words of a different language they consider as mere jargon, or the result of caprice. In the same manner, forms of behaviour different from their own appear offensive and irrational, or a perverse substitution of absurd for reasonable manners.

"Among the varieties of this sort, we find actions, gestures, and forms of expression in their own nature indifferent, entered into the code of civil or religious duties, and enforced under the strongest sanctions of public censure or esteem; or under the strongest denunciations of the divine indignation or favor.

"Numberless ceremonies and observances in the ritual of different sects are to be accounted for on the same principles which produce the diversity of names or signs for the same thing in the vocabulary of different languages. Thus, the generality of Christians when they pray take off their hats; the Jews when they pray put them on. Such acts, how strongly soever they may affect the imaginations of the multitude, may justly be considered as part of the arbitrary language of particular countries; implying no diversity whatever in the ideas or feelings of those among whom they are established."*

As a further proof of the impossibility of judging of the general character of a people from their opinions concerning the morality of particular actions, we may observe, that, in some of the writings of the ancient moralists, we meet with the most refined and sublime precepts blended promiscuously with dissuasives from the most shocking and detestable crimes; in one sentence, perhaps, a precept which may be read with advantage by the most enlightened of the present times; and in the next, a dissuasive from some crime which no one now could be supposed to perpetrate, who was not arrived at the last stage of depravity. The following quotations from the IOIHMA NOTOETIKON, ascribed to Phocylides,† will sufficiently illustrate this

See Dr. Ferguson's Principles of Moral and Political Science, Vol. II. pp. 142, 143.

Phocylides, a Greek Poet and Philosopher, flourished about 540 years before the Christian era. The poem, however, which passes under his name, is supposed to have been the work of some writer contemporary with Adrian or Trajan. But this does not render the above quotations the less applicable to our present purpose.

remark. I shall transcribe them in a very literal Latin version, and would have endeavoured to bring them within the reach of a still wider circle of my readers by means of an English translation, if the simplicity of expression in the two learned languages had admitted of a literal version into our own tongue.

"Primum Deum cole, postea vero tuos parentes.

Omnibus justa tribue, neque judicium ad gratiam trahe.
Ne abjicias paupertatem, injuste ne judica personam:
Quod si tu male judicaveris, Deus te postea judicabit.
Mendico statim da, neque cras venire jube.

Exulem in domum excipe, et cæcum duc in viam.
Naufragorum miserere, quoniam navigatio incerta est.
Communis casus omnium; vita trochus; instabilis felicitas.
Sint in pari honore advenæ cum civibus;

Omnes enim paupertatem experimur vagam,

Regioque nullum stabile habet solum hominibus.

Qui volens injuste agit, malus vir est; sed qui ex necessitate,
Non dico prorsus malum; sed institutum examina cujusque.
Infantulis tenellis ne violenter manum corripueris ;
Neque mulier conceptum fœtum corrumpat in ventre,
Neque post partum canibus projiciat aut vulturibus lacerandum.
Neque ullus suæ conjugi gravidæ manum afferat."

After this follow some dissuasives from crimes too shocking to be named; and immediately after the following beautiful maxims.

"Tuum ama conjugem. Quid enim suavius et præstantius
Quam si viro consentit chara uxor usque ad senectam,

Et maritus suæ uxori, neque inter eos incidit contentio.

Reverere canos circum tempora, cedeque senibus
Sede et honoribus omnibus; natu vero præstantem

Senem, æqualem patris, paribus cum patre, honoribus venerare.
Servum ne lædas maledictis deferendo apud herum."

Accipe vel a servo, si recte sapiat, consilium.

I have dwelt very long on this subject, because, if it be painful to be staggered in our belief of the immutability of moral distinctions by the first aspect of the History of Mankind, it affords a tenfold pleasure to those who feel themselves interested in the cause of morality, when they find, on an accurate examination, that those facts on which sceptics have laid the greatest stress are not only consistent with the moral constitution of man, but result necessarily from this constitution, diversified in its effects according to the different cir

To

cumstances in which the individual is situated. trace in this manner the essential principles of the human frame amidst the various disguises it borrows from accidental causes, is one of the most interesting employments of philosophical curiosity; nor is there perhaps a more satisfactory gratification to a liberal mind than when it recognises, under the superstition, the ignorance, and the loathsome sensualities of savage life, the kindred features of humanity, and the indelible vestiges of that divine image after which man was originally formed.

