In Russia there are several forms of procedure in the instruction of political crimes. In our case the Administration adopted the mixed procedure that is to say, the case was to be conducted by the gendarmes and by the procureur. At the outset of our examination the colonel of gendarmerie told us we were accused of belonging to a secret society whose aim was the overthrow of the Government, and of distributing the proclamations of the socialist revolutionary party. The penalty inflicted by the Penal Code for these crimes is a trifleonly loss of all civil rights and hard labour for fifteen years. As to the proofs of our guilt, they were very convincing. On the 1st of April, 1883, at Kamienietz-Podolsk the Socialists had distributed certain proclamations, and on the 31st of March I had been with my wife to Kiev, where these proclamations were printed; one of the prisoners arrested for this affair had heard from another accused person that the proclamations had been given him by my wife, and above all a student of the University of Kiev, whom we did not even know by name, mentioned my wife's name in a letter written to a friend. We only found out all this evidence against us when the preparation of the case was already finished, a month after the search of our rooms. According to custom and to regulation the evidence brought against an accused person is only communicated to him in very general terms. For instance, he is told there are witnesses against him, but what is the nature of the evidence or who the witnesses are is kept secret. After our interrogatory we were placed under police surveillance, and forbidden to leave the town.

The house search and the inquiry had made our position very disagreeable. Clients would not come to a barrister accused of high treason, especially as to do so would be dangerous. The uncertainty as to what each day might bring us, my experience of the past, all that went on around us decided me to wind up all my business affairs as quickly as possible and to make my provision for the future. But the gendarmes would not leave us in peace. On the 30th of May the gendarme and procureur informed me that I must deposit a security of 6,000 roubles for myself and my wife, and that if this were not paid in at once we should be thrown into prison. Not having so large a sum ready to hand, I requested a few hours' grace, but this the functionaries refused, and it was only through the help of relatives and colleagues that we were not there and then arrested.

It was well known to the authorities that I am not a rich man, and they had supposed I should be unable to pay down such a heavy sum. Finding they had miscalculated, they conceived a new plan. On the 30th of May I heard from a secret but sure source that in two or three days we were to be arrested and imprisoned for good. We had no wish to thus gratify our persecutors, and so on the 3rd of June we left Russia. In a week we had escaped to Geneva.

My story is ended. The reader has seen that for fourteen years my life has been a turbulent one. He has seen, too, what were the 'crimes' that made it such. I need not add that I am but one example among many hundreds, and I leave it to my readers to say what the Government of a country must be where such acts as I have described are not only possible but of daily occurrence.

ISIDOR GOLDSMITH

THE GREAT WALL' OF INDIA.

It would be of great advantage to England if at the present moment the idea could be removed from the minds of the English people that Herat is in any way the key of India. Some thirty years ago, very many of those who were then considered to be experts on Central Asian politics believed it to be so, but in later years a better knowledge of its real position and value has been gained, and it is now known that if an invasion of India is ever contemplated by a foreign power, there are other and better roads leading towards the Indian frontier than that via Herat; nevertheless for many reasons it would be a valuable acquisition, and that Russia will occupy this position at some no very distant date, there can I think be little doubt; and the almost certainty of her doing so will, I hope, compel the people of England to turn their serious attention to the strengthening of the natural frontier of India, which has already been commenced, and which may be made, I believe, absolutely impregnable.

I trust, therefore, that all efforts will now be concentrated on this object, and that wild and impracticable schemes for attempting to turn Russia out of Herat, or of taking possession of it ourselves, will be put on one side for ever; such schemes can only lead to enormous expenditure both of treasure and life, and to no practical results.

Let us examine our present Indian frontier, which commences to the south, on the Indian Ocean near the seaport of Kurrachee, and ends on the north at Peshawer. Along this whole length, a distance of some 750 miles, runs the Suliman range of mountains, varying in height and ruggedness and pierced by many passes, the two main ones being the Bolan and the Kyber, and joining the Himalayan ranges north of Peshawer. To the east, along the foot of these mountains, nearly for their whole length, runs a strip of desert, then comes a fringe of cultivation, then the river Indus, unfordable at any point from its mouths to beyond Peshawer, which it passes at Attock -to the west of this range, marking the Indian frontier, between the Kyber and the Bolan passes, lies Afghanistan, with which country and the character of its inhabitants we are already too well acquainted, and we may here call to mind the remark of the Great Duke of Wellington, that it was a country in which 'a small army would be annihilated, and a large one starved.'

