2. All our benevolent affections imply a desire of happiness to their respective objects. Indeed, it is from this circumstance they derive their name. III. Our Benevolent Affections not resolvable into Self-love.] The philosophers who have endeavoured to resolve our appetites and desires into self-love have given a similar account of our benevolent affections. It is evident that this amounts to a denial of their existence as a separate class of active principles; for when a thing is desired, not on its own account, but as instrumental to the attainment of something else, it is not the desire of the means, but that of the end, which is in this case the principle of action. In the course of my observations on the different affections, when I come to consider them particularly, I shall endeavour to show that this account of their origin is extremely wide of the truth. In the mean time it may be worth while to remark, in general, how strongly it is opposed by the analogy of the other active powers already examined. We have found that the preservation of the individual and the continuation of the species are not intrusted to self-love and reason alone, but that we are endowed with various appetites which, without any reflection on our part, impel us to their respective objects. We have also found, with respect to the acquisition of knowledge, (on which the perfection of the individual and the improvement of the species essentially depend,) that it is not intrusted solely to self-love and benevolence, but that we are prompted to it by the implanted principle of curiosity. It further appeared, that, in addition to our sense of duty, another incentive to worthy conduct is provided in the desire of esteem, which is not only one of our most powerful principles of action, but continues to operate of Cornelia when she retired to the hold of the ship to indulge her grief in solitude and darkness after the murder of Pompey. "Caput ferali obduxit amictu, Decrevitque pati tenebras, puppisque cavernis Delituit; savumque arctè complexa dolorem Perfruitur lacrymis, et amat pro conjuge luctum," &c., &c. in full force to the last moment of our being. Now, as men were plainly intended to live in society, and as the social union could not subsist without a mutual interchange of good offices, would it not be reasonable to expect, agreeably to the analogy of our nature, that so important an end would not be intrusted solely to the slow deductions of reason, or to the metaphysical refinements of selflove, but that some provision would be made for it, in a particular class of active principles, which might operate, like our appetites and desires, independently of our reflection? To say this of parental affection or of pity is saying nothing more in their favor than what was affirmed of hunger and thirst, that they prompt us to particular objects without any reference to our own enjoyment. I have not offered these objections to the selfish theory with any view of exalting our natural affections into virtues; for, in so far as they arise from original constitution, they confer no merit whatever on the individual any more than his appetites or desires. At the same time, (as Dr. Reid has observed,) there is a manifest gradation in the sentiments of respect with which we regard these different constituents of character. Our desires, (it was formerly observed,) although not virtuous in themselves, are manly and respectable, and plainly of greater dignity than our animal appetites. In like manner it may be remarked that our benevolent affections, although not meritorious, are highly amiable. A want of attention to the essential difference between the ideas expressed by these two words has given rise to much confusion in different systems of moral philosophy, more particularly in the systems of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. As it would lead me into too minute a detail to consider our different benevolent affections separately, I shall confine myself to a few detached remarks on some of the most important. The first place is undoubtedly due to what we commonly call natural affection, including under the term the affections of parents and children, and those of other near relations. SECTION II. OF THE AFFECTIONS OF KINDRED. I. The Parental Affection common to Animals and Men.] The parental affection is common to us with most of the brutes, although with them it is variously modified according to their respective natures, and according as the care of the parent is more or less necessary for the preservation and nurture of the young. Cicero remarks that this is no more than might have been expected from that beneficent providence everywhere conspicuous in nature. "Hæc inter se congruere non possunt, ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non "Commune animantium omnium est conjunctionis appetitus, et cura quædam eorum quæ procreata sunt." + curaret. When I ascribe parental affection to our own species, I do not mean to insinuate that there is any foundation for those stories which poets have feigned of particular discriminating feelings which have enabled parents and children, after a long absence, or when they have never met before, mutually to recognize each other. The parental affection takes its rise from a knowledge of the relation in which the parties stand, and it is very powerfully confirmed by habit. All that I assert is, that it results naturally from that knowledge, and from the habits superinduced by the relation which the parties bear to each other; in which sense it may be justly said, (to adopt a beautiful and philosophical expression of Dr. Ferguson's,) that "natural affection springs up in the soul as the milk springs in the breast of the mother." Accordingly, it operates, in a great measure, independently of reflection and of a sense of duty. Reason, indeed, might satisfy a man that his children are particularly intrusted to his care, and that it * De Finibus, III. 19. "Nature would have been inconsistent if she had intended men to procreate, without providing at the same time that they should love their offspring." De Offic., I. 4. "The passion which unites the sexes, and a certain affection for their young, are common to all animals." Principles of Moral and Political Science, Vol. I. p. 31. is his duty to rear and educate them, as reason might have induced him to eat and drink without the appetites of hunger and thirst; but reason cannot create an affection any more than an appetite. And, considering how little the conduct of mankind is in general influenced by a sense of duty, there are good grounds for thinking, that, were not reason in this case aided by a very powerful implanted principle, a very small proportion out of the whole number of children brought into the world would arrive at maturity. How much this affection depends upon habit appears from this, that, when the care of a child is devolved upon one who is not its parent, the parental affection is, in a great measure, transferred along with it. This (as Dr. Reid observes) is plainly "the work of nature," and is an additional provision made by her for the continuation and preservation of the species. The parental affection, as we have hitherto considered it, is common to both sexes; but it cannot, I think, be denied, that it is in the heart of the mother that it exists in the most perfect strength and beauty. Indeed, I do not think that those have gone too far who have pronounced "the heart of a good mother to be the masterpiece of nature's works." * There is no form, certainly, in which humanity appears so lovely, or presents so fair a copy of the Divine image after which it was made. II. Affections of Kindred the Foundation of our Social and Political Virtues.] Nor are these affections of parent and child useful solely for the preservation of the race. They form the heart in infancy for its more extensive social duties, and gradually prepare it for those affections which constitute the character of the good citizen; not to mention that, in every period of life, it is our private attachments which furnish the most powerful of all incentives to patriotism and heroic virtue. Nothing, therefore, could be more unphilosophical than the opinion of Plato, that the indulgence of the domestic charities. unfitted men for the discharge of their political duties; an * See Marmontel, Leçons sur la Morale, p. 132, et seq. opinion which he carried so far as to propose, that, as soon as a child was born, it should be separated from its parents, and educated ever after at the expense of the public. It has been often observed that persons brought up in foundling hospitals have seldom turned out well in the world; and although I doubt not that various splendid exceptions to this proposition may be quoted, I am inclined to think, that, if the special accidents connected with these exceptions were fully known, they would be found, instead of invalidating, to confirm the general rule. One thing, at least, is obvious, that, in that best of all educations which nature has provided for us in the ordinary circumstances of our condition, it formed an important part of her plan to soften the heart betimes amid the scenes of domestic life; and, accordingly, it is under the shelter of these scenes that all the social virtues may be seen to shoot up with the greatest vigor and luxuriancy. Even the sterner qualities of fortitude and bravery, so far from being inconsistent with a warm and susceptible heart, are almost its inseparable attendants, insomuch that we always expect to find them united. How true, in this respect, to all the best feelings of our nature, is the beautiful story recorded of Epaminondas, that, after the battle of Leuctra, he thanked the gods that his parents still survived to enjoy his fame! It is remarked by Dr. Beattie that Homer and Virgil, the most accurate of all observers, and the most faithful of all painters of human character, always unite the domestic attachments with the more splendid virtues of their heroes. The scene between Hector and Andromache, and the interview between Ulysses and his father after an absence of twenty years, are pronounced by the same excellent critic to be the finest passages in the Iliad and Odyssey. He observes further, that, in the portrait of Achilles, his love to his parents forms one of the most prominent and distinguishing features, and that "this single circumstance throws an amiable softness into the most terrific human personage that was ever described in poetry." How powerful a charm the Eneid derives from the same source it is needless to mention, as it is the chief groundwork of the interest inspired by the whole texture of the fable. In |