One of the most pleasing facts of this kind that I have met with is mentioned by Sparman, in his Travels through the Southern Parts of Africa, where he had occasion to visit a tribe of men, whom we are accustomed to consider as sunk, by the grossness and brutishness of their manners, to the lowest point in the scale of civilization; and with this fact, (which I shall state in Sparman's own words, without any comment), I shall at present dismiss this part of our argument.

"A Hottentot is rich in proportion to the number of his cattle; but the richest is clothed, fed, and attended, no better than the poor; more trinkets of brass, of shells, or of beads; more fat in dressing his victuals, or in anointing his body; the honor or advantage of being able to maintain more servants or cowherds. And that which constitutes the distinction of rank in this simple race of men is the divine pleasure of doing good to his fellow creatures."

CHAPTER FOURTH.

CONTINUATION OF THE REMARKS ON THE OBJECTIONS STATED BY DIFFERENT WRITERS TO THE REALITY AND IMMUTABILITY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS, AND TO THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE MORAL FACULTY

AMONG MANKIND.

THE doctrines on this subject which I have hitherto been endeavouring to refute, (how erroneous soever in their principles, and dangerous in their consequences) have been maintained by some writers, who certainly were not unfriendly in their views to the interests of virtue and of mankind. In proof of this, I need only mention the name of Mr. Locke, who, in the course of a long and honorable life, distinguished himself no less by the exemplary worth of his private character, and by his ardent zeal for civil and religious liberty, than by the depth and originality of his philosophical speculations. His errors, however, ought not, on these accounts, to be treated with reverence; but, on the contrary, they require a more careful and severe examination, in consequence of the high authority they derive from his genius and his virtues. And, accordingly, I have enlarged on such of his opinions as seemed to me favorable to sceptical views concerning the foundation of morals, at much greater length than the ingenuity or plausibility of his reasonings in support of them may appear to some to have merited.

To these opinions of Locke Lord Shaftesbury has alluded in various parts of his works with a good deal of indignation; and particularly in the following passage of his Advice to an Author. "One would imagine that our philosophical writers, who pretend to treat of morals, should far outdo our poets in recommending virtue, and representing what is fair and amiable in human actions. One would imagine, that, if they turned their eyes towards remote countries, (of which they affect so much to speak) they should search for that simplicity of manners, and innocence of behaviour, which has been often known among mere savages, ere they were corrupted

by our commerce, and, by sad example, instructed in all kinds of treachery and inhumanity. 'Twould be of advantage to us to hear the cause of this strange corruption in ourselves, and be made to consider of our deviation from nature, and from the just purity of manners which might be expected, especially from a people so assisted and enlightened by religion. For who would not naturally expect more justice, fidelity, temperance, and honesty, from Christians, than from Mahometans or mere Pagans? But so far are our modern moralists from condemning any unnatural vices or corrupt manners, whether in our own or foreign climates, that they would have vice itself appear as natural as virtue; and, from the worst examples, would represent to us, that all actions are naturally indifferent; that they have no note or character of good or ill in themselves, but are distinguished by mere fashion, law, or arbitrary decree.' Wonderful philosophy! raised from the dregs of an illiterate mean kind, which was ever despised among the great ancients, and rejected by all men of action or sound erudition; but, in these ages, imperfectly copied from the original, and, with much disadvantage, imitated and assumed in common, both by devout and indevout attempters in the moral kind."

Besides these incidental remarks on Locke, which occur in different parts of Shaftesbury's writings, there is a letter of his addressed to a student at the university, which relates almost entirely to the opinion we have been considering, and contains some excellent observations on the subject.

In this letter Lord Shaftesbury observes, that "all those called free writers now-a-days have espoused those principles which Mr. Hobbes set a-foot in this last age.""Mr. Locke," he continues, " as much as I honor him on account of other writings, (on government, policy, trade, coin, education, toleration, &c.) and as well as I knew him, and can answer for his sincerity as a most zealous Christian and believer, did however go in the self same track, and is followed by the Tindals, and all the other ingenious free authors of our time.

""Twas Mr. Locke that struck the home blow; for