nothing but the mere feeling of security. Whenever they have to pay upon a policy, it is to them so much loss, and the business could not go on at all, if there were not hundreds willing to pay the premium for one who has to claim the compensation. It is now thought almost disgraceful in a private person to neglect insurance. What should such neglect be thought in a nation-in a nation having greater treasures to insure, and easier means of insuring them, than any other in the world?

Steam Tactics.

The new element of steam makes the necessity for precaution much greater than before. It completely supersedes a system of warfare in which England at all events had established a superiority, and must introduce another in which she will have to start as it were afresh, and on equal terms with her rivals. No one knows or can know to what changes in naval tactics this single cause may lead. We have seen, indeed, what wonders steam ships can do in the way of bombardment, and against Asiatics, and nothing could be more unjust than to cast a slight upon the brilliant achievements of the English Navy in Syria and China; but the great naval battles, in which the tug shall be of Greek with Greek, are all yet in the future. And the character of that future may be mainly determined by ideas now working in the brain of some smooth-faced lieutenant or some nimble topman, just as the military genius which astonished the old tacticians at Monte Notte belonged, twelve months previously, to a young artillery officer, who was sauntering about the streets of Paris in want of employment. Nor is it at all impossible for naval heroes to be born at both sides of the Channel. St. Malo before now has had her Duguay Trouin, and Dunkirk her Jean Bart, who, as the enthusiastic French historian' tells us, did, in their day, give matter for thought to the people of Plymouth. If anything of the sort should

1 Michelet.

occur again, one would certainly hope to see in that most magnificent of harbours a little more activity than was shown in the matter of the Amazon.

Age of Naval Commanders.

One more remark must be added upon a point of considerable delicacy, but which ought not to be withheld because statesmen, whatever they may think, do not speak of such things, and journals, like judges, only pronounce opinions when some overt acts are brought in question before them. The Admirals of England are no doubt all possessed of the gallantry which belongs to the profession, and we know from eminent instances to how late a period the energy of command may survive; but it must still be considered a doubtful policy, to observe something like a rule of not entrusting the highest commands, except where the threescore years and ten commonly allotted to the life of man are nearly or altogether completed. It certainly was not by the observance of this rule that Wellington, Napoleon, or Nelson, was enabled to win great battles, but it was by the observance of this rule that England sustained that calamitous reverse, which has made the disasters of Cabul as memorable in English military history, as the loss of Varus and his legions was in that of Rome.

The Artillery.

There yet remains one branch of the national defences upon which nothing has been said, and the efficiency of which still more evidently depends upon an elaborate apparatus and an elaborate education. Is the condition of the artillery what it should be? Whatever it be, it is certain that if it should fall to the lot of a commander to defend England, he will have to rely solely upon such men and equipments as he finds actually ready, for neither by the militia, nor by volunteering, nor by

impressment, nor by any imaginable short cut, can you call into existence a considerable force of artillery. It is here as it is in the different departments of industry; every step of progress implies the use of more complicated and expensive machinery, and the more machinery is used, the more there is need of skilled labour to direct it. The hard work is done by the machine, but the guidance and efficiency of it require the disciplined human intelligence. Now it is pre-eminently true, that military success has become more and more dependent upon that combination of machines and skilled labour which is found in the corps of artillery. The Duke of Wellington's one remarkable failure in Spain-that before Burgos-was a failure for want of artillery; and there is probably no kind of force in which France, both from natural aptitude, and from the traditional system left by the Empire, is more brilliant and effective. Now of the inadequacy of this all-important artillery force in England very strong representations have been made, without, so far as I know, receiving any satisfactory reply'. Ten thousand artillerymen at most are scattered over a chain of garrisons and stations in all parts of the world. At Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands, there are said to be more than twelve hundred pieces of heavy ordnance, and those guns have rather less than one man to each of them, five being about the number which a gun requires to work it. Then there are the garrisons of Quebec, Bermuda, St. Helena, Ceylon, Hong Kong, and one knows not how many others, to all of which England is wedded for better for worse, for the greatness of empire never permits recession of the frontier. All that she holds she must try to keep, if she desires to be free to keep anything. All these garrisons, however, must have their draughts out of the corps of artillery, and the few that are left are all that England has to rely upon for her own protection.

1 See, especially, an article in the Quarterly Review for March, 1848, evidently from a writer perfectly conversant with the subject.

The Dockyard Battalions.

The inadequacy of this corps, and the influence of the reigning spirit of economy on all Governments, are shown in the expedient adopted for strengthening the artillery force. The artizans in the dockyards are a very intelligent and superior class of men, and it was a good thought to organize those men into battalions, and train them as gunners, so as to enable them in an emergency to aid in the defence of the great naval stations at which their work lies. But it could never have been reasonably expected that those men would perform all the services which are supposed to require at least two years' drill, and exclusive attention. Scarcely, however, has this auxiliary force begun its amateur practice, when the spirit of economy transforms it into a complete and universally available corps of artillery. It is to do hard work in sawing, and hammering, and welding, and yet be ready to scamper off with hundreds of heavy guns to some distant point of the coast to oppose an invader. Such was the service which one of the most farsighted of English ministers seemed on one occasion to expect from those dockyard battalions. He was asked by the writer to whom reference has been already made, whether he knew where to lay his hands on the carriages and horses necessary for this operation; whether he was aware of the difficulty which men had in acting as efficient drivers, "of the time and care required to teach an artillery soldier how to keep his distances on the march and in position," and of the pains that must be used before venturing to harness horses to artillery, "so that they may be able to bear not only the noise of great guns, but the fall of innumerable projectiles about them, and the crashing of the machines which they may be in the very act of drawing."1 It is impossible to avoid the suspicion that the eminent person to whom those queries were addressed had not fully present to his mind the nature of the operations which he supposed to be

I Quarterly Review, March, 1848.

practicable. The dockyard battalions are worthy of all praise, but they can scarcely be a second corps of artillery. Moreover, it is driving a very hard bargain in behalf of the State, to expect, in return for a single payment, the work of a skilful artizan, and also the work of an accomplished artillerist. They are not accustomed to throw away money in Lancashire, but still the wages of the hands are never expected to serve instead of a police-rate.

Morality of Force.

Before leaving this subject, it is necessary to take notice of the impressions of a class of minds highly deserving of respect, to whom reasonings and calculations like those of the present chapter will seem not so much erroneous as revolting and abominable. They have a vague but very strong notion, that the whole business of war is demoralising to those who engage in it; that every extension of the military and naval profession, therefore, ought to be resisted as an evil far outweighing any good that it can accomplish. Those, however, who have this feeling are rarely consistent, for there is no argument against armies or navies which does not go to the renunciation of every exercise of physical force-an extreme to which none but the most extravagant theorists are found to venture. Few think it wrong to resist the midnight burglar, or would hesitate to use the surest means of protecting wife or child from outrage. It may often become the most sacred of duties to use force, to avert injustice from the weak and innocent; and if this be once accorded, the same principle must apply to all kinds of force, from the vigorous push or the unarmed fist, to the line-of-battle ship and the park of artillery. It is true, indeed, that the abuse of a military organization is a most fearful crime. He who holds such power, holds it under an awful responsibility. It is thus at every step of human progress. The capacity of evil is enlarged at the same time with the capacity for good. But the God of armies does count armies amongst the instru