ably keeps its ground at this day. Absurd as these ideas are, they show strongly how natural to the human mind are the sentiments now under consideration; for this belief of the connection between virtue and good fortune has plainly taken its rise from the natural connection between the ideas of virtue and merit, a connection which, we may rest assured, is agreeable to the general laws by which the universe is governed, but which the slightest reflection may satisfy us cannot always correspond with the order of events in such a world as we inhabit at present.

I am not certain but we may trace something of the same kind in the sports of children, who have all a notion that good fortune in their games of chance depends upon perfect fairness towards their adversaries, and that those are certain to lose who attempt to take secretly any undue advantage.

Indeed, the moral perceptions (although frequently misapplied in consequence of the weakness of reason and the want of experience) may be as distinctly traced in the mind at that time of life as ever afterwards, when surely it cannot be supposed that they are the result, as some authors have held, of a conviction, founded on actual observation, of the utility of virtue.t

ordeal, which was one of the first laws instituted by Moses among the Jews. See Numbers, Chap. V. Fire or water were usually employed; but in India the mode varies, and is often determined by the choice of the parties. I remember a letter from a man of rank, who was accused of corresponding in time of war with the enemy, in which he says, 'Let my accuser be produced; let me see him face to face; let the most venomous snakes be put into a pot; let us put our hands into it together; let it be covered for a certain time; and he who remaineth unhurt shall be innocent.'

“This trial is always accompanied with the solemnities of a religious ceremony." - Crawford's Sketches of the Hindoos, p. 298. *Horat. Epist. Lib. I. Ep. 1. 59.

+ Cousin expresses clearly and forcibly his view of the connection between merit and demerit and the rewards and punishments rightfully inflicted by society. Histoire de la Philosophie du XVIIIe. Siècle, Vingtieme Leçon. We copy a single paragraph from Professor Henry's excellent translation, Elements of Psychology, Chap. V.: -"Without

II. How to guard against Self-deceit.] I shall conclude this subject with again recalling to the attention of the reader a very remarkable fact formerly stated, that our

any doubt, it is useful to society to inflict contempt upon the violator of moral order; without doubt, it is useful to society to punish effectually the individual who attacks the foundations of social order. This consideration of utility is real; it is weighty; but I say that it is not the first, that it is only accessory, and that the immediate basis of all penalty is the idea of the essential merit and demerit of actions, the general idea of order, which imperiously demands that the merit and demerit of actions, which is a law of reason and of order, should be realized in a society that pretends to be rational and well ordered. On this ground, and on this ground alone, of realizing this law of reason and of order, the two powers of society, opinion and government, appear faithful to their primary law. Then comes up utility, the immediate utility of repressing evil, and the indirect utility of preventing it, by example, that is, by fear. But this consideration has need of a basis superior to itself, in order to render it legitimate. Suppose, in fact, that there is nothing good or evil in itself, and consequently neither essential merit nor demerit, and consequently, again, no absolute right of blaming or punishing; by what right, then, I ask, do you blame or disgrace a man, or make him ascend the scaffold, or put him in irons for life, for the advantage of others; when the action of the man is neither good nor bad in itself, and merits in itself neither blame nor punishment? Suppose that it is not absolutely right, just in itself, to blame this man or to punish him, and the legitimacy and propriety of infamy and of glory, and of every species of reward and punishment, are at an end. Still further, I maintain if punishment has no other ground than utility, then even its utility is destroyed; for in order that a punishment may be useful, it is requisite, 1st, that he upon whom it is inflicted, endowed as he is with the principle of merit and demerit, should regard himself as justly punished, and should accept his punishment with a suitable disposition; 2d, that the spectators, equally endowed with the principle of merit and demerit, should regard the culprit as justly punished according to the measure of his crime, and should apply to themselves by anticipation the same justice in case of crime, and should be kept in harmony with the social order by the view of its legitimate penalties. Hence arises the utility of examples of punishment, whether moral or physical. But take away its foundation in justice, and you destroy the utility of punishment; you excite indignation and abhorrence, instead of awakening penitence in the victim, or teaching a salutary lesson to the public. You array courage, sympathy, every thing noble and elevated in human nature, on the side of the victim. You excite all energetic spirits against society and its artificial laws. Thus the utility of punishment is itself grounded in its justice, instead of justice being grounded in its utility. Punishment is the sanction of the law, and not its foundation. Moral order has its foundation not in punishment, but punishment has its foundation in moral order. The idea of right and wrong is grounded only on itself, on reason which reveals it. It is the condi tion of the idea of merit and demerit which is the condition of the idea of reward and punishment; and this latter is to the two former, but especially to the idea of right and wrong, in the relation of the consequence to the principle.” — ED.

