to many points of our coast (one vulnerable point is about thirty miles from London, and others hardly more than forty), that a part of an enemy's army which might succeed, in any way, whether by force or surprise, in moving inland faster than the defenders could intervene, might lay hands on it. Vain would then be any victories of ours elsewhere; the foe would have us by the throat. Therefore, many schemes have been devised for the defence of London. The problem has proved one of quite unique difficulty, owing to the vast and constantly increasing area of the metropolis. Only a military ruler, absolute in power and energy, could face the task of making of it a fortress, that is, of enclosing the town with ramparts to secure it from assault, and surrounding these with an outer circle of forts to shelter it from bombardment. A compromise has been more than once attempted by abandoning the idea of the ramparts, and proposing to surround the capital with detached forts, permanently built and armed.

But besides the objection of locking up in these forts the great force necessary to man them, the value of the land would render it vain to think of purchasing sites so extensive. Moreover, forts imply the ability to stand a siege, and London is never victualled for that contingency, and never could be if the command of the sea were lost. What it needs is the ability to protect itself from assault, and to relieve the field army from the necessity of always directly covering it; a condition which must be embarrassing, and would perhaps lead to a fatal extension of our forces.

or,

I would therefore propose the practicable and, to my mind, every way preferable course of designing a line of positions round London. Taking at first the most vulnerable sides, this line might start from Claybury Hill, in Essex on the Roding, to the Thames about Barking; thence, south of the Thames, following either the line marked by the heights of Plumstead and Shooter's Hill, to Bromley, if it were judged necessary to preserve Woolwich from the chances of fire, the more forward front of Erith, Bexley, Chislehurst, Bromley, and on by Beckenham, Upper Norwood, and Wimbledon to Kingston Hill, from whence the Thames would be the front of defence to Kew; thence, north of the river by Acton, Willesden, Muswell Hill, Tottenham, Woodford, to the completion of the circuit at Claybury. Within this circuit, of some fifty miles in extent, positions must be chosen, each including a group of roads leading upon the capital from a possible landing-place. Now it is not to be supposed that London would ever be attacked all round at once. The troops of the sides unattacked-presumably the northern and western-would therefore be available as reserves to the rest. On this basis 60,000 men might defend London. It is essential that the troops appropriated to this service should have their head-quarters within, or very little outside, the circle of defence. Let us see what proportion of this number is made up by corps now existing who fulfil this condition.

Thirty-six battalions of Volunteer Rifles have their head-quarters well within the line, mostly in London itself; these number 25,000. Two of the Essex battalions, numbering about 1,300, are also within it. The London division of Artillery Volunteers is 3,300 strong. This force of artillerymen would suffice for the 160 guns (fortypounders), which would amply supply batteries for the positions. But the infantry would need to be considerably supplemented. It is no peculiarity of the present plan, but common to all schemes for the defence of London, to require that a large force shall be available for that purpose only. My estimate is far below others when I take it at 60,000 men. This would involve the raising of 30,000 fresh Volunteers within the circuit, which, with those already enumerated, would form the guards of London. I believe that the universal encouragement and stimulus which the general scheme set forth in this paper would give to the Volunteers would render the addition of this number to the London division quite feasible. The Engineers of the defence would play an important part; the Middlesex and Tower Hamlets Engineer Volunteers number 1,400; the great building contractors and their workmen, who would be thrown out of employment by an invasion, should be enrolled in addition; and the whole force of this branch should be appropriated to parts of the line, and should practise exactly the works necessary for the defence of those parts --the shelter trenches, field works, preparation of buildings and streets

-as previously planned by those charged with the scheme of defenceso that, when occasion should arise for executing what was already completely designed, every company would know and fulfil its own share.

I do not, of course, pretend that this force of 60,000 would be nearly sufficient to surround London with troops. But, as already said, it is not to be supposed that this could ever be necessary. position from Claybury Hill to the Thames near Barking, six miles, would, when duly prepared, be amply furnished with 20,000 men and 60 guns, and would bar the approaches from the Essex coast. Another position (the longer of the two before indicated) from Erith, by Bexley and Chislehurst to Bromley, nine miles, would close all the roads to London from an invader landing anywhere from the mouth of the Thames to Hastings, and this line could be held by 30,000 men with 90 guns. Thus our most vulnerable sides would be at once secured, with 10,000 men still in reserve. Again, if the invasion, altogether south of the Thames, were to embrace the coast line from the mouth of the Thames to Chichester, the same troops, with the remaining 10,000, would continue the line from Bromley, by Norwood and Streatham, to Tooting. The line of defence from Wimbledon, by Kingston Hill, to Kew, on a curve of nine miles, would bar all advance from an area of invasion between Southampton and the Land's End. By the employment of these London guards on the front or fronts menaced, not only would the metropolis be secure from such bodies as might evade the field army, but the main body of the invaders, after

breaking through the field army, might be held till our forces could again combine against it. Moreover, there would then be no need for our field army directly to cover London, and the advantage of basing it on some other point would be easily demonstrable. Thus, based on Portsmouth, and posted across the Brighton Downs above the river Arun, it would oblige an invader landing near Brighton to wheel round to attack it, when, if the enemy were decisively defeated, he would not regain his landing-place.

In making themselves acquainted with the intended positions, the Volunteers should also occupy thoroughly designed lines of outposts.

