questioned if the motives of the author have in general been well understood, either by his admirers or by his opponents. In affirming that self-love is the spring of all our actions, there is no good reason for supposing that he meant to deny the reality of moral distinctions as a philosophical truth,-a supposition quite inconsistent with his own fine and deep remark, that hypocrisy is itself a homage which vice renders to virtue. He states it merely as a proposition, which in the course of his experience as a man of the world, he had found very generally verified in the higher classes of society, and which he was induced to announce, without any qualification or restriction, in order to give more force and poignancy to his satire. In adopting this mode of writing he has unconsciously conformed himself, like many other French authors, who have since followed his example,* to a suggestion which Aristotle has stated with admirable depth and acuteness in his Rhetoric. "Sentences or apothegms lend much aid to eloquence. One reason of this is, that they flatter the pride of the hearers, who are delighted, when the speaker, making use of general language, touches upon opinions which they had before known to be true in part. Thus, a person who had the misfortune to live in a bad neighbourhood, or to have worthless children, would easily assent to the auroit peut-être tout autant de sagacité, et surement beaucoup plus de justice à démeler aussi ce qu'il y a dans l'homme de noble et de vertueux. Croit on que la vertu ne garde pas souvent son secret tout aussi bien que l'amour propre, et qu'il n'y ait pas autant de mérite à l'appercevoir ? ”—Lycée, Tome X. p. 299. Thus it has often been said by French writers, that no man is a hero to his valet de chambre; and the maxim, when properly understood, has some foundation in truth. It probably was meant by its original author to refer only to those petty circumstances of temper and behaviour which, without effecting the essentials of character, have a tendency to diminish, on a near approach, the theatrical effect of great men. It has, however, been frequently quoted as implying that there are none whose virtues will bear a close examination; in which acceptation, it is not more injurious to human nature than it is contrary to fact. How much more profound, as well as more pleasing, is the remark of Plutarch! "Real virtue is most loved where it is most nearly seen, and no respect which it commands from strangers can equal the never-ceasing admiration it excites in the daily intercourse of domestic life."(Plut. Vit. Periclis.) It is indeed true, that some men, who are admired by the world, appear to most advantage when viewed at a distance; but on the other hand, may it not be contended, that many who are objects of general odium would be found, if examined more nearly, not to be destitute of estimable and amiable qualities? May we not even go further, and assert that the very worst of men have a mixture of good in their composition, and to express a doubt whether human nature would gain or lose upon a thorough acquaintance with the conduct and motives of individuals? speaker who should affirm that nothing is more vexatious than to have any neighbours; nothing more irrational than to bring children into the world." This observation of Aristotle, while it goes far to account for the imposing and dazzling effect of these rhetorical exaggerations, ought to guard us against the common and popular error of mistaking them for the serious and profound generalizations of science. As for La Rochefoucauld, we know, from the best authorities, that in private life he was a conspicuous example of all those moral qualities of which he seemed to deny the existence; and that he exhibited, in this respect, a striking contrast to the Cardinal de Retz, who has presumed to censure him for his want of faith in the reality of virtue.† In reading La Rochefoucauld, it should never be forgotten that it was within the vortex of a court he enjoyed his chief opportunities of studying the world, and that the narrow and exclusive circle in which he moved was not likely to afford him the most favourable specimens of human nature in general. Of the court of Louis the Fourteenth, in particular, we are told by a very nice and reflecting observer (Madame de la Fayette) that "ambition and gallantry were the soul, actuating alike both men and women. So many contending interests, so many different cabals were constantly at work, and in all of those women bore so important a part, that love was always mingled with business, and business with love. Nobody was tranquil or indifferent. Every one studied to advance himself by pleasing, serving, or ruining others. Idleness and languor were unknown, and nothing was thought of but intrigues or pleasures." In the passage already quoted from Voltaire, he takes notice of the effect of La Rochefoucauld's max * In several of his maxims, for instance, he is at pains to depreciate the virtue of courage, and speaks of it in a way that might lead a careless reader to suspect that he felt in himself a deficiency of this quality. Yet we learn from his personal enemy, the Cardinal de Retz, that he was extremely brave, “Il n'a jamais été guerrier, quoiqu'il fut très soldat."-Mémoires, Tome I. p. 312. "Il aimoit à railler," says Madame de Maintenon, "il disoit que la bravoure personelle lui paroissoit une folie; et il étoit pourtant très brave.”—Letters of Madame de Maintenon. "Ses maximes ne marquent pas assez de foi à la vertu.”