inevitable fate or destiny the connection is necessary and obvious; and hence in every false religion the scheme of fatalism may be expected to form, not only an essential, but the fundamental article. The inconsiderable influence which this theological dogma (a dogma, too, peculiarly calculated to affect and even to overwhelm the imagination) has always had in stifling the sentiment of remorse on the commission of a crime, affords a demonstrative proof of the impotence of such scholastic refinements, when opposed to the feelings of nature, on a question concerning which these feelings form the only tribunal to which a legitimate appeal can be made. That a criminal, in order to alleviate the pang of remorse, may have sometimes sought for relief in this doctrine, is far from being improbable; but no man ever acted on this belief in the common concerns of human life; and, indeed, some of its most zealous partisans have acknowledged, (particularly Lord Kames,) that, were it to prevail universally as a practical principle, the business of the world could not possibly go on. In the ancient Stoical system, (as I have already observed,) the doctrine of fatalism and that of man's free agency were both admitted as fundamental articles of belief. "By fate," says Mrs. Carter, "the Stoics seem to have understood a series of events appointed by the immutable councils of God, or that law of his providence by which he governs the world. It is evident by their writings that they meant it in no sense which interferes with the liberty of human actions." Of the truth of this remark the most satisfactory evidence is afforded by the very first sentence of the Enchiridion of Epictetus, in which it is explicitly stated, that "opinion, pursuit, desire, and aversion, and, in one word, whatever are our own actions, are in our own power. * That the doctrine of fatalism, however, led some of the Stoics to very impious and alarming consequences, appears from the following words, which Lucan puts into the mouth of Cato. "Summum Brute nefas civilia bella fatemur, See, also, Lib. VII. 657.- Copleston, Prælect. Acad., p. 277. Such, too, is the philosophy of Virgil: "Stat sua cuique dies, breve et irreparabile tempus Omnibus est vitæ ; sed famam extendere factis Hoc virtutis opus.' The doctrine, however, of fatalism, and of an inevitable destiny, must not be confounded with that of the Divine prescience, between which and the freedom of human actions some of our profoundest philosophers, as I have already observed, (particularly Clarke and Reid,) have labored to show that there is no inconsistency, while other writers of no less eminence have apprehended that there is no absurdity in supposing that the Deity may, for wise purposes, have chosen to open a source of contingency in the voluntary actions of his creatures, to which no prescience can possibly extend. Whatever opinion we may adopt on this point, the conclusions formerly stated concerning man's free agency remain unshaken. Our own free-will we know by our consciousness; and we can have no evidence for any other truth so irresistible as this. On the other hand, it would unquestionably be rash and impious in us, from the fact of our own free-will, to deny that our actions may be foreseen by the Deity, or to measure the Divine attributes by a standard borrowed from our imperfect faculties. The conclusion of St. Augustine on this subject is equally pious and philosophical. "Wherefore we are nowise reduced to the necessity, either by admitting the prescience of God, to deny the freedom of the human will, or by admitting the freedom of the will to hazard the impious assertion, that the prescience of God does not extend to all future contingencies: but, on the contrary, we are dis * Eneid, Lib. X. 467. "To all that breathe is fixed the appointed date; The notions of Virgil, however, on this point, as is well observed by Servius, do not seem to have been quite consistent. How are the following lines, which he applies to Dido, to be reconciled with the above passage? "Nam quia nec fato, meritâ nec morte peribat; posed to embrace both doctrines, and with sincerity to bear testimony to their truth, the one that our faith may be sound, the other that our lives may be good."* * The following passage in one of Gray's letters has a sufficient connection with what is said above to justify me in giving it a place here. Indeed, were the connection much slighter and less obvious than it is, little apology would be necessary for relieving the attention of the reader by quoting any thing relating to so important a subject from such a pen. "I am as sorry as you seem to be, that our acquaintance harped so much on the subject of materialism when I saw him with you in town, because it was plain to which side of the long-debated question he inclined. That we are, indeed, mechanical and dependent beings, I need no other proof than my own feelings; and from the same feelings I learn with equal conviction, that we are not merely such. That there is a power within which struggles against the force and bias of that mechanism, commands its motion, and by frequent practice reduces it to that ready obedience we call habit; and all this in conformity to a preconceived opinion (no matter whether right or wrong),—to that least material of all agents, a thought. I have known many in his case, who, while they thought they were conquering an old prejudice, did not perceive that they were under the influence of one far more dangerous,—one that furnishes us with a ready apology for all our worst actions, and opens to us a full license for doing whatever we please; and yet these very people were not at all the more indulgent to other men (as they naturally should have been); their indignation at such as offended them, their desire of revenge on any body that hurt them, was