that, since Dante, no one had stood on such visiting terms with Heaven.' A perfectly delightful book of happy, garrulous prose is My Study Windows, although it does not vie with either of its predecessors in the depth and range of pure criticism. But such papers as that 'On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners' may well be envied by living essayists for touches as genial and incisive as those of Leigh Hunt or Charles Lamb. Mr. Lowell must have been in a strait betwixt two when nature endowed him with the susceptible imagination of the poet on the one hand, and the clear judicial intellect of the critic on the other.

It may with truth be assumed that the essence of the highest poetry is the perception of the deep things of nature, humanity, and God. Though clowns jostle kings in Shakespeare, there are moments when the bard is wrapt in a divine ecstasy. These supreme moments come to every poet. They are very frequent with the subject of our article, and he who would attempt to gauge either his endowments or his general moods, by his overflowing wit, would do Mr. Lowell the greatest injustice. He is in so far the product of his times that he must take part in all the movements affecting the welfare of those who surround him. He is indignant over the curse of slavery, but, when indignation fails to move, he calls in the potent aid of ridicule. Many a tyrant has braved the wrath of his foes, but few can stand unmoved those shafts of invective and scorn which pierce them, as it were, under the fifth rib. It is as much the duty of its owner to use this talent of ridicule in the world's service, as it is the duty of a Claude to paint his divine landscapes, or a Luther to thunder forth his anathemas against vice and error. In degree, it would be as absurd to attempt to assess the poetical faculties of Shakespeare from his Touchstones and his Gobbos as to assess those of Russell Lowell from Hosea Biglow and Birdofredum Sawin. It is difficult to regard contemporary writers wholly detached from the influence of those popular ideas which surround them; and so, by the great majority of readers, it is to be feared, Mr. Lowell's genius is measured chiefly by the clever vagaries of Hosea Biglow, and his pastor, the Rev. Homer Wilbur. It has been our object partly to correct this impression by dwelling upon those serious poems of Mr. Lowell which more fully attest his genius than anything that he has written. The Elizabethan writers are placed at so great a distance from us that we can regard the developments of their genius with a free and unbiassed spirit, giving to each its due proportion. Though the time may be far distant, it must come when this will be the case with such writers as Mr. Lowell. In any case, we are convinced that no poetic note higher or deeper than his, no aspirations more finely touched towards lofty issues, no voice more powerful for truth and freedom, have hitherto come to us from across the Atlantic.

G. BARNETT SMITH.

OUR ARMIES IN INDIA.

THE question of the military forces under the Crown in India is a double one, dealing with two sets of armies subject to different conditions, the British and the native armies. But there is a further distinction. In each of the three Presidencies the military system, as it now exists, is distinct and independent. Any one therefore who speaks of the Indian Army' as a united force under a single command neglects two sets of distinctions, one natural, the other local and arbitrary, and the effect of which, in the minds of the highest Indian authorities, it is one of the objects of this paper to show. Besides British and native armies there are the armies of native States, of which something will be said separately.

The English Government have at their disposal two recent sources of information and advice, embodying the latest views on the subject of military reforms in India. In the first place, there is the report of the Army Commission appointed under Lord Lytton's viceroyalty, which bears internal proof of the immense care bestowed on it; and, secondly, there is what amounts to a critical review of that report, being a series of recommendations sent by Lord Ripon to the English Government, after a lengthened investigation of the measures suggested in the original report, an investigation undertaken by Lord Ripon's Government shortly after his appointment at the request of the India Office; and these recommendations in their turn were so carefully drawn up as to elicit a warm compliment from Lord Hartington in his reply. It should therefore be remembered that any of these recommendations as to military reforms made by Lord Lytton's Army Commission, and endorsed by the Government of Lord Ripon, have run the gauntlet of criticism in two separate camps politically hostile to each other; and, moreover, that they have been sifted and closely debated by the experienced professional advisers of each administration in turn, presumably unbiassed by any political considerations whatever. The principal changes in the Indian military system which have been not only suggested, but repeatedly pressed upon the Home Government, by Lord Ripon's administration are so important, and affect so vitally the constitution and administration of the armies in India, that they require all the justification that they get from such a rare combination of authority and experience. Their chief object

is to secure unity of system, unity of responsibility, unity of administration, unity of command throughout the whole Indian Empire, while maintaining the division of military labour, and the individuality of local military life, which are rendered not only advisable but necessary by the circumstances and conditions of the people and the country. Nowhere is a unity of system more essential than in India, but nowhere would centralisation of work be more fatal. Such is evidently their opinion.

Owing to the circumstances of the establishment of British rule in India, it was absolutely impossible at first to constitute one single army for India under one undivided command. The different Presidencies were isolated from each other so completely that this would have been impracticable. They were separated by wide tracts of country, and by States under native rule, many of them at that time bitterly opposed to our Government. There were no telegraphs, and no railways, and communication between the Presidencies was too uncertain and too long in transit to make unity of military administration possible.

Since then the circumstances of the country and the feelings of the people towards us have undergone a complete change. India is being crossed and recrossed by railways and telegraphs in all directions, and the next few years will see an immense development of both; and now, instead of having to run the gauntlet of hostile native States before a message or a regiment can be sent from one Presidency to another, we are being constantly met by striking proofs of their loyalty and friendship, and they are fully aware that their prosperity depends on the maintenance of the strong peaceful rule of the British Government.

