The philosophy of Pope is in this respect much more pleasing and much more solid:

"Heaven forming each on other to depend,

A master, or a servant, or a friend,

Bids each on other for assistance call,

Till one man's weakness grows the strength of all.
Wants, frailties, passions, closer still ally

The common interest, or endear the tie.

To these we owe true friendship, love sincere,
Each home-felt joy, that life inherits here." *

The considerations now stated afford a beautiful illustration of the beneficent design with which the physical condition of man is adapted to the principles of his moral constitution; an adaptation so striking, that it is not surprising those philosophers, who are fond of simplifying the theory of human nature, should have attempted to account for the origin of these principles from the habits which our external circumstances impose. In this, as in many other instances, their attention has been misled by the spirit of system from those wonderful combinations of means to particular ends, which are everywhere conspicuous in the universe. It is not by the physical condition of man that the essential principles of his mind are formed; but the one is fitted to the other by the same superintending wisdom which adapts the fin of the fish to the water, and the wing of the bird to the air, and which scatters the seeds of the vegetable tribes in those soils and exposures where they are fitted to vegetate. It is not the wants and necessities of his animal being which create his social principles, and which produce an artificial and interesting league among individuals who are naturally solitary and hostile; but, determined by instinct to society, endowed with innumerable principles which have a reference to his fellow creatures, he is placed by the condition of his birth in that element, where alone the perfection and happiness of his nature are to be found.

In speaking of the lower animals, I before observed, that such of them as are instinctively social discover the secret workings of nature even when removed from the

* See on this subject the Moralists of Lord Shaftesbury.

society of their kind. This fact amounts in their case to a demonstration of that mutual adaptation of the different parts of nature to each other which I have just remarked. It demonstrates that the structure of their internal frame is purposely adjusted to that external scene in which they are destined to be placed. As the lamb, when it strikes with its forehead while yet unarmed, proves that it is not its weapons which determine its instincts, but that it has preexistent instincts suited to its weapons, so when we see an animal deprived of the sight of his fellows cling to a stranger, or disarm, by his caresses, the rage of an enemy, we perceive the workings of a social instinct, not only not superinduced by external circumstances, but manifesting itself in spite of circumstances which are adverse to its operation. The same remark may be extended to man. When in solitude he languishes, and by making companions of the lower animals, or by attaching himself to inanimate objects, strives to fill up the void of which he is conscious. "Were I in a desert," (says an author who, amid all his extravagances and absurdities, sometimes writes like a wise man, and, where the moral feelings are at all concerned, never fails to write like a good man)—" Were I in a desert, I would find out wherewith in it to call forth my affections. If I could not do better, I would fasten them upon some sweet myrtle, or seek some melancholy cypress to connect myself to; I would court their shade, and greet them kindly for their protection. I would cut my name upon them, and swear they were the loveliest trees throughout the desert. If their leaves withered, I would teach myself to mourn, and when they rejoiced, I would rejoice along with them."

The Count de Lauzun was confined by Louis the Fourteenth for nine years in the Castle of Pignerol, in a small room where no light could enter but from a chink in the roof. In this solitude he attached himself to a spider, and contrived for some time to amuse himself with attempting to tame it, with catching flies for its support, and with superintending the progress of its web. The jailor discovered his amusement, and killed the spider; and the Count used afterwards to declare,

that the pang he felt on the occasion could be compared only to that of a mother for the loss of a child.*

This anecdote is quoted by Lord Kames in his Sketches, and by the late Lord Auckland in his Principles of Penal Law. It is remarkable that both these learned and respectable writers should have introduced it into their works on account of the shocking incident of the jailor, and as a proof of the pure and unprovoked malice of which some minds are capable, without taking any notice of it as a beautiful picture of the feelings of a man of sensibility in a state of solitude, and of his disposition to create to himself some object upon which he may rest those affections which have a reference to society.

It will be said that these are the feelings of one who has experienced the pleasures of social life, and that no inference can be drawn from such facts in opposition to Hobbes. But if they do not prove in man an instinctive impulse towards society prior to experience, they at least prove that he feels a delight in the society of his fellow creatures, which no view of self-interest is sufficient to explain.

It does not belong to our present speculation to illustrate the importance of the social union to our improvement and our happiness. Its subserviency to both, (abstracting entirely from its necessity for the complete gratification of our physical wants) is much greater than we should be disposed at first to apprehend. In proof of this, it is sufficient to mention here its connexion with the culture of our intellectual faculties, and with the developement of our moral principles. Illustrations of this may be drawn from the low state in which both these parts of our nature are generally found in the deaf and dumb, and from the effects which a few months' education sometimes has in unfolding their mental powers. The pleasing change which in the meantime takes place in their once vacant countenances, when animated and

In Delille's poem on the Imagination, the same anecdote which is is here told of the Count de Lauzun is attributed to Pelisson, a celebrated literary and political character in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth, who was confined four years in the Bastille, on account of his connexion with the disgraced minister Foucquet. See end of Chant. VI.

lighted up by an active and inquisitive mind, cannot escape the notice of the most careless observer.*

SECTION III.

