than one intellectual leader, too, has shown the rare quality of practical wisdom. Goethe's calm strength of will displaying itself in a careful ordering of the daily life is matter of common knowledge. Beethoven managed just to keep himself right by resolute bodily exercise. In George Eliot an exceptional feeling of moral responsibility sufficed for a nice economising of the fitful supply of physical energy.

At the same time, our slight study of the ways of genius has familiarised us with illustrations of striking moral weaknesses. We have seen a meaning in Rochefoucauld's paradox that 'il n'appartient qu'aux grands hommes d'avoir de grands défauts.' The large draught of mental energy into the channels of imaginative production is apt to leave the will ill-provided in working out the multifarious tasks of a temperate and virtuous life.

Our conclusion is that the possession of genius carries with it special liabilities to the action of the disintegrating forces which environ us all. It involves a state of delicate equipoise, of unstable equilibrium, in the psycho-physical organisation. Paradoxical as it may seem, one may venture to affirm that great original power of mind is incompatible with nice adjustment to surroundings, and so with perfect well-being. And here it is that we see the real qualitative difference between genius and talent. This last means superior endowment in respect of the common practical intelligence which all men understand and appraise. The man of talent follows the current modes of thought, keeps his eye steadily fixed on the popular eye, produces the kind of thing which hits the taste of the moment, and is never guilty of the folly of abandoning himself to the intoxicating excitement of production. To the original inventor of ideas and moulder of new forms of art this intoxication is, as we have seen, everything. He is under a kind of divine behest to make and fashion something new and great, and at the moment of compliance recks little of the practical outcome to himself. And such recklessness is clearly only one form of imprudence, and so of mal-adaptation.

But if improvident, he is improvident in a high cause. Emerson and others have taught us the uses of the great man. The teacher of a new truth, the discoverer of a higher and worthier form of artistic expression, is one in advance of his age, who by his giant exertions enables the community, and even the whole race, to reach forward to a further point in the line of intellectual evolution. He is a scout who rides out well in advance of the intellectual army, and who by this very advance and isolation from the main body is exposed to special perils. Thus genius, like philanthropy or conscious selfsacrifice for others, is a mode of variation of human nature which, though unfavourable to the conservation of the individual, aids in the evolution of the species.

If this be a sound view of the nature and social function of the

man of genius, it may teach more than one practical lesson. Does it not, for example, suggest that there is room just now for more consideration in dealing with the infirmities of great men? There is no need of exonerating intellectual giants from the graver human responsibilities. We do well to remember that genius has its own special responsibilities, that noblesse oblige here too. At the same time we shall do well also to keep in mind that the life of intellectual creation has its own peculiar besetments, and that in the very task of fulfilling his high and eminently humane mission, and giving the world of his mind's best, the great man may become unequal to the smaller fortitudes of everyday life. To judge of the degree of blameworthiness of faults of temper is a nice operation which may even transcend the ability of a clever and practised critic. Perhaps the temper most appropriate to the contemplation of genius, and most conducive to fairness of moral judgment, is one in which reverence is softened by personal gratitude, and this last made more completely human by a touch of regretful pity.

JAMES SULLY.

THE IRISH PARLIAMENT OF 1782.

MR. PARNELL has at last put in definite words the demands of the Irish Nationalist party.

In his speech at Cork, on the 21st of January last, he is reported to have said:

We cannot ask for less than the restitution of Grattan's Parliament, with its important privileges and wide and far-reaching constitution.

This irreducible minimum will be demanded by a numerous and compact Irish party in the next Parliament; and it is important, therefore, to know what was the constitution, what were the powers of that Parliament whose restitution is to be asked for. It is strange that, practically, no work exists which gives a concise and succinct account of it. Mr. Lecky brings the history of the Irish Parliament only as far as 1782; Mr. Froude's history of it is intermingled with the narrative of other Irish affairs; whilst the late Chief Justice Whiteside's lectures on the subject by no means go sufficiently deep to satisfy the requirements of the political student.

The constitution of the Parliament of 1782, or, as Mr. Parnell calls it, Grattan's Parliament,' cannot be satisfactorily understood without an acquaintance with the previous history of the Irish Parliament.

