the distinction pointed out in the foregoing quotations between the moral faculty and our other active powers be acknowledged, it is of the less consequence what particular theory we adopt concerning the origin of our moral ideas." And accordingly, though he resolves moral approbation ultimately into a feeling of the mind, he nevertheless represents the supremacy of conscience as a principle which is equally essential to all the different systems that have been proposed on the subject. "Upon whatever we suppose our moral faculties to be founded," I quote his own words, "whether upon a certain modification of reason, upon an original instinct called a moral sense, or upon some other principle of our nature, it cannot be doubted that they are given us for the direction of our conduct in this life. They carry along with them the most evident badges of their authority, which denote that they were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions; to superintend all our senses, passions, and appetites; and to judge how far each of them was to be either indulged or restrained. Our moral faculties are by no means, as some have pretended, upon a level in this respect with the other faculties and appetites of our nature, endowed with no more right to restrain these last, than these last are to restrain them. No other faculty or principle of action judges of any other. Love does not judge of resentment, nor resentment of love. Those two passions may be opposite to one another, but cannot, with any propriety, be said to approve or disapprove of one another. But it is the peculiar office of those faculties now under consideration to judge, to bestow censure or applause upon all the other principles of our nature." * "Since these, therefore," continues Mr. Smith, "were plainly intended to be the governing principles of human nature, the rules which they prescribe are to be regarded as the commands and laws of the Deity, promulgated by those vicegerents which he has thus set up within us. By acting according to their dictates we may be said, in some sense, to cooperate with the Deity, * Theory of Moral Sentiments, Vol. I. p. 410, 6th Edit. and to advance, as far as in our power, the plan of Providence. By acting otherwise, on the contrary, we seem to obstruct, in some measure, the scheme which the Author of Nature has established for the happiness and perfection of the world, and to declare ourselves in some measure the enemies of God. Hence we are naturally encouraged to hope for his extraordinary favor and reward in the one case, and to dread his vengeance and punishment in the other. * I have only to add further on this subject at present, that the supreme authority of conscience is felt and tacitly acknowledged by the worst no less than by the best of men; for even they who have thrown off all hypocrisy with the world, are at pains to conceal their real character from their own eyes. No man ever, in a soliloquy or private meditation, avowed to himself that he was a villain; nor do I believe that such a character as Joseph in the School for Scandal (who is introduced as reflecting coolly on his own knavery and baseness, without any uneasiness but what arises from the dread of detection) ever existed in the world. Such men, probably, impose on themselves fully as much as they do upon others. Hence the various artifices of selfdeceit which Butler has so well described in his discourses on that subject. "We may defend villany," says Lord Shaftesbury, "and cry up folly before the world. But to appear fools, madmen, or varlets to ourselves, and prove it to our own faces that we are really such, is insupportable. For so true a reverence has every one for himself when he comes clearly to appear before his close companion, that he had rather profess the vilest things of himself in open company than hear his character privately from his own mouth. So that we may readily from hence conclude, that the chief interest of ambition, avarice, corruption, and every sly insinuating vice, is to prevent this interview and familiarity of discourse which is consequent upon close retirement and inward recess." + • Theory of Moral Sentiments, Vol. I. pp. 412, 413, 414, 415. † Shaftesbury's Advice to an Author, Part i. Sect. 2. Somewhat to the same purpose it is remarked by a late lively and ingenious, though eccentric writer, (Soame Jenyns) that "men's opinions much oftener proceed from their actions than their actions from their opinions. They act first, and then with great facility reconcile their principles to their conduct; for which reason we find many whom no advantage can induce to do any thing which appears to them wrong, but of that many very few who can ever be convinced that any thing is wrong from which either pleasure or profit accrues to themselves." It is hardly necessary for me to observe, that there is no merit in our moral perceptions but in acting agreeably to them. We commonly, indeed, and justly consider the want of them as a mark of depravity, because we proceed on the supposition that every man has received them from nature, and that it is only by habits of profligacy that they can be eradicated. How powerful their influence is over the mind appears remarkably from the general taste for moral novels and for tragedy, and from the enthusiastic rapture with which virtuous sentiments from the stage are uniformly received. "I am a man, and feel an interest in all mankind." (Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.) It is said by St. Augustine, that at the delivery of this sentiment the whole Roman theatre resounded with applause.* We may venture to say that a similar sentiment, well pronounced by an actor, would at this day, in the most corrupted capital in Europe, be followed by a similar burst of sympathetic emotion. 66 "Voyez, à nos spectacles, Quand on peint quelque trait de candeur, de bonté, "On such occasions," as a late writer remarks, though we may think meanly of the genius of the poet, it is impossible not to think, and to be happy in See a Note on this line in Colman's translation of the Self-Tormentor of Terence. + Le Méchant, Comédie de Gresset. thinking, highly of the people ;-the people whose opinions may often be folly, whose conduct may sometimes be madness, but whose sentiments are almost always honorable and just ;-the people whom an author may delight with bombast, may amuse with tinsel, may divert with indecency, but whom he cannot mislead in principle, nor harden into inhumanity. It is only the mob in the side boxes, who, in the coldness of self-interest, or the languor of out-worn dissipation, can hear unmoved the sentiments of compassion, of generosity, or of virtue.” * Account of the German Theatre by Henry Mackenzie, Esq. Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Vol. II. Part II. p. 174. CHAPTER SEVENTH. OF CERTAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH COOPERATE WITH OUR MORAL POWERS IN THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE CONDUCT. In order to secure still more completely the good order of society, and to facilitate the acquisition of virtuous habits, nature has superadded to our moral constitution a variety of auxiliary principles, which sometimes give rise to a conduct agreeable to the rules of morality and highly useful to mankind, where the merit of the individual, considered as a moral agent, is inconsiderable. Hence some of them have been confounded with our moral powers, or even supposed to be of themselves sufficient to account for the phenomena of moral perception, by authors whose views of human nature have not been sufficiently comprehensive. The most important principles of this description are, 1. A Regard to Character. 2. Sympathy. 3. The Sense of the Ridiculous. And, 4. Taste. The principle of Self-love (which was treated of in a former section) cooperates very powerfully to the same purposes. SECTION I. Of Decency, or a Regard to Character. UPON this subject I had formerly occasion to offer various remarks in treating of the desire of esteem. But the view of it which I then took was extremely general, as I did not think it necessary for me to attend to the distinction between Intellectual and Moral qualities. There can be no doubt that a regard to the good opinion of our fellow creatures has great influence in promoting our exertions to cultivate both the one and the other; but what we are more particularly concerned to remark at present, is the effect which this principle has in strengthening our virtuous habits, and in restraining those passions which a sense of duty alone would not be sufficient to regulate. |