CHAPTER THIRD.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL RELIGION,

OF THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

THE observations made in the last article contain some of the principal heads of the argument for the existence of God, and also for his unity, for his power, and for his wisdom. Of the two last of these attributes, we justly say that they are infinite; that is, that our conceptions of them always rise in proportion as our faculties are cultivated, and as our knowledge of the universe becomes more extensive. The writers on natural religion commonly give a particular enumeration of attributes, which they divide into the natural, the intellectual, and the moral; and of which they treat at length in a systematical manner. This view of the subject, whatever may be its advantages, could not be adopted with propriety here. The remarks which follow are confined to the evidences of the Divine goodness and justice; those attributes which constitute the moral perfections of the Deity, and which render him. the proper object of religious worship.

In applying to the Deity the phrase moral attributes, I express myself in conformity to common language; but the object of the following speculations will be better understood when I say, that the scope of my reasonings is to show, in the first place, that there are evidences of benevolent design in the universe; and secondly, that there are evidences of a moral government exercised over man by means of rewards and punishments; or, in other words, that the constitution of the human mind, and the course of human affairs, prove that the reward of virtue, and the punishment of vice, is the aim of the general laws by which the world is governed.

SECTION I.

Of the Evidences of Benevolent Design in the Universe.

In entering on this subject we may lay it down as a fundamental principle, that our ideas of the moral attributes of God must be derived from our own moral perceptions. It is only by attending to these that we can form a conception of what his attributes are; and it is in this way we are furnished with the strongest proofs that they really belong to him.

In the course of our inquiries into the principles of morals, it formerly appeared that the power of distinguishing right from wrong is one of the most remarkable circumstances which raise man above the brutes; and indeed, I apprehend, it is chiefly this modification of reason we have in view, when we employ that word to express the exclusive characteristic of the human race among the various inhabitants of the globe. I endeavoured further to show, that to act in conformity to this sense of rectitude is the highest excellence which man is capable of attaining; insomuch, that, in comparison of moral worth, the most splendid intellectual endowments appear insignificant and contemptible. Nor do these ideas apply only to our own species. I before showed that the constitution of our nature determines us to conceive the distinction between right and wrong as eternal and immutable; not as arising from an arbitrary accommodation of our frame to the qualities of external objects, like the distinction between agreeable and disagreeable tastes or smells, but as a distinction necessary and essential, and independent of the will of any being whatever,-analogous in this respect to that between mathematical truth and falsehood. We are justified, therefore, in drawing inferences from our own moral judgments with respect to the moral administration of the Deity, on the same ground on which we conclude that what appears to us to be demonstrably true must appear in the same light to all other intelligent beings. And as moral worth is the highest excel

lence competent to our own nature, we are justified in ranking moral excellence among those attributes of God which more peculiarly claim our love and adoration.*

But not to insist on this metaphysical view of the subject, it is evident, that, if we believe that we have derived our existence from the Deity, we must ascribe to him, in an infinite degree, all those powers and perfections which he has communicated to us, or which he has rendered us capable of acquiring. From our own imperfect knowledge we must ascribe to him omniscience; from our limited power we must ascribe to him omnipotence; and, a fortiori, from our moral perceptions we must ascribe to him unerring moral rectitude, and goodness unbounded towards his whole creation.

In opposition to this mode of reasoning, sceptics have frequently urged the impropriety of forming a deity after our own image; and have represented the argument I stated for the moral attributes of God as arising from the same illusion of the imagination which leads the vulgar to ascribe to him the human form and organs of perception analogous to our own. But the comparison is by no means just. There is obviously a wide distinction between the possession of a power and the being limited to the exercise of that power in a particular way. The former is always a perfection, the latter is a mark of an imperfect and dependent being. Thus the possession of knowledge is a perfection, and we may venture to ascribe it in an infinite degree to the Deity; but it would be rash in us, from what we experience in ourselves, to conclude that the Deity investigates truth by those slow processes of deduction which are suited to the weakness of the human faculties. In like manner, although it would be absurd to suppose that the Deity hears and sees in a way analogous to what we experience in ourselves, we may without impiety conclude, nay, we must from the fact believe, that he possesses in an infinite degree of perfection all our powers of perception, because it is from him that we have received them. "He that made the eye shall he not see?

On this subject see Cudworth, Intel. System, p. 204.

He that made the ear shall he not hear?"-Not indeed by means of bodily organs similar to ours, but in some way far above the reach of our comprehension.

The argument which these considerations afford for the great and important truth I wish to establish at present is irresistible. Moral excellence appears obviously to constitute the chief perfection of the human mind; and we cannot help considering the moral attributes of God as claiming, in a more especial manner, our love and adoration, than either his wisdom or power.

With respect to that particular attribute of the Deity, to which the following reasonings more immediately relate, the general argument applies with singular force. The peculiar sentiment of approbation with which we regard the virtue of beneficence in others, and the peculiar satisfaction with which we reflect on such of our actions as have contributed to the happiness of mankind; to which we may add the exquisite pleasure accompanying the exercise of all the kind affections, naturally lead us to consider benevolence or goodness as the supreme attribute of God. It is difficult indeed to conceive what other motive could have induced a Being, completely and independently happy, to call his

creatures into existence.

In this manner, then, without going further than our own moral perceptions, we have a strong argument for the moral attributes of God: and this argument will strike us with the greater force in proportion to the culture which our moral perceptions have received. The same observation may be applied to the moral argument for a future state. The effect of both these arguments on the mind may be in a great measure destroyed by dissipation and profligacy; or (on the other hand) by a sedulous and reverential attention to the moral suggestions of our own breasts, it may be identified with all our habits of thought and of action. It is owing to this that, while the truths of natural religion are regarded by some as the dreams of a warm imagination, they command the assent of others with the evidence of intuitive certainty. "Be persuaded," says Shaftesbury, "that wisdom is more from the heart than from the head.

Feel

goodness, and you will see all things fair and good." "Dwell with honesty, and beauty, and order; study and love what is of this kind, and in time you will know and love the Author." *

Impressed with a conviction of the justness and importance of this remark, I have always been of opinion that those who have written in defence of natural religion have insisted too much on the cold metaphysical argument which can only prove the power and wisdom of the Deity, and have addressed themselves too little to our moral constitution. It must be owing to this that some sceptical writers, who have admitted the evidence. for the physical attributes of God, have denied or doubted of the evidence for his moral attributes. This in particular was the case with Lord Bolingbroke.† The arguments for the physical attributes are addressed to the understanding alone; those for the moral attributes to the heart. If you wish to convince a person who affects to be sceptical on this subject, you must begin with attempting to rouse his moral feelings. Convince him of the dignity of his nature, and inspire him with the love of virtue and of mankind, and you have gone far towards accomplishing your object. Just and comfortable views of Providence and of man's future destination will follow of course. And here, by the way, we may remark the additional reason which these considerations suggest, why the study of natural religion should not be considered as the foundation of moral philosophy, inasmuch as they show that just views of religion presuppose an examination of the moral constitution of man.

The foregoing reasonings rest entirely on our own moral perceptions, without any reference to facts collected from without and I apprehend that it is only after establishing a priori this presumption for the divine goodness that we can proceed to examine the fact with safety. It is true, indeed, that, independently of this presumption, the disorders we see would not demonstrate ill intention in the Author of the Universe, as it