Returning to the general subject, it is observable that the Volunteers are not always most numerous where most needed. Thus in Scotland there are 45,000, and in the Midlands of England more than 20,000. This, however, would suit the general scheme very well, for this last-named 20,000 could join the field army as the reserve of the battle-field; and the routes of all its corps, from their points of assembly to their places in the rear of each position of the field army, should be laid down. Scotland would certainly be able to reinforce this reserve with 10,000 men, while continuing to guard her own ports and coasts. But a more serious feature of the case is, that the counties most exposed to attack are very far from being the strongest in the numbers of their volunteers. While Manchester, for instance, supplies nearly 8,000 and Derbyshire 3,500, Essex has only four battalions, two of which have been assigned in this scheme to the defence of London, while the others would be needed for the forts on the Thames; the East Kent corps at Woolwich and Blackheath would also be needed for river defence, leaving only the 2,100 West Kent for the field in that great and exposed county; Sussex has only 1,600, while the Hampshire force would only serve to man a few of the works of Portsmouth. I would therefore point out the expediency of increasing the Volunteers of Essex, Kent, Sussex, Hampshire, and Surrey (most of the Surrey corps are in London) till each should make up its quota of the field army to at least 5,000; that is to say, that the total additional numbers contributed by those five counties should be, say, 22,000. These, with the regular active force, the regular reserve, the militia and its reserve, and the yeomanry, supported by the numbers already computed as available from Scotland and the midland counties, would at once enable us to confront an invader, in the field and in fortresses, with a most sufficient army, while guarding London with its separate force. And it is easy to imagine circumstances in which a large proportion of the rest of the Volunteers would be free to reinforce those in the field. I am assured that nothing is needed but the feeling that they are a reality, to induce the Volunteers generally largely to extend their term of service, so that the recruits, who come in plenty, would be in augmentation, not in replacement; while the passed men might be induced extensively to re-enrol themselves.

I will here endeavour to give an approximate estimate of the expense which the proposed measures would entail. The field equipment-valise, water-bottle, haversack, mess-tin, greatcoat, infantry leggings, and a pair of boots-of each Volunteer would cost 21. 18. 6d. per man at regulation prices. If summoned to the field each would bring his own blanket, for which an allowance might be made to him. This rate, for the existing force, would amount to 442,000l. The 52,000 additional Volunteers would cause an addition of 107,000l.

The strategically placed magazine and store centres might be thus assigned: North of the Thames at Willesden, Highgate Junction, and Stratford in Essex; south of the Thames at Wimbledon, Croydon, Woolwich, and Chatham. Plenty of accommodation exists at the two last-named places; there would thus be five centres to provide for. Each of these should have a magazine to hold 300 rounds for 60 guns, with a shell store, and a store for field equipment, as tents, &c. To lease the site, and construct these buildings, may be estimated at 25,000l. a centre—125,000l. in all. Small magazines, gun-sheds, and drill-sheds at such headquarters of corps as do not already possess them, say 100,000l. Still better, perhaps, might it be to rent existing buildings for the purpose. A year's work on the general plan of defence (and a year might go far to finish it), with a staff of thirty to forty officers and a sufficiency of draughtsmen, might cost 25,0002. Total, in round numbers, 800,000l. Thus a grant of a million would leave a large margin with which to indulge any liberality towards the force that might seem most expedient.

man.

The force cost the country last year 570,000l., about 2l. 138. a

The projected augmentation of numbers would cause, at that rate, an increase of 138,000l. in the annual expense.

It is desirable that the nation should awake to a sense of the force it possesses, and which might be such a power for defence. I am confident that most readers will be astonished to find what a weapon we hold, and what we might achieve with it. I can only regard it as a piece of good fortune that would have been incredible if not real. Self-formed, and springing from the ranks and the will of the people, it is more than commonly secure from the operation of crotchets and mal-administration. In endeavouring to complete its efficiency I have suggested nothing which would not make us a large return for a small outlay. We might make a beginning at once, and so give the world a much-needed assurance that we are a practical people capable of opposing the evils which threaten us. It is the fashion to call our navy our first line of defence; but this refers only to material means. Our first line of defence should be the respect of Europe.

EDWARD HAMLEY.

EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL.

'I have spent all my life in trying to guess what was at the other side of the Hill. All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what you don't know by what you do that's what I call guessing what was at the other side of the Hill.'-Duke of WELLINGTON, Conversations with Mr. Croker.

IN writing the present paper I am trying to follow the precept of the great man whose words I have quoted, but in trying to find out what is at the other side of the hill before us I must look back to what is at the other side of the hill behind us.

I make no excuse for again putting forward my opinions as to our dealings with Egypt; for at a time like this, however unpleasant it may be not to swim with the stream, or rather with the torrent, down which so many friends, men of ability and worth, are being hurried, it becomes a matter of duty to speak out if one thinks that thereby any good can be effected. I think good may be effected; for many persons who formerly differed from my views, even to irritation, as to the course that was pursued in Egypt in 1881 and in 1882, have of late informed me they are now convinced that, if those views had prevailed, we should not be struggling in our present sea of troubles. I may claim to write on Egypt with some knowledge of the subject. I have been constantly there since 1855, and I have taken invariably the deepest interest in the poor, downtrodden, industrious, and kindly natives of that country. I sympathised strongly with the movement of the National party that Egyptians should have a share in the government of their own land; I had confidence, which still remains unshaken, in the integrity of Ahmed Arabi the Egyptian,' to whom every eye was directed with hope and love from Assouan to Damietta. I believed that the moderate reforms of scandalous abuses asked for by him would have received the approbation of England, and indeed of every free self-governing country in Europe; but I was over-sanguine. The reforming party never had a chance. Abolition of abuses, the very recognition that the fellahs were ground down and oppressed, their cry of distress, their plea for mercy that their virtual slavery should in some degree be

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