moral emotions seem to be stronger with respect to the conduct of others than our own. A man who can be guilty, apparently without remorse, of the most flagrant injustice, will yet feel the warmest indignation against a similar act of injustice in another; and the best of men know it to be in many cases a useful rule, before they determine on any particular conduct, to consider how they would judge of the conduct of another in the same circumstances. "Do to others as ye would that they should do unto you." This is owing to the influence of selfpartiality and self-deceit. Mr. Smith has been so much struck with the difference of our moral judgments in our own case and in that of another, that he has concluded conscience to be only an application to ourselves of those rules which we have collected from observing our feelings in cases in which we are not personally concerned. I shall afterwards state some objections to which this opinion is liable.

Were it not for the influence of self-deceit, it could hardly happen that a man should habitually act in direct opposition to his moral principles. We know, however, that this is but too frequently the case. The most perfect conviction of the obligation of virtue, and the strongest moral feelings, will be of little use in regulating our conduct, unless we are at pains to attend constantly to the state of our own character, and to scrutinize with the most suspicious care the motives of our actions. Hence the importance of the precept so much recommended by the moralists of all ages," Know thyself."

These observations may convince us still more of the truth of what I have elsewhere remarked with respect to sentimental reading, and of its total insufficiency for forming a virtuous character without many other precautions.* Where its effects are corrected by habits of business, and every instance of conduct is brought home by the reader to himself, it may be a source of solid improvement; for although strong moral feelings do by no means alone constitute virtue, yet they add to the satisfaction we derive from the discharge of our duty, and they increase the interest we take in the prosperity of virtue in the world.

*

Philosophy of the Human Mind, P. I. Chap. viii. Sect. v.

CHAPTER IV.

OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

I. Ground of Obligation.] According to some systems, moral obligation is founded entirely on our belief that virtue is enjoined by the command of God. But how, it may be asked, does this belief impose an obligation? Only one of two answers can be given. Either that there is a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the Author and the Governor of the universe; or that a rational self-love should induce us, from motives of prudence, to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to the Almighty Arbiter of happiness and misery.

On the first supposition, we reason in a circle. We resolve our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion, and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation.

The other system, which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence, although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which sufficiently invalidate every argument in its favor. Among others, it leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest; 2. That a being independently and completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral attributes.

But further, the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional motives to the practice of it, but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation.

In the last place, if moral obligation be constituted by a regard to our situation in another life, how shall the existence of a future state be proved, or even rendered probable, by the light of nature? or how shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the Deity? The truth is, that the strongest presumption for such a state is deduced. from our natural notions of right and wrong, of merit and

demerit, and from a comparison between these and the general course of human affairs.

It is absurd, therefore, to ask why we are bound to practise virtue. The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation. Every being who is conscious of the distinction between right and wrong carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe, notwithstanding he may be in total ignorance of a future state. "What renders obnoxious to punishment," as Dr. Butler has well remarked, "is not the foreknowledge of it, but merely the violating a known obligation." Or (as Plato has expressed the same idea), τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός. *

On

From what has been stated, it follows that the moral faculty, considered as an active power of the mind, differs essentially from all the others hitherto enumerated. The least violation of its authority fills us with remorse. the contrary, the greater the sacrifices we make in obedience to its suggestions, the greater are our satisfaction and triumph.

II. Butler on the Supremacy of Conscience.] The supreme authority of conscience, although beautifully described by many of the ancient moralists, was not sufficiently attended to by modern writers as a fundamental principle in the science of ethics till the time of Dr. Butler. Too little stress is laid on it by Lord Shaftesbury; and the omission is the chief defect in his system of morals. Shaftesbury's opinion, however, although he does not state it explicitly in his Inquiry, seems to have been precisely the same at bottom with that of