This change in the circumstances of India and in the relations of native States towards the British Government has, in the opinion of nearly every Indian military authority, made the continuance of the three separate Presidential military systems artificial, unnecessary, and dangerous, and, if it is perpetuated, it will be perpetuating a disadvantage, and continuing a risk which an absolute necessity compelled our forefathers to face, but which, if they could, they would probably have been the first to avoid. We have inherited the Presidential military system, where each Presidency has its own separate army with a separate commander-in-chief, and the whole paraphernalia which surrounds him, as opposed to a departmental military system for the whole of India, in which each Presidency would be regarded, for military purposes, as a department in the Indian military service, working under one central and supreme authority, with a simplicity of design and a unity of system and of control absolutely essential to the complete efficiency of the service.

What renders the present state of things specially unsatisfactory is that, in military matters, the separate Presidential control, such as

it is, is very inefficient because it is often so remote, and acts indirectly. Formerly the armies in each of the three Presidencies were really local forces. They were rarely employed outside the Presidency to which they severally belonged, and each of the separate local governments made its own financial and other arrangements as to clothing, transport, pensions, &c., and was in direct communication. with the Court of Directors, no control being exercised by the Horse Guards. But now this has undergone a complete change. All European forces in India are furnished from the British army, the armies belonging to each Presidency are constantly employed outside its borders, and so it often happens that, in matters which relate to the administration of the troops, it is not the Government of the province where they are quartered which has to be consulted but the Government of another province, and the Government of India may have to make a formal application to that of Madras or Bombay before it can move a regiment in Hyderabad or Burma.

It was in order to secure the advantages of unity and simplicity of system that Lord Ripon's Government repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, urged the importance of their proposed military reforms upon the India Office. Their recommendations were, no doubt, carefully weighed. No one who reads through the despatches on the subject could say that they were rejected hastily, or perhaps that they have even now, been rejected finally; but the fact remains that most of them, and those the most important, have been shelved, without any kind of pledge of their adoption. In the despatch of the 28th of February, 1881, to the Home Government, the recommended reforms were summarised in the following words:

1. The Madras and Bombay armies to come under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief in India. The Civil Establishments connected with those armies to come under the direct orders of the Government of India, and the military secretariats of those Presidencies to be abolished. The designation of the officers commanding those armies might conveniently be changed from 'Commanderin-Chief' to Lieutenant-General Commanding.'

2. The Commander-in-Chief in India to give up the direct control of the Bengal Army, but to retain his seat in the Governor-General's Council.

3. The Bengal Army to be commanded by two Lieutenant-Generals. To meet the charges for these officers, whose salaries might be the same as those of the Lieutenant-Generals Commanding in Madras and Bombay, we may say at once, in anticipation of the proposals to be hereafter submitted, that we are prepared to accept the recommendations of the Commission [Lord Lytton's Army Commission already referred to] for reducing the number of Major-Generals and other officers to an extent at least sufficient to cover the charge. We shall shortly lay a definite proposal on this head before Her Majesty's Government.

4. The Punjaub Frontier Force to be maintained as a separate body, but, to come under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

The despatch concludes with a paragraph setting out the advantages which the suggested reforms would offer to the armies of Madras

and Bombay, which have hitherto been overshadowed by the larger body,' i.e. the Bengal army.

Hereafter

All the military forces in India will be on the same footing; all should have an equal share of the prizes of the service in peace time, and the same opportunity for distinction in war; and we may hope that a healthy feeling of emulation will take the place of the class jealousies and prejudices which have unfortunately been too often manifested in past times.

In recommending so persistently a unity of military administration for India, Lord Ripon's Government cannot be said to have done more than make an attempt to bring the military system into harmony with the law which controls it. The law laid down more than half a century ago that the superintendence, direction, and control of the whole civil and military government of all the said territories and revenues in India shall be, and is, hereby vested in a GovernorGeneral and Councillors, to be styled "the Governor-General of India in Council" (3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 85, § 39).

The irony of the position is that the law invests the governorgeneral with a responsibility which the facts prevent him from exercising. The English public have probably very little idea what the actual state of things is. If anything serious goes wrong the governorgeneral is held responsible by public opinion, and no one thinks his responsibility should be diminished; on the contrary, the argument is that it should be increased by a concentration of power, and that it should be made a reality where it is a sham. Most Englishmen know, in a general sort of way, the powers with which a governorgeneral is invested, and would suppose that, in time of war at all events, high appointments in any section of the army in India would be made, actually as well as nominally, by the central Government, officers being selected for responsible posts from a personal knowledge of their fitness. The facts are so strange as to be hardly credible. If, as matters now stand, we had to go through another campaign in Afghanistan, in which the armies of Bengal and of Bombay took part, the central Government would be nominally responsible for the appointments of all officers, not only those in command of the Bengal troops, of whose qualifications they would have had every opportunity of judging, but also of those in command of Bombay troops, of whose merits, until tested in the field, they could know nothing except by hearsay, because they belong to a separate force under a separate commander- . in-chief. In the eyes of the public the responsibility is supposed to be where it ought to be-in the hands of the Government of India, but in practice it is divided between the Governments of India, Bombay, and Madras, and by subdivision ceases to exist. The Viceroy of India would naturally turn to the commander-in-chief for advice in the matter of high appointments in the army, all military appoint