safely affirmed, (as Socrates long ago observed in the Phado of Plato,) that whoever founds his fortitude on any thing else is only valiant through fear. In other words, he exposes himself to danger, merely from a regard to the opinion of others, and, of consequence, wants that internal principle of heroism which can alone arm the mind with patience under those misfortunes which it is condemned to bear in solitude, or under sorrows which prudence conceals from the public eye. But to the man who believes that every thing is ordered for the best, and that his existence and happiness are in the hands of a Being who watches over him with the care of a parent, the difficulties and dangers of life only serve to call forth the latent powers of the soul, by reminding him of the prize for which he combats, and of that beneficent Providence by which the conflict was appointed.

Safe in the hands of one disposing Power,
Or in the natal or the mortal hour.

IV. Religion the First and Chief Branch of Moral Duty.] The view which I have given of religion, as forming the first and chief branch of moral duty, and as contributing in its turn most powerfully to promote the practice of every virtue, is equally consonant to the spirit of the Sacred Writings, and to the most obvious dictates of reason and conscience; and accordingly it is sanctioned by the authority of all those philosophers of antiquity who devoted their talents to the improvement and happiness of mankind. "It should never be thought," says Plato in one of his Dialogues, "that there is any branch of human virtue of greater importance than piety towards the Deity." The chief article of the unwritten law mentioned by Socrates is, "that the gods ought to be worshipped." This," he says, "is acknowledged everywhere, and received by all men as the first command."* And to the same purpose Cicero, in the first book of his Offices, places in the first rank of duties those we owe to the immortal gods. "In ipsa communitate sunt gradus officiorum ex quibus, quid cuique præstet, intelligi

* Xen. Memor. Lib. IV. c. iv.

possit ut primà Diis immortalibus; secunda, patriæ; tertia, parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis debeantur." * The elevation of mind which some of the most illustrious characters of antiquity derived from their religious principles, however imperfect and erroneous, and the weight which these principles gave them in their public and political capacity, are remarked by many ancient writers; and such, I apprehend, will be always found to be the case when the personal importance of the individual rests on the basis of public opinion. "But he," says Plutarch, "who was most conversant with Pericles, and most contributed to give him a grandeur of mind, and to make his high spirit for governing the popular assemblies more weighty and authoritative, in a word, who exalted his ideas, and raised, at the same time, the dignity of his demeanour, the person who did this was Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, whom the people of that age reverenced as the first who made mind or intellect (in opposition to chance) a principle in the formation and government of the universe."t

The extraordinary respect which the Romans, during their period of greatest glory, entertained for religion (false as their own system was in its mythological foundations, and erroneous in many of its practical tendencies) has been often taken notice of as one of the principal sources of their private and public virtues. "The Spaniards," says Cicero, "exceed us in numbers; the Gauls in the glory of war; but we surpass all nations in that wisdom by which we have learned that all things are governed and directed by the immortal gods." +

In the latter periods of their history, this reverence for religion, together with the other virtues which gave them the empire of the world, was in a great measure lost; and we continually find their orators and historians drawing a melancholy contrast between the degeneracy of their man

first

* Lib. I. c. ult. "In society itself our duties are of different degrees, in which the proper order of preference is readily understood: of all, our duties to the immortal gods; secondly, to our country; thirdly, to our parents, and, after them, to other men in their several gradations."

In the account which

ners and those of their ancestors. Livy has given of the consulate of Q. Cincinnatus, he mentions an attempt which the tribunes made to persuade. the people that they were not bound by their military oath to follow the consul to the field, because they had taken that oath when he was a private man. But, however agreeable this doctrine might be to their inclinations, and however strongly recommended to them by the sanction. of their own popular magistrates, we find that their reverence for the religion of an oath led them to treat the doctrine as nothing better than a cavil. Livy's reflection on this occasion is remarkable. "Nondum hæc, quæ nunc tenet seculum, negligentia Deûm venerat : nec interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum leges aptas faciebat, sed suos potius mores ad ea accommodabat." *

CHAPTER II.