nothing mitigated. In short, they wished to be persuaded of that opinion for the sake of its convenience, but were not so in their hearts; and they would have been glad (as they ought in common prudence) that nobody else should think the same, for fear of the mischief that might ensue to themselves. His French author I never saw, but have read fifty in the same strain, and shall read no more. I can be wretched enough without them.". Works, by Mason, Letter XXXI. I shall avail myself of this note to remark, that, on the subject of free-will, though Locke has thrown out many important observations, he is on the whole more indistinct, undecided, and inconsistent, than might have been expected from his powerful mind, when directed to so important a question. This was probably owing to his own strong feelings in favor of man's moral liberty, combined with the deep impression left on his philosophical creed by the writings of Hobbes, and by the habits of intimacy and friendship in which he lived with the acutest and ablest of all necessitarians, Anthony Collins. That Locke conceived himself to be an advocate for free-will appears indisputably from many expressions in his chapter On Power; and yet in that very chapter he has made various concessions to his adversaries, in which he seems to yield all that was contended for by Hobbes and Collins; and accordingly, he is ranked, with some appearance of truth, by Priestley, with those who, while they opposed verbally the scheme of necessity, have adopted it substantially, without being aware of their mistake. [To the multitude of works cited or referred to in this chapter may be added the following: Crombie's Essay on Philosophical Necessity; Bray's Philosophy of Necessity; Cogan's Ethical Questions, Question BOOK III. OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF OUR DUTY. THE different theories which have been proposed concerning the nature and essence of virtue have arisen chiefly from attempts to trace all the branches of our duty to one principle of action, such as a rational self-love, benevolence, justice, or a disposition to obey the will of God. In order to avoid those partial views of the subject which naturally take their rise from an undue love of system, the following inquiries proceed on an arrangement which has, in all ages, recommended itself to the good sense of mankind. This arrangement is founded on the different objects to which our duties relate. 1st. The Deity. 2d. Our Fellow-Creatures. And, 3d. Ourselves. CHAPTER I. OF THE DUTIES WHICH RESPECT THE DEITY. I. The Duty of Religious Consideration.] It is scarcely possible to conceive a man capable of reflection, who has not, at times, proposed to himself the following IV.; Sir T. C. Morgan's Sketches of the Philosophy of Morals, Chap. II.; Bailey's Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, &c., Essay III.; Gregory's Essay in Defence of Philosophical Liberty; Bockshammer On the Freedom of the Human Will; Charma, Essai sur les Bases et les Développemens de la Moralité, Part. I. Sect. i, ii.; Damiron, Psychologie, Liv. I. Sect. ii. Chap. iii.; Ballantyne's Examination of the Human Mind, Chap. III.; Gibon, Cours de Philosophie, Part. I. Chap. xiii.; Blakey's Essay showing the Intimate Connection between our Notions of Moral Good and Evil and our Conceptions of the Freedom of the Divine and Human Wills; Harvey's Examination of the Pelagian and Arminian Theory of Moral Agency; Day's Inquiry respecting the Self-determining Power of the Will; Day's Examination of President Edwards's Inquiry on the Freedom of the Will.] questions: Whence am I? and whence the innumerable tribes of plants and of animals which I see, in constant succession, rising into existence? Whence the beautiful fabric of this universe? and by what wise and powerful Being were the principles of my constitution so wonderfully adapted to the various objects around me ? To whom am I indebted for the distinguished rank which I hold in the creation, and for the numberless blessings which have fallen to my lot? And what return shall I make for this profusion of goodness? The only return I can make is by accommodating my conduct to the will of my Creator, and by fulfilling, as far as I am able, the purposes of my being. But how are these purposes to be discovered? The analogy of the lower animals gives me here no information. They, too, as well as I, are endowed with various instincts and appetites; but their nature, on the whole, exhibits a striking contrast to mine. They are impelled by a blind determination towards their proper objects, and seem to obey the law of their nature in yielding to every principle which excites them to action. In my own species alone the case is different. Every individual chooses for himself the ends of his pursuit, and chooses the means which he is to employ for attaining them. Are all these elections equally good? and is there no law prescribed to man? I feel the reverse. I am able to distinguish what is right from what is wrong; what is honorable and becoming from what is unworthy and base; what is laudable and meritorious from what is shameful and criminal. Here, then, are plain indications of the conduct I ought to pursue. There is a law prescribed to man as well as to the brutes. The only difference is, that it depends on my own will whether I obey or disobey it. And shall I alone counteract the intentions of my Maker, by abusing that freedom of choice which he has been pleased to bestow on me, by raising me to the rank of a rational and moral being? This is surely the language of nature; and which could not fail to occur to every man capable of serious thought, were not the understanding and the moral feelings in some instances miserably perverted by religious and political prejudices, and in others by the false refinements of meta |