SECTION III.-Additional Remarks on Happinesss I. Influence of the Temper on Happiness II.-Influence of the Imagination on Happiness III.-Influence of Opinions on Happiness IV. Influence of Habits on Happiness SECTION IV.-Argument for Necessity, proposed by Leib- SECTION V.-Defence of the Scheme of Necessity by Col- SECTION VI.-Is the Evidence of Consciousness in favor of THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN. INTRODUCTION. In my former work on the Human Mind I confined my attention almost exclusively to Man considered as an intellectual being; and attempted an analysis of those faculties and powers which compose that part of his nature commonly called his intellect or his understanding. It is by these faculties that he acquires his knowledge of external objects; that he investigates truth in the sciences; that he combines means in order to attain the ends he has in view; and that he imparts to his fellow creatures the acquisitions he has made. A being might, I think, be conceived, possessed of these principles without any of the active propensities belonging to our species, at least without any of them but the principle of curiosity;-a being formed only for speculation, without any determination to the pursuit of particular external objects, and whose whole happiness consisted in intellectual gratifications. But although such a being might perhaps be conceived to exist, and although, in studying our internal frame, it be convenient to treat of our intellectual powers apart from our active propensities, yet, in fact, the two are very intimately, and indeed inseparably, connected in all our mental operations. I already hinted, that, even in our speculative inquiries, the principle of curiosity is necessary to account for the exertion we make; and it is still more obvious that a combination of means to accomplish particular ends presupposes some determination of our nature, which makes the attainment of these ends desirable. Our active propensities, therefore, are the motives which induce us to exert our intellectual powers; and our intellectual powers are the instruments by which we attain the ends recommended to us by our active propensities: "Reason the card, but passion is the gale." It will afterwards appear, that our active propensities are not only necessary to produce our intellectual exertions, but that the state of the intellectual powers, in the case of individuals, depends, in a great measure, on the strength of their propensities, and on the particular propensities which are predominant in the temper of their minds. A man of strong philosophical curiosity is likely to possess a much more cultivated and inventive understanding than another of equal natural capacity, destitute of the same stimulus. In like manner, the love of fame, or a strong sense of duty, may compensate for original defects, or may lay the foundation of uncommon attainments. The intellectual powers, too, may be variously modified by the habits arising from avarice, from the animal appetites, from ambition, or from the benevolent affections; insomuch that the moral principles of the miser, of the elegant voluptuary, of the political intriguer, and of the philanthropist, are not, perhaps, more dissimilar than the acquired capacities of their understandings, and the species of information with which their memories are stored. Among the various external indications of character, few circumstances will be found to throw more light on the ruling passions of individuals than the habitual direction of their studies, and the nature of those accomplishments which they have been ambitious to attain. When Montaigne complains of "the difficulty he experienced in remembering the names of his servants; of his ignorance of the value of the French coins which he was daily handling; and of his inability to distinguish the different kinds of grain from each other, both in the earth and in the granary; "* his observations, instead Montaigne's Essays, Book II. Chap. xvii. |