OF THE DUTIES WHICH RESPECT OUR FELLOW-
CREATURES.

UNDER this title it is not proposed to give a complete enumeration of our social duties, but only to point out some of the most important, chiefly with a view to show the imperfections of those systems of morals which attempt to resolve the whole of virtue into one particular principle. Among these, that which resolves virtue into benevolence is undoubtedly the most amiable; but even this system will appear, from the following remarks, not only to be inconsistent with truth, but to lead to dangerous consequences.

* Lib. III. c. xx.

"But that disregard of the gods, which prevails in the present age, had not then taken place; nor did every one, by his own interpretations, accommodate oaths and the laws to his particular views, but rather adapted his practice to them."

27

SECTION I.

OF BENEVOLENCE.

I. Hutcheson resolves all Virtue into Benevolence.] Benevolence is so important a branch of virtue, that it has been supposed by some moralists to constitute the whole of it. According to these writers, good-will to mankind is the only immediate object of moral approbation; and the obligation of all our other moral duties arises entirely from their apprehended tendency to promote the happiness of society.

Among the most eminent partisans of this system in modern times, Mr. Smith mentions particularly Dr. Ralph Cudworth, Dr. Henry More, and Mr. John Smith of Cambridge; "but of all its patrons," he observes, "ancient or modern, Dr. Francis Hutcheson was undoubtedly beyond all comparison the most acute, the most distinct, the most philosophical, and, what is of the greatest consequence of all, the soberest and most judicious.” *

In favor of this system, Mr. Smith acknowledges that there are many appearances in human nature which at first sight seem strongly to support it; and of some of these appearances Dr. Hutcheson avails himself with much acuteness and plausibility. First, whenever, in any action supposed to proceed from benevolent affections, some other motive is discovered, our sense of the merit of this action is just so far diminished as this motive is believed to have influenced it. Secondly, when those actions, on the contrary, which are commonly supposed to proceed from a selfish motive are discovered to have arisen from a benevolent one, it generally enhances our sense of their merit. Lastly, it was urged by Dr. Hutcheson, that, in all casuistical disputes concerning the rectitude of conduct, the ultimate appeal is uniformly made to utility. In the later debates, for example, about passive obedience and the right of resistance, the sole point in controversy among men of sense was, whether universal submission would probably be attended with greater evils than temporary in

* Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part VII. Sect. ii. chap. iii.

surrections when privileges were invaded. Whether what, upon the whole, tended most to the happiness of mankind was not also morally good, was never once made a question.

Since benevolence, therefore, was the only motive which could bestow upon any action the character of virtue, the greater the benevolence which was evidenced by any action, the greater the praise which must belong to it.

In directing all our actions to promote the greatest possible good, in submitting all inferior affections to the desire of the general happiness of mankind, — in regarding one's self as but one of the many, whose prosperity was to be pursued no further than it was consistent with, or conducive to, that of the whole, -consisted the perfection of virtue.

Dr. Hutcheson held, further, that self-love was a principle which could never be virtuous in any degree or in any direction. This maxim he carried so far as to assert, that even a regard to the pleasure of self-approbation, to the comfortable applauses of our own consciences, diminishes the merit of a benevolent action. "In the common judgments of mankind, however," says Mr. Smith, "this regard to the approbation of our own minds is so far from being considered as what can in any respect diminish the virtue of any action, that it is rather looked upon as the sole motive which deserves the appellation of virtuous."

Of the truth and correctness of these principles Dr. Hutcheson was so fully convinced, that, in conformity to them, he has offered some algebraical formulas for computing mathematically the morality of actions. Of this very extraordinary attempt the following axioms, which he premises to his formulas, may serve as a sufficient specimen.

1. The moral importance of any agent, or the quantity of public good produced by him, is in a compound ratio of his benevolence and abilities, or M (moment of good) ВХА.

=

2. In like manner the moment of private good or interest produced by any person to himself is in a compound ratio of his self-love and ability, or I=S × A.

3. When, in comparing the virtue of two agents, the abilities are equal, the moment of public good produced by them in like circumstances is as the benevolence, or M = BX 1.