upon acting, the other regulates his Action. However, these Principles are natural, not moral: And, therefore, in themselves, neither good nor bad; but So, only as they are directed.

Nor this a good, nor that a bad we call,

Each works its End, to move or govern all;
And to their proper Operation still
Afcribe all Good, to their improper, Ill.

This Obfervation is made with great Judgment, in Oppofition to the defperate Folly of thofe Fanatics, who, as the Afcetic, pretend to eradicate SelfLove; as the Mystic, would ftifle Reason; and both, on the abfurd Fancy of their being moral, not natural Principles.

The Poet proceeds [from 1. 48 to 57] more minutely to mark out the diftinct Offices of these two Principles, which he had before affigned only in general; and here he fhews their Neceffity; for without Self-Love, as the Spring, Man would be unactive, and without Reason, as the Balance, active to no Purpose.

Fixt like a Plant on his peculiar Spot,

To draw Nutrition, propagate, and rot:
Or Meteor like flame lawless thro' the Void,
Destroying others, by himself destroy'd.

Having thus explained the Ends and Offices of each Principle, he goes on [from 1.56 to 69] to fpeak of their Qualities: And fhews how they are fitted to discharge thofe Functions, and answer their respective Intentions. The Business of Self

Love

Love being to excite to Action, it is quick and im petuous; and moving instinctively, has, like Attraction, its Force prodigiously increased as the Object approaches, and proportionably leffen'd as that recedes. On the contrary, Reafon, like the Author of Attraction, is always calm and fedate, and equally preferves itself, whether the Object be near, or far off. Hence the moving Principle is made more strong; tho' the restraining, be more quickfighted. The Confequence he draws from this is, that, if we would not be carried away to our Deftruction, we must always keep Reafon upon Guard.

But it would be objected, that if this Account be true, human Life would be most miferable, and, even in the wifeft, a perpetual Conflict between Reafon and the Paffions. To this therefore the Poet replies [from 1. 68 to 71.] First, that Providence has fo graciously contrived, that even in the voluntary Exercise of Reafon, as in the mere mechanic Motion of a Limb, Habit makes that, which was at first done with Pain, easy and natural. And fecondly, that the Experience gained by the long Exercise of Reafon goes a great Way towards eluding the Force of Self-love. Now, the attending to Reafon, as here recommended, will gain us this Habit and Experience.

Attention, Habit and Experience gains;

Each strengthens Reason, and Self-love restrains. Hence it appears, that this Station in which Rea

fon

fon is to be kept conftantly upon Guard, is not fo uneafy a one as may be at first imagined.

From this Defcription of Self-love and Reafon it follows, as the Poet obferves [from 1. 70 to 83] that both confpire to one End, namely human Happiness, tho' they be not equally expert in the Choice of the Means; the Difference being this, that the first haftily feizes every thing which has the Appearance of Good; the other weighs and examines whether it be indeed what it appears.

This fhews, as he next obferves, the Folly of the Schoolmen, who confider them as two oppofite Principles, the one Good and the other Ill: The Obfervation is seasonable and judicious; for this dangerous School-Opinion gives great Support to the Manichean or Zoroaftran Error, the Confutation of which was one of the Author's chief Ends of Writing. For if there be two Principles in Man, a good and bad, it is natural to think him the joint Product of the two Manichean Deities (the first of which contributed to his Reason, the other to his Paffions) rather than the Creature of one individual Cause. This was Plutarch's Notion, and, as we may fee in him, of the more ancient Manicheans. It was of Importance therefore to reprobate and fubvert a Notion that ferved to the Support of fo dangerous an Error. And this the Poet has done with more Force and Clearness than is often to be found in whole Volumes wrote against that heretical Opinion:

Let fubtile Schoolmen teach these Friends to fight,
More ftudious to divide, than to unite;

And Grace and Virtue, Sense and Reason split,
With all the rafh Dexterity of Wit.

But the French Tranflator has mistaken these Lines for a Reflection, not on the Theology, as Mr. Pope intended them, but on the Logic of the Schools, with which the Poet had here nothing to do. This, it is true, delights in Diftinctions without Difference, which is indeed a Fault, but not of fo high Malignity as the other: that, which the Poet cenfures, leading directly into Error; this, which his Tranflator reproves, only hindering our Progrefs in Truth or Science.

Qu'un Scholastique vain cherchant à discourir
Cache la Verité loin de la découvrir,

Que, par un long tiffu d'Argumens inutiles,
Par des tours ambigus, par des raifons inutiles,
Voulant tout divifer jusques à l'infini,

Il fepare avec art ce qui doit être uni.

Now, tho' this Fault in the Logic of the Schools be univerfally owned and condemned by all out of them, and by no one more than by Mr. De Croufaz himself, in his Books of Logic, yet in pure Contradiction to Mr. Pope, who, as he thought, had condemned it, he could not forbear faying, A Poet may happen to write with more Elegance than a Schoolman, and yet for all that not be able to exprefs himself with more Juftness and Precision.

Commentaire, p. 152.

The

The Poet having given this Account of the Nature of Self-love in general, comes now to anatomize it, in a Difcourfe of the PASSIONS, which he aptly names the Modes of Self-love; the Object of all these, he fhews [from 1. 82 to 91] is Good; and when under the Guidance of Reason, real Good; either of our own, or of another; for fome Goods not being capable of Divifion or Communication, and Reason, at the fame time directing us to provide for ourselves, we therefore, in pursuit of these Objects, fometimes aim at our own Good, fometimes at the Good of others; when fairly aiming at our own, the Paffion is call'd Prudence, when at another's, Virtue.

Hence (as he fhews from 1. 90 to 95) appears the Folly of the Stoics, who would eradicate the Paffions, Things fo neceffary both to the Good of the Individual, and of the Kind. Which prepofterous Method of promoting Virtue, he therefore very reasonably reproves. But as it was from Obfervation of the Evils occafion'd by the Paffions, that the Stoics thus extravagantly projected their Extirpation, the Poet recurs [from 1. 94 to 101] to his grand Principle, so often before, and to so good Purpose, insisted on, that

- partial Ill is univerfal Good;

and fhews, that, tho' the Tempest of the Paffions, like that of the Air, may tear and ravage some few Parts of Nature in its Paffage, yet the falutary Agitation produced by it preferves the whole in Life and Vigour. This is his firft Argument against