none of them measurable, are of varying degree, and all are hard to estimate. Yet the vast majority of post-Kantian writers, and many before him, have unhesitatingly replied, "Yes! the aesthetic experience is peculiar and specific." And their grounds, when not merely verbal, have usually been those of direct inspection.

It requires some audacity to run counter to such a tradition, and I do not do so without reflection. Yet, after all, the matter is one of classification, and when so many other divisions in psychology are being questioned and re-organised, this also may be re-examined.

The case for a distinct æsthetic species of experience can take two forms. It may be held that there is some unique kind of mental element which enters into æsthetic experiences and into no others. Thus Mr Clive Bell used to maintain the existence of an unique emotion 'æsthetic emotion' as the differentia. But psychology has no place for such an entity. What other will be suggested? Empathy, for example, as Vernon Lee herself insists, enters into innumerable other experiences as well as into æsthetic experiences. I do not think any will be proposed.

Alternatively, the aesthetic experience may contain no unique constituent, and be of the usual stuff but with a special form. This is what it is commonly supposed to be. Now the special form as it is usually described-in terms of disinterestedness, detachment, distance, impersonality, subjective universality, and so forth-this form, I shall try to show later, is sometimes no more than a consequence of the incidence of the experience, a condition or an effect of communication. But sometimes a structure which can be described in the same terms is an essential feature of the experience, the feature in fact upon which its value

depends. In other words, at least two different sets of characters, due to different causes, are, in current usage, ambiguously covered by the term 'æsthetic.' It is very necessary to distinguish the sense in which merely putting something in a frame or writing it in verse gives it an 'æsthetic character,' from a sense in which value is implied. This confusion, together with other confusions,1 has made the term nearly useless.

The aesthetic mode is generally supposed to be a peculiar way of regarding things which can be exercised, whether the resulting experiences are valuable, disvaluable or indifferent. It is intended to cover the experience of ugliness as well as that of beauty, and also intermediate experiences. What I wish to maintain is that there is no such mode, that the experience of ugliness has nothing in common with that of beauty, which both do not share with innumerable other experiences no one (except Croce; but this qualification is often required) would dream of calling æsthetic. But a narrower sense of æsthetic is also found in which it is confined to experiences of beauty and does imply value. And with regard to this, while admitting that such experiences can be distinguished, I shall be at pains to show that they are closely similar to many other experiences, that they differ chiefly in the connections between their constituents, and that they are only a further development, a finer organisation of ordinary experiences, and not in the least a new and different kind of thing. When we look at a picture, or read a poem, or listen to music, we are not doing something quite unlike what we were doing on our way to the Gallery or when we dressed in the morning. The fashion in which the experience is caused in us is

1 E.g. Any choice for which the chooser cannot give his reasons tends in the laboratory to be called an 'æsthetic choice.'

different, and as a rule the experience is more complex and, if we are successful, more unified. But our activity is not of a fundamentally different kind. To assume that it is, puts difficulties in the way of describing and explaining it, which are unnecessary and which no one has yet succeeded in overcoming.

The point here raised, and particularly the distinction between the two quite different sets of characters, on the ground of which an experience may be described as æsthetic or impersonal and disinterested, will become clearer at a later stage.1

A further objection to the assumption of a peculiar æsthetic attitude is that it makes smooth the way for the idea of a peculiar æsthetic value, a pure art value. Postulate a peculiar kind of experience, æsthetic experience, and it is an easy step to the postulation of a peculiar unique value, different in kind and cut off from the other values of ordinary experiences. "To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions." 2 So runs a recent extreme statement of the Esthetic Hypothesis, which has had much success. To quote another example less drastic but also carrying with it the implication that æsthetic experiences are sui generis, and their value not of the same kind as other values. "Its nature is to be not a part, nor yet a copy, of the real world (as we commonly understand that phrase), but a world in itself independent, complete, autonomous." 3

This view of the arts as providing a private heaven for æsthetes is, as will appear later, a

1 Cf. Chapters X and XXXII, and Impersonality, Index.

2 Clive Bell, Art, p. 25.

3 A. C. Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry, p. 5.

B

great impediment to the investigation of their value. The effects upon the general attitudes of those who accept it uncritically are also often regrettable; while the effects upon literature and the arts have been noticeable, in a narrowing and restriction of the interests active, in preciousness, artificiality and spurious aloofness. Art envisaged as a mystic, ineffable virtue is a close relative of the 'æsthetic mood', and may easily be pernicious in its effects, through the habits of mind which, as an idea, it fosters, and to which, as a mystery, it appeals.

envisaged

CHAPTER III

THE LANGUAGE OF CRITICISM

I too have seen

My vision of the rainbow Aureoled face
Of her whom men name Beauty: proud, austere :
Divinely fugitive, that haunts the world.

The Dominion of Dreams.

WHATEVER the disadvantages of modern æsthetics
as a basis for a theory of Criticism, the great advance
made upon prescientific speculation into the nature
of Beauty must also be recognised. That paralysing
apparition Beauty, the ineffable, ultimate, unanalys-
able, simple Idea, has at least been dismissed and
with her have departed or will soon depart a flock
of equally bogus entities. Poetry and inspiration
together, it is true, still dignify respectable quarters
with their presence.

"Poetry, like life, is one thing. . .. Essentially
a continuous substance or energy, poetry is historic-
ally a connected movement, a series of successive
integrated manifestations. Each poet, from Homer
or the predecessors of Homer to our own day,
has been, to some degree and at some point, the
voice of the movement and energy of poetry; in
him, poetry has for the moment become visible,
audible, incarnate; and his extant poems are the
record left of that partial and transitory incarnation.
... The
The progress of poetry, with its vast power and
exalted function, is immortal."1

1 G. W. Mackail, Lectures on Poetry. Introduction.

19

incarnate = [incarnating

embodied in flesh.