The above gives an outline of the physical aspect of our Indian frontier: the question now is, How can India be rendered secure from attack by the defence of such a frontier?

In the year 1855 the late General John Jacob remarked in a letter to the writer of this paper as follows:-

It seems to me that, if arrangements for the permanent defence of our NorthWest frontier be not speedily applied and manfully carried out, they will have caused the loss of our Indian Empire within the next generation of men.

He soon after proposed to the then Government of India that Quettah, commanding the approach to the northern entrance of the Bolan Pass, situated in Beloochistan, should be occupied and fortified by us, as we had a right to do under the terms of a treaty with the ruler of the country. Jacob's views were disregarded, and nothing was done towards carrying them out before he died in 1859, at which time he was still urging his warnings on the Government of India.

In 1866, his successor in command of the Sind frontier again, on the plea of having maturely considered the injurious effects which were being caused along our frontier and in India itself by the continued advance of Russia, was of decided opinion that

it was absolutely necessary that a position should be occupied in advance of our existing line of frontier, not so much with a view of attempting to stop the actual Russian advance, which would require a much greater effort, but with a view of being prepared to meet her with advantage on our side under any circumstances that might occur at some future time;

at the same time again urging upon the Indian Government the advisability of occupying Quettah; but his views met with the same treatment as had been given to those of his predecessor, and the most formidable minutes were formulated from the Council Board at Calcutta against the proposal, one of its most distinguished members closing his remarks as follows:

Neither the people nor the country have altered since 1838, and anyone who knows Afghanistan will not hastily or partially compromise troops in that country or in Beloochistan without an adequate motive and on purely restless and visionary anticipations, which have in one case been signally falsified, and will in all probability be the same in the present instance.

I may here mention that there had never been any question of occupying any point whatever in Afghanistan. It was not until 1876 that the Government of India began to think that the ideas of General Jacob and his successor were not visionary anticipations,' and Quettah was occupied, and now represents what General Jacob called the bastion of the front attacked,' and which should be made by our engineer officers as strong and secure from attack as science can effect. Running south from Quettah, of which it forms a part, is the plateau of Beloochistan, varying in elevation for a distance of 200 miles from Quettah to Kozdar, of from 4,000 to 6,800 feet above the

sea level, and connected with British territory by comparatively easy passes in friendly hands; along this plateau we might locate our European soldiers, in a salubrious climate, ready at a very short notice to concentrate at Quettah, which station would be by rail within forty-eight hours of the seaport of Kurrachee, and within three weeks from London itself. This position would constitute our left flank defence, as no army of any serious dimensions could march towards India through the deserts of Mekran lying west of Beloochistan and extending to the Indian Ocean. We should now have to provide for the defence of the remaining 400 miles of the Punjab frontier between Mithencote and Peshawer, running along the foot of the Suliman range of mountains. On this line we ought, I think, to construct strong defensive works to command the debouchures of the numerous passes. Mithencote, Dehra Gazee Khan, Dehra Ishmael Khan, Bunnoo, Kohat, and Peshawer, the latter commanding the exits from the Kyber Pass, would probably be some of the points selected; behind this line we have the Indus river, nowhere fordable, and which in summer is very broad and rapid-in some parts during that season it has a width of from four to five miles. This splendid river might be patrolled by any number of iron gun and torpedo boats. Peshawer would form our right flank defence; and here, in addition to a fortress, we might construct a strongly intrenched camp, and with the railroad which has already reached to this point we should have the vast resources of Northern India at our command to meet any army debouching from the Kyber, while from the other extremity at Quettah we could draw viâ Kurrachee on the resources not only of India, but from England direct; in fact, we should have close at our backs all the material and resources which England and India could supply, and in addition those of our colonies. Under such favourable circumstances, I think we have only to remain cool, husband our vast strength, and in case of war let Russia do her worst. Now let us analyse the position of that Empire supposing she possessed herself of Herat.

We certainly hear much of the power of that valley to maintain and supply an army for aggressive operations, but can its means of doing so compare in any way with those at the disposal of India for defensive purposes, as I have endeavoured to point out? Even were Herat connected by rail direct with Russia itself, the power of supply would be very limited in comparison to that of England, with the assistance of our commercial marine, and our command of the sea. An attack on such a position as I have suggested we should hold on the frontier of India would require the concentration at Herat of at least 200,000 men and 600 guns, for the advance, the line of communication, and reserves, and in addition hundreds of thousands of baggage animals, exclusive of camp-followers.

We must also consider the time that would be required for the