The Desire of Esteem.

THIS principle, as well as those we have now been considering, discovers itself at a very early period in infants,

*For an additional illustration of the same thing, see a remarkable case of recovery from deafness and dumbness in the history of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris for the year 1703.

A doctrine similar to that which I have now been controverting, concerning the origin of society, was maintained by some of the ancient sophists, and has found advocates in every age among those writers who wish to depreciate human nature, as well as among many who were anxious to represent man as entirely the creature of education and government, with the view of inculcating implicit and passive obedience to the civil magistrate. In Buchanan's elegant and philosophical Dialogue De Jure Regni apud Scotos, the question is particularly discussed between the two interlocutors, of whom the one ascribes the origin of society to views of utility, (meaning by utility the private interest or advantage of the individual ;)

“Ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et æqui,'

quæ cœtus hominum primum congregavit, ac jussit

'Communi dare signa tuba, defendier iisdem

Turribus, atque una portarum clave teneri.'

In opposition to which doctrine, Buchanan himself, who is the other speaker, contends with great warmth for the existence of social principles in the nature of man, which, independently of any views of interest, lay a foundation for the social union. In the course of his argument on this subject he touches on most of the considerations which have been stated above.

"Magnam profecto videtur quibusdam utilitas habere vim, ad societatem publicam humani generis et constituendain et continendam. Sed est, nisi fallor, congregandorum hominum causa longe antiquior, et communitatis eorum inter ipsos multo prius et sanctius vinculum. Alioqui, si commodi sui privatim quisque velit habere rationem, vide, ne illa ipsa utilitas solveret potius quam conjungeret humanam societatem. "Ea est quædam naturæ vis, non hominibus modo, sed mansuetioribus etiam aliorum animantium indita, ut si etiam absint utilitatis illa blandimenta, tamen cum sui generis animantibus libenter congregentur. At de cæteris in præsentiâ nihil attinet disputare: homini certe a naturâ hanc vim tam videmus alte impressam, ut si quis omnibus iis rebus abundet, quæ vel ad incolumitatem tuendam, vel ad voluptatem et animorum oblectationem comparatæ sunt, sine hominum commercio vitam sibi insuavem sit existimaturus. Quin et illi ipsi, qui cupiditate scientiæ, et studio veri investigandi, se a turbâ removerunt, et in secretos abdiderunt recessus, neque perpetuam animi contentionem ferre diutius potuerunt: nec, si quando eam remisissent, in solitudine se continere poterant: sed illa ipsa secreta sua studia libenter proferebant ; et velut in communem utilitatem elaborâssent, in medium conferebant sui laboris fructum. Quod si quis est, qui omnino solitudine capiatur, cœtusque hominum fugiat ac devitet, id magis animi morbo quam vi naturæ, fieri existimo: qualem Timonem Atheniensem accepimus, et Corinthium Bellerophontem ;

'Qui miser Elæis errabat solus in oris,

Ipse suum cor edens, hominum vestigia vitans.""

The foregoing passage seems to me curious, as it shows how completely Buchanan had not only anticipated, but refuted the very far fetched argument which Hobbes was soon after to draw from his supposed state of nature in support of his slavish maxims of government.

who, long before they are able to reflect on the advantages resulting from the good opinion of others, and even before they acquire the use of speech, are sensibly mortified by any expression of neglect or contempt. It seems, therefore, to be an original principle of our nature, that is, it does not appear to be resolvable into reason, and experience, or into any other principle more general than itself. An additional proof of this is the very powerful influence it has over the mind, an influence more striking than that of any other active principle whatsoever. Even the love of life daily gives way to the desire of esteem, and of an esteem which, as it is only to effect our memories, cannot be supposed to interest our self-love. In what manner the association of ideas should manufacture, out of the other principles of our constitution, a new principle stronger than them all, it is difficult to conceive.

In these observations I have had an eye to the theories of those modern philosophers who represent selflove, or the desire of happiness, as the only original principle of action in man, and who attempt to account for the origin of all our other active principles from habit or the association of ideas. That this theory is just in some instances cannot be disputed. Thus, in the case of avarice it is manifest that it is from habit alone it derives its influence over the mind; for no man surely was ever brought into the world with an innate love of money. Money is at first desired, merely as the means of obtaining other objects; but, in consequence of being long and constantly accustomed to direct our efforts to its attainment on account of its apprehended utility, we come at last to pursue it as an ultimate end, and frequently retain our attachment to it long after we have lost all relish for the enjoyments it enables us to command. In like manner it has been supposed that the esteem of our fellow creatures is at first desired on account of its apprehended utility, and that it comes in time to be pursued as an ultimate end, without any reference on our part to the advantages it bestows. In opposition to this doctrine it seems to me to be clear, that as the object of hunger is not happines but food;