficial purposes. But although benevolence and goodness be plainly an attribute of the Deity, it is not the only character in which he manifests himself to us in the course of his providence. There is another character perfectly consistent with this, and perhaps in fact a consequence of it, but which involves a different and very important consideration ;-that of the righteous Governor of the universe, whose object is not merely to communicate happiness, but to reward virtue and to punish vice.

From the order of the universe, and the combination of means we every where see employed to accomplish particular ends, we formerly concluded that it is the work of an intelligent mind. Now the same mode of reasoning leads us with equal certainty to draw other inferences concerning the Divine Nature and attributes. It was observed in the course of our argument with respect to the goodness of God, "that all which we enjoy, and a great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power."-"That pleasures and pains are the consequences of our actions; and that we are endued with capacities for foreseeing these consequences." That one course of conduct leads to happiness and another to misery is a fact confirmed by the general course of events; and as the general course of events means to those who acknowledge the existence of God the same thing with the general plan of Divine Providence, this fact proves that God exercises a government over the world by means of rewards and punishments; a government analogous to that which a master exercises over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. Nor is this all. From an examination of the course of human affairs it appears clearly, that, although happiness and misery are by no means distributed with an exact regard to the merits of individuals, yet they are so to so great a degree as may convince us that the leading object of Providence is to reward the good and

to punish the evil. In other words, it appears that God exercises over the world not merely a government but a moral government; not so perfect indeed as our moral constitution would lead us to desire, but sufficiently discernible in its general tendency to every attentive and well disposed mind.

According to some philosophers and divines the sole ultimate end of the creation was the communication of happiness, and the sole moral attribute of the Deity is pure benevolence. It is not impossible that this may be the case; nay, there are various considerations which make this not an improbable opinion. On this supposition we must conclude that the Deity bestowed on us our moral constitution as a mean towards a further end, the happiness of our own nature;-and distributed rewards and punishments only to secure this end more effectually. It is not impossible there may be beings in the creation to whom he manifests himself alone under the character of benevolence. But all this is mere speculative supposition. The rules of our conduct are not to be derived from possibilities but from facts; and all that the fact authorizes us in this instance to conclude is, that God exercises over us a moral government by rewards and punishments, analogous to that which the civil magistrate establishes for preserving the order of society.*

Upon this subject two methods of arguing have been employed, which tend wonderfully to illustrate and confirm each other: the one founded on an examination of our own moral constitution; and the other on an examination of the ordinary course of Providence in the administration of human affairs. The former should, I

"The annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or to forbear, and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of government. Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our behaviour be owing to the Author of Nature acting upon us every moment which we feel it, or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as to the matter before us. For if civil magistrates could make the sanction of their laws take place without interposing at all after they had passed them; without a trial and the formality of an executioner: if they were able to make their laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them upon himself, we should be just in the same sense under their government then as we are now, but in a much higher degree and more perfect manner."-Butler's Analogy, Chap. 2.

think, precede the latter, in order to fortify the mind against those sceptical suspicions which the irregularities and disorders of the present state of things are apt to obtrude on a gloomy imagination. I have accordingly already hinted in part at this argument; but for the sake of connexion it may be proper in this place to recapitulate the following particulars.

In considering the evidences of benevolent design in the universe, it was before remarked, that, as our first ideas of the moral attributes of God are derived from our own moral perceptions, so it is from the consideration of these that the strongest proofs of his attributes arise.

It was also observed that the distinction between right and wrong is apprehended by the mind to be eternal and immutable, no less than the distinction between mathematical truth and falsehood; and that of course to argue from our own moral judgments to the administration of the Deity, cannot be justly censured as a rash extension to the Divine Nature of suggestions resulting from the arbitrary constitution of our own minds.

The power we have of conceiving this distinction is one of the most remarkable of those which raise us above the brutes; and the sense of obligation which it involves possesses a distinguished preeminence over all our other principles of action. To act in conformity to our sense of rectitude is plainly the highest excellence which our nature is capable of attaining; nor can we avoid extending the same rule of estimation to all intelligent beings whatever.

Besides these conclusions with respect to the Divine attributes, (which seem to be implied in our very perception of moral distinctions) there are others perfect

agreeable to them, which continually force themselves on the mind in the exercise of our moral judgments, both with respect to our own conduct and that of other men. The reverence which we feel due to the admonitions of conscience,-the sense of merit and demerit which accompanies our good and bad actions,the warm interest we take in the fortunes of the virtuous, the indignation we feel at the occasional triumph

of successful villany,-all imply a secret conviction of the moral administration of the universe.

An examination, however, of the ordinary course of human affairs adds greatly to the force of these considerations,* and furnishes a proof from the fact, that, notwithstanding the seemingly promiscuous distribution of happiness and misery in this life, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice are the great objects of all the general laws by which the world is governed. The

From the natural course of things vicious actions are to a great degree actually punished as mischievous to society. And beside the penalties actually inflicted in such cases, the fears and apprehensions of it in case of a discovery operate frequently as no inconsiderable punishment on those who escape the vengeance of human laws. That those vices which are destructive of society should be punished by the magistrate, arises from the very existence of society. And as the political union is the necessary result of the nature of man, the penalties by which it restrains crimes may be considered as a part of the order of Providence, though acting by the instrumentality of man. Nor is it a valid objection to this reasoning that good actions, and such as are really beneficial to the public, are sometimes punished, as in the case of unjust persecution; and that vicious actions are frequently rewarded; for, in the first place, when this occurs it is matter of accident, and does not arise necessarily from the established order of things, as the penalties annexed to certain vices result necessarily from the constitution of society; and, secondly, when good actions are punished, and bad ones rewarded, it is owing to some accidental misconception of their tendency, the former being supposed erroneously to be hurtful and the latter beneficial to the public. The general proposition, therefore, holds without any thing that can be opposed to it on the other hand, that the punishment of certain vices results necessarily from the circumstances in which Providence has placed mankind.

"In the natural course of things virtue as such is actually rewarded, and vice as such punished. Besides the agreeable and disagreeable effects of virtue and vice on men's own minds, the course of the world turns in some measure upon the approbation and disapprobation of them as such in others. The sense of well and ill doing, the presages of conscience, the love of good characters and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame, resentment, gratitude,—all these, considered in themselves and in their effects, afford manifest real instances of virtue as such naturally favored, and of vice as such discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course of human life. That God has given us a moral constitution may be urged most justly as a proof of our being under his moral government. But that he has placed us in a condition which gives this nature scope to operate, and in which it does unavoidably operate, by influencing mankind so to act as to favor and reward virtue and punish vice; this is not the same, but an additional proof of his moral government, for it is an instance of it. The first is a proof that he will finally favor and support virtue effectually. The second is an example of his favoring and supporting it at present in some degree.

"Besides the actual effects of virtue and vice in this life, there is something very remarkable in their necessary tendencies; and in so far as these tendencies lie open to our observation, they afford a proof from the fact of the moral government under which we are placed. The actual consequences of virtue and of vice are indeed very conspicuous; but they bear little proportion to what they would produce if their tendencies were not restrained by accidental circumstances. Good and bad men, for example, would be much more rewarded and punished as such, were it not that justice is often artificially eluded, that characters are not known, and many who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice are hindered from doing so from accidental causes."

The foregoing note is little more than an abridgment of some observations of Butler's in his chapter On the Moral Government of God.-See Butler's Analogy, p. 73. Third Edit.