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CHAPTER SIXTH.

OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

ACCORDING to some systems, moral obligation is founded entirely on our belief that virtue is enjoined by the command of God. But how, it may be asked, does this belief impose an obligation? Only one of two answers can be given. Either that there is a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the Author and the Governor of the universe; or that a rational selflove should induce us, from motives of prudence, to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to the Almighty Arbiter of happiness and misery. On the first supposition we reason in a circle. We resolve our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion, and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation.

The other system, which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence, although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which sufficiently invalidate every argument in its favor. Among others it leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest: 2. That a being independently and completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral attributes.

But further, the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional motives to the practice of it, but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation.

In the last place, if moral obligation be constituted by a regard to our situation in another life, how shall the existence of a future state be proved, or even rendered probable by the light of nature? or how shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the Deity? The truth is, that the strongest presumption for such a state is deduced from our natural notions of right and wrong;

of merit and demerit; and from a comparison between these and the general course of human affairs.

It is absurd, therefore, to ask why we are bound to practise virtue. The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation. Every being who is conscious of the distinction between right and wrong carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe, notwithstanding he may be in total ignorance of a future state. "What renders obnoxious to punishment," as Dr. Butler has well remarked, " is not the foreknowledge of it, but merely the violating a known obligation." Or (as Plato has expressed the same idea,) τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νομός ἐστι βασιλικός.*

From what has been stated, it follows that the moral faculty, considered as an active power of the mind, differs essentially from all the others hitherto enumerated. The least violation of its authority fills us with remorse. On the contrary, the greater the sacrifices we make in obedience to its suggestions, the greater are our satisfaction and triumph.

The supreme authority of conscience, although beautifully described by many of the ancient moralists, was not sufficiently attended to by modern writers as a fundamental principle in the science of ethics till the time of Dr. Butler. Too little stress is laid on it by Lord Shaftesbury; and the omission is the chief defect in his system of morals. Shaftesbury's opinion, however, although he does not state it explicitly in his Enquiry, seems to have been precisely the same at bottom with that of Butler.t

With respect to Dr. Butler, I shall take this opportunity of remarking, that in his Sermons on Human Nature, in the Preface to his Sermons, and in a short Dissertation on Virtue annexed to his Analogy, he has, in my humble opinion, gone further towards a just explanation of our moral constitution than any other modern philosopher. Without aiming at the praise of novelty or of refinement, he has displayed singular penetration

* Minos.

† See his Advice to an Author, Part i. Sect 2, paragraph 1st and 2d.

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and sagacity in availing himself of what was sound in former systems, and in supplying their defects. He is commonly considered as an uninteresting and obscure writer: but, for my own part, I never could perceive the slightest foundation for such a charge; though I am ready to grant that he pays little attention to the graces of composition, and that the construction of his sentences is frequently unskilful and unharmonious. the charge of obscurity, which he himself anticipated from the nature of his subject, he has replied to it in the most satisfactory manner in the preface already referred to. I think it proper to add, that I would by no means propose these sermons, (which were originally preached before the learned Society of Lincoln's Inn) as models for the pulpit. I consider them merely in the light of philosophical essays. In the same volume with them, however, are to be found some practical and characteristical discourses, which are peculiarly interesting and impressive, particularly the sermons on self-deceit and on the character of Balaam; both of which evince an intimate acquaintance with the springs of human action, rarely found in union with speculative and philosophical powers of so high an order. The chief merit, at the same time, of Butler as an ethical writer, undoubtedly lies in what he has written on the Supreme Authority of Conscience as the governing principle of human conduct,-a doctrine which he has placed in the strongest and happiest lights; and which, before his time, had been very little attended to by the moderns. It is sometimes alluded to by Lord Shaftesbury, but so very slightly, as almost to justify the censure which Butler bestows on this part of his writings.

The scope of Butler's own reasonings may be easily conceived from the passage of Scripture which he has chosen as the groundwork of his argument: "For when the gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves."

One of the clearest and most concise statements of this doctrine that I have met with is in a sermon on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue, by Dr. Adams of

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Oxford; the justness of whose ideas on this subject makes it the more surprising that his pupil and friend, Dr. Samuel Johnson, should have erred so very widely from the truth. "Right," says he, "implies duty in its idea. To perceive an action to be right is to see a reason for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from all other considerations whatever; and this perception, this acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very essence of obligation, that which commands the approbation and choice, and binds the conscience of every rational human being."-"Nothing can bring us under an obligation to do what appears to our moral judgment wrong. It may be supposed our interest to do this, but it cannot be supposed our duty. For, I ask, if some power, which we are unable to resist, should assume the command over us, and give us laws which are unrighteous and unjust, should we be under an obligation to obey him? Should we not rather be obliged to shake off the yoke, and to resist such usurpation, if it were in our power? However, then, we might be swayed by hope or fear, it is plain that we are under an obligation to right, which is antecedent, and in order and nature superior to all other. Power may compel, interest may bribe, pleasure may persuade, but reason only can oblige. This is the only authority which rational beings can own, and to which they owe obedience."

Dr. Clarke has expressed himself nearly to the same purpose. "The judgment and conscience of a man's own mind concerning the reasonableness and fitness of the thing is the truest and formallest obligation; for whoever acts contrary to this sense and conscience of his own mind is necessarily self-condemned; and the greatest and strongest of all obligations is that which a man cannot break through without condemning himself. So far, therefore, as men are conscious of what is right and wrong, so far they are under an obligation to act accordingly."

I would not have quoted so many passages in illustration of a point which appears to myself so very obvious, if I had not been anxious to counteract the authority of some eminent writers who have lately espoused a very

different system, by showing how widely they have departed from the sound and philosophical views of their predecessors. I confess, too, I should have distrusted my own judgment, if, on a question so interesting to human happiness, and so open to examination, I had been led, by any theoretical refinements, to a conclusion which was not sanctioned by the concurrent sentiments of other impartial inquirers. The fact, however, is, that as this view of human nature is the most simple, so it is the most ancient which occurs in the history of moral science. It was the doctrine of the Pythagorean school, as appears from a fragment of Theages, a Pythagorean writer, published in Gale's Opuscula Mythologica.* It is also explained by Plato in some of his Dialogues, in which he compares the soul to a commonwealth, and reason to the council of state, which governs and directs the whole.

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Cicero has expressed the same system very clearly and concisely. Duplex enim est vis animorum atque naturæ. Una pars in appetitu posita est, quæ hominem huc et illuc rapit, quæ est ogun Græce; altera in ratione, quæ docet et explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumve sit. Ita fit ut ratio præsit, appetitus obtemperet." In the following passage this doctrine is enforced in a manner peculiarly sublime and expressive.

"Est quidem vera Lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat. Nec erit alia Lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia, nunc alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus. Ille hujus legis inventor, disceptator, lator. Cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit." †

It is very justly observed by Mr. Smith, (and I consider the remark as of the highest importance) that "if

* Opuscula Mythologica Physica et Ethica. Amstel. 1688, p. 688, et seq. tFragment. Cic. de Repub. Lib. iii.

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