The Drofs cements what else were too refin'd, And in one Int'reft Body acts with Mind. But left it fhould be objected that this Account favours the Doctrine of Neceffity, and would infinuate that Men are only acted upon in the Prodution of Good out of Evil; the Poet teacheth [from 1. 186 to 193] that Man is a free Agent, and hath it in his own Power to turn the natural Paffions into Virtues or into Vices, properly fo called: Reafon the Biafs turns from Good to Ill, Secondly, If it fhould be objected, that tho' the Poet doth indeed tell us fome Actions are beneficial and fome hurtful, yet he could not call thofe Virtuous, nor thefe Vicious, because, as he has defcribed Things, the Motive appears to be only Gratification of fome Paffion; give me leave to anfwer for him, that this would be mistaking the Argument, which in this Epistle [to l. 239.] confiders the Paffions only with regard to Society, that is, with regard to their Effects rather than their Motives.-That however 'tis his Design to teach that Actions are properly virtuous and vicious; and tho' it be difficult to diftinguifh genuine Virtue from fpurious, they having both the fame Appearance, and both the fame public Effects, yet they may be difembarraffed. If it be asked, by what Means? He replies [from 1. 192 to 195] by Confcience, which is fufficient to the Purpofe; for 'tis 'tis only a Man's own Concern, to know whether his Virtue be pure and folid; for what is that to athers, while the Effect of this Virtue, whether real or unsubstantial, is, as to them, the same? This Light and Darkness, in our Chaos join'd, What fhall divide? The God within the Mind. A Platonic Phrafe for CONSCIENCE; and here employed with great Judgment and Propriety. For Confcience either fignifies, fpeculatively, the Judg ment we pafs of Things upon whatever Principles we chance to have; and then it is only OPINION, a very unable Judge and Divider: Or elfe, it fignifies, practically, the Application of the eternal Rule of Right (received by us as the Law of God) to the Regulation of our Actions; and then it is properly CONSCIENCE, The God (or the Law of God) within the Mind, of Power to divide the Light from the Darkness in this Chaos of the Paffions. But ftill it will be faid, why all this Difficulty to distinguish true Virtue from falfe? The Poet fhews why [from 1. 194 to 201] "That tho' indeed "Vice and Virtue fo invade each other's Bounds, "that fometimes we can fcarce tell where one <<ends and the other begins, yet great Purposes "are ferv'd thereby, no lefs than the perfecting "the Conftitution of the Whole; as Lights and "Shades, which run into one another in a wellСс wrought Picture, make the Harmony and Spi❝rit of the Compofition." But on this Account to say there is neither Vice nor Virtue, the Poet fhews [from 1. 200 to 207] would be juft as wife as to fay there is neither black nor white; because the Shade of that, and the Light of this often run into one another: Afk your own Heart, and nothing is so plain; "Tis to mistake them costs the Time and Pain. This is an Error of Speculation which leads Men fo foolishly to conclude, that there is neither Vice nor Virtue. 2. There is another of Practice, which hath more common and fatal Effects; and is next confidered [from 1. 206 to 211:] It is this, That tho', at the first Afpect, Vice be fo horrible as to affright all Beholders, yet, when by Habit we are once grown familiar with her, we first suffer, and in time begin to lose the Memory of her Nature: Vice is a Monster of fo frightful Mien, As, to be hated, needs but to be feen; Yet feen too oft, familiar with her Face, We first endure, then pity, then embrace. Which neceffarily implies an equal Ignorance in the Nature of Virtue. Hence Men conclude, that there is neither one nor the other. But it is not only that Extreme of Vice next to Virtue, which betrays us into these Mistakes: We are deceived too, as he fhews us [from 1. 210 to 221] by our Obfervations about the other Ex treme: But But where th'Extreme of Vice was ne'er agreed: Afk where's the North? at York 'tis on the Tweed, In Scotland, at the Orcades; and there At Greenland, Zembla, or the Lord knows where. For, from the Extreme of Vice's being unfettled, and perpetually fhifting, Men conclude, that Vice itself is only nominal. i.e. 3. There is yet a third Cause of this Error of no Vice no Virtue, compofed of the other two, partly fpeculative, and partly practical: And this alfo the Poet confiders [from 1. 220 to 229] fhewing it arifeth from the Imperfection of the best Characters, and the Inequality of all; whence it happens that no Man is extremely virtuous or vicious, nor extremely conftant in the Purfuit of either. Why it so happens the Poet affigns an admirable Reason in this Line: For, Vice or Virtue, SELF directs it still. An Adherence or Regard to what is, in the Senfe of the World, a Man's own Intereft, making an Extreme in either impoffible. Its Effect in keeping a good Man from the Extreme of Virtue needs no Explanation: And in an ill Man, Self-intereft fhewing him the Neceffity of fome kind of Reputation, the procuring and preferving that will neceffarily keep him from the Extreme of Vice. The Mention of this Principle that felf directs Vice and Virtue, and its Confequence, which is, that H Each Each Individual feeks a feveral Goal, leads the Author to obferve That Heav'n's great View is one, and that the Whole; and this brings him naturally round again to his main Subject, namely, God's producing Good out of Ill, which he profecutes in his inimitable Manner [from 1. 228 to 239.] That counterworks each Folly and Caprice; That difappoints th'Effect of ev'ry Vice: That happy Frailties to all Ranks apply'd, Shame to the Virgin, to the Matron Pride, Fear to the Statesman, Rashness to the Chief, To Kings Prefumption, and to Crowds Belief. I. Hitherto the Poet hath been employed in difcourfing of the Use of the Paffions, with regard to Society at large, and in freeing his Doctrine from Objections. This is the first general Division of the Subject of this Epistle. II. He comes to fhew [from 1. 238 to 251] the Use of these Paffions, with regard to the more confined Circle of our Friends, Relations and Acquaintance. And this is the Second general Di vifion : Wants, Frailties, Paffions closer still ally The common Int'reft, or endear the Tie : As |