According to Sir John Davies-probably the greatest authority on the subject-the first time and occasion for instituting the High Court of Parliament in Ireland was in the reign of Edward the First. England then, torn by internal dissensions, and threatened with Scotch incursions, was unable to look after her subjects who had migrated to and settled in Ireland; and they, left to their own resources, obtained authority from England, and held a Parliament among themselves. This privilege of separate legislative power, once gained, was not surrendered. That it was not a satisfactory form of connection between the two countries, however, is proved by the fact that Henry the Seventh most materially modified it. In fact, he annihilated the independence of the Irish Parliament and made the government of Ireland directly dependent on the sovereign's own

will and pleasure. Sir Edward Poyning was selected to give effect to the King's determination, and was sent to Ireland as Deputy. On his arrival there, in 1494, he convened a Parliament; and a most important and far-reaching Act, known throughout Irish history as Poyning's Act, was passed. It enacted that

no Parliament be holden hereafter in the said land but at such season as the King's Lieutenant and Council there first do certify the King under the Great Seal of that land the causes and consideration, and all such Acts as them seemeth should pass in the same Parliament,

and until the King and his English Council had signified their approval of the same under the Great Seal of England. Thus by a single Act Henry made the Irish Parliament absolutely dependent on the English Government, and for nearly three centuries afterwards that one Act ruled all Irish legislation.

In the next reign the identity and inseparability of the Crowns of the two countries were enacted. Hitherto the English sovereigns had only been Lords' of Ireland, but in 1542 it was enacted by the Irish Parliament that

the King's Highness, his heirs and successors, kings of England, be always kings of this land of Ireland, and should hold and enjoy all prerogatives, dignities, &c., for ever—as united and knit to the imperial Crown of the realm of England.

Thenceforward the union of the Crowns was an accomplished and recognised fact, and the chief executive power in both countries was vested in the same person; but as the sovereign could not himself reside in Ireland or personally conduct the government of that country, a great part of his authority was delegated to a Deputy, or Viceroy, or Lord-Lieutenant, with whom a Council was associated. This Irish Council consisted of some twenty or thirty members -the Lord Chancellor of Ireland and some of the judges, the Archbishop of Dublin, a bishop or two, and some nobles. Practically it was a Third Chamber of the Legislature, as all Irish Bills had to receive its approval before going before the English Privy Council, and before submission to the Irish Parliament.

Such was the Constitution of Ireland at the beginning of the seventeenth century; such, too, was it at the end of that century, for we may pass over the brief interruptions in this form of government: one when Cromwell, with the gifted foresight of a great statesman, united the Irish and English Parliaments, and established complete free trade between the two countries; and one when James the Second, driven from England, sought to make a stand in Ireland, and convoked a Parliament there. After each of these brief interruptions the country reverted to its Constitution under Poyning's Act.

In the early part of the eighteenth century an important event occurred which still further reduced the value of the Irish Constitution.

A dispute arose as to the relative authority of the Irish House of Lords and the House of Lords of Great Britain. In a certain legal case-it is unnecessary to go into details-an appeal from the decision of the law courts was made to the Irish House of Lords. The appeal was further carried to the English House of Lords, which set aside the decision of the Irish Lords. The latter protested strenuously against the English Lords assuming a superior authority, and presented a petition to the King, in which they urged that,

if the power of the judicature may, by a vote of the British Lords, be taken away from the Parliament of Ireland, no reason can be given why the same may not, in like manner, deprive us of the benefit of our whole Constitution.

The answer given to this petition was the celebrated 'Declaratory Act' (6 George I.), which enacted

that the Kingdom of Ireland hath been, is, and of right ought to be subordinate unto, and dependent upon, the imperial Crown of Great Britain, as being inseparably united and annexed thereunto; and that the King, with the consent of the Lords and Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled, hath power to make laws of sufficient force to bind the Kingdom and people of Ireland; and that the House of Lords of Ireland have not, nor ought of right to have, any jurisdiction to judge of, or affirm, or reverse any decree made in any court within the said Kingdom, and that all proceedings before the said House of Lords upon any such judgment or decrees are void.

It may here be remarked that up to this time Parliament was by no means so indispensable an institution that prolonged periods could not elapse without it. From 1585 to 1612 (27 years) there was no Parliament; and again from 1615 to 1634 (19 years) and from 1666 to 1692 (26 years) no Parliaments were held. By the close of George the Second's reign, however, it used to meet every second year.

Another matter which must be mentioned is, that there was no limitation of time for the existence of a Parliament, except the life of the sovereign. Some Parliaments lasted for many years-that of George the Second was actually in existence for thirty-three.

The Irish Constitution remained in this powerless and inert form down to the end of George the Second's reign; then, under the awakening feeling of the Protestants of Ireland, who had long been suffering under a denial of nearly all the privileges which their brethren in England had gained by the Revolution, many concessions affecting the constitution and powers of Parliament were secured. Before detailing them, the constitution of both Houses of Parliament and the electorate must be described; and it is to be borne in mind that, with one exception hereafter to be stated, the description now given is that also of the constitution and electorate of Grattan's Parliament. Of the House of Lords little need be said. It consisted of about