—Mémoires, Tome I. p. 133. ims in improving the style of French composition. We may add to this remark, that their effect has not been less sensible in vitiating the tone and character of French philosophy, by bringing into vogue those false and degrading representations of human nature and of human life, which have prevailed in that country more or less for a century past. Mr. Addison, in one of the papers of the Tatler, expresses his indignation at this general bias among the French writers of his age. "It is impossible," he observes, "to read a passage in Plato, or Tully, or a thousand other ancient moralists, without being a greater and better man for it. On the contrary, I could never read any of our modish French authors, or those of our own country, who are the imitators and admirers of that nation, without being for some time out of humor with myself, and at every thing about me. Their business is to depreciate human nature, and to consider it under the worst appearences; they give mean interpretations and base motives to the worthiest of actions. In short, they endeavour to make no distinction between man and man, or between the species of man and that of the brutes." * From this time downwards we may trace the rise and progress of that disposition to persiflage, which has been so long characteristical of the higher orders in France, and which, a few years ago, some individuals in our own country were so ambitious to copy. In France it seems to have attained to its greatest glory during the gay and unprincipled period of the regency; and ever since it has left sensible effects, not only on the tone of fashionable society, but on the spirit of most philosophical theories. Its principles are too fugitive to be reduced to any system; but fortunately a faithful and lively portrait of it is preserved for the information of posterity in one of the comedies of Gresset. The following speech of Cleon in the Méchant is an invaluable document for the history of French manners, (now alas! too widely diffused all over the civilized world) during the greater part of the eighteenth century. Some of the foregoing remarks on La Rouchefoucauld are copied from the Preliminary Dissertation to the Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica, by the author of this work. "Oh! bon, quelle folie! êtes vous de ces gens Soupçonneux, ombrageux? Croyez-vous aux méchans? Ce petit préjugé, qui ne va qu'au vulgaire ? Que rien n'est vrai sur rien, qu'importe ce qu'on dit? L'Aigle d'une maison n'est qu'un sot dans un autre. Si l'on s'aimoit si fort: l'amusement circule Par les préventions, les torts, le ridicule. Au reste chacun parle et fait comme il l'entend; Tout est mal, tout est bien: tout le monde est content."* From the form in which La Rochefoucauld's maxims are published, it is impossible to attempt a particular * In subjoining a prose translation of these exquisite verses, I need scarcely say that I aim at nothing but to convey to the merely English reader a general conception of the drift and substance of the original. "Good heavens! What extravagance! Is it possible that you should belong to that suspicious and jealous tribe who believe in the existence of the wicked? And that your fancy should realize to itself that phantom which is conjured up by the low prejudices of the vulgar? For my own part, to speak impartially, my faith does not go quite so far. I consider every body as bad, and nobody as bad. We all take and give, so as to balance our accounts pretty equally with each other. Do you speak of what passes in conversation? As there is neither merit, nor taste, nor opinion, which does not furnish matter of dispute,-as there is nothing which can be pronounced true of any thing,-of what consequence is it what one says? One man shall be my hero, and another shall be yours; the idol of this house is the laughing stock of the next. Here for instance, I say of Eraste, that his attempts at wit are dull and pitiful; elsewhere you will find people that will tell you that they think Eraste an amusing companion. If you talk of the actions of men, and are hurt with their intrigues and duplicity, in these, when examined to the bottom, I see nothing but a fund of entertainment to myself. And were you to attach to things of this sort the idea of crime, how many respectable men would you be forced to number with the knaves? To be agreeable covers every fault, or serves as its apology. The only crime now known is ennui, and every thing is good which helps us to escape from it. Were people to feel any serious attachment to their friends, this evil would soon make its way into the best company; for the circulation of amusement depends on prejudices, on calumnies, and on absurdities. In short every body now speaks and acts according to his own humor. All is wrong, all is right, and all the world is equally happy." examination of them; nor, indeed, do I apprehend that such an examination is necessary for any of the purposes which I have at present in view. So far as their tendency is unfavorable to the reality of moral distinctions, it is the same with that of Mandeville's system; and, therefore, the strictures I am now to offer on the latter writer may be applied with equal truth to the general conclusions which some have chosen to draw from the satirical observations of the former. Dr. Mandeville was born in Holland, where he received his education both in medicine and in philosophy. He made his first appearance in England about the beginning of the last century, and soon attracted. very general attention by the vivacity and licentiousness of his publications. One of his first performances was levelled at his own profession. It is entitled, "A Treatise on the Hypochondriac and Histeric Passions, interspersed with Discourses in the way of Dialogue on the Art of Physic, and Remarks on the modern practice of Physicians and Apothecaries." The work, however, by which he is best known, is a poem printed in 1714, with the title of "The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves turned Honest;" upon which he afterwards wrote remarks, and published the whole at London in 1723. This book was presented by the grand jury of Middlesex the same year, and was severely animadverted on soon after by some very eminent writers, particularly by Dr. Berkeley, bishop of Cloyne, and by Dr. Hutcheson of Glasgow, in his various treatises on ethical subjects. To the remarks on the Fable of the Bees, the author has prefixed an inquiry into the origin of moral virtue ; and it is to this inquiry that I propose to confine my-. self chiefly in the following strietures, as it exhibits his peculiar opinions concerning the principles of morals in a more systematical form than any of his other writings. In the course of the observations which I have to offer with respect to it, I shall perhaps be led to report one or two remarks which were already suggested by the doctrines of Locke. But for this repetition I hope that the importance of the subject will be a sufficient apology. VOL. V. 19 |