sufficient to set aside this account of the origin of the idea in question. But I apprehend that the notion of resistance itself, no less than that of direction, presupposes some knowledge of extension. Opposition to our muscular efforts does very probably give rise to a peculiar feeling in the mind, a feeling of ungratified desire accompanied by a tactual and a muscular sensation. But that feeling can bear no resemblance to the opposition which causes it. We are apt to be imposed upon by the mere name "feeling of resistance" but either the phrase has no meaning at all, or it means only the feeling which is caused by resistance: and this feeling does not imply in itself any knowledge of the opposition which causes it. The ingenious author of the passage which we have quoted, has, we humbly suspect, mistaken the feeling produced by resistance for the idea of the resistance which produces it. Resistance (as far at least as the idea of it can be serviceable in the present question) is opposition to voluntary motion: the idea of resistance, therefore, must imply a knowledge of the power of voluntary motion. But we can form no idea of motion, without matter and extension. So that the idea of resistance must be posterior to that of extension. The reasoning of the ingenious writer may appear more plausible so long as we retain the phrase "continued feeling of resistance." But let us substitute for it an equivalent

which will not force upon our minds, in the same unavoidable manner our own previous knowledge of the material world,-let us call it a continued feeling of ungratified desire accompanied by a tactual and a muscular sensation, and I apprehend we shall no longer be satisfied with this analysis of our idea of extension.

Such are the difficulties which attend the explanation of this apparently most simple of all our ideas. I do not know of any other plausible opinion, differing materially from those already considered, which has been advanced on the subject. For my own part it appears to me absolutely impossible to give any account whatever of this notion, upon the present theory of

sensation.

The remaining primary qualities of bodies are hardness, softness, fluidity, and motion. The three first may be considered as modes of resistance, which, as I have already said, I conceive to presuppose some knowledge of extension. As for motion, it is evident that without extension it cannot be imagined.

CHAPTER VI.

OPINION OF DR. REID REGARDING PERCEPTION-OBJECTIONABLE. -A DIFFERENT VIEW OF SENSATION EXHIBITED.-ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE MATERIAL WORLD.

SECTION I.

THUS have we given a patient, and, it is hoped, an impartial examination to the principal modes in which philosophers have tried to explain the origin of our idea of extension; and have found them all insufficient. Shall we then come to the conclusion, that is is impossible that we can have any such idea? No: we leave this conclusion to the admirers of Mr. Hume's philosophy. What a pity that he did not think of this! What a grand accession it would have made to his system of universal scepticism!-for then he might have advanced from the annihilation of matter and spirit, to the effectual destruction of those impressions and ideas, which his triumphant career had left in quiet possession of the desolate void. But

indeed he did enter on this last field of glory, and, had life been prolonged to him, perhaps he might have proceeded from the ideas of power, cause, and effect, to that of extension, and successively to all the others. For us, however, who are less ambitious, there is a different resource.

We might associate ourselves with Dr. Reid, who, with more acuteness than some of those who have depreciated him, saw that it was impossible to explain perception while the common philosophic theory of sensation was retained. He, therefore, retaining that theory, was of opinion that perception is a distinct faculty of the mind, which will admit of no analysis,-a sort of intuitive knowledge of the qualities of external objects, spontaneously arising in the mind on these objects being presented to the senses. This opinion, however, is liable to great objections. For in the first place, our perceptions, by the different senses, differ more from one another than any one of them differs from judgment. If, therefore, this be a faculty distinct from judgment, it were better to have a separate faculty of perception for each sense. In the next place, some of our perceptions are clearly capable of analysis, especially those of vision. Distance, magnitude, and position, appear to be as much a part of our visual perceptions, as colour, light, and shade; yet it is abundantly proved by indisputable facts, that the former are ascertained only by the judgment.

If in this case perception may be analysed into the operation of other faculties, does not this favor the thought that other perceptions also may be analysed? Where then shall we stop? Where mark the boundaries of these two faculties? Dr. Reid professed to proceed on the principles of common sense. In this case, he has unwarily deviated from them, and holds a sort of middle ground between common sense, and erroneous philosophy: for he retains the common philosophic theory of sensation, a theory unknown to common sense, and contradicted by every man's natural, I had almost said instinctive, belief. Here, I think, lay his error; had he rejected that hypothesis, he would not have found it necessary to coin a new faculty.

Every common working man says, that he has the knowledge of an external extended world, as certainly as that of his own existence: let us hear then his account of it. He says he feels it, and sees it, and cannot but believe it :-he gives, in short, the very account of it which first came under our consideration,-the object makes an impression on a part of the surface of his body corresponding in extent to its magnitude. How strangely is the man deluded? Why does he think of an explanation which we have already shewn to be so absurd? Come then, let us try to convince him of his mistake:-let us use the arguments by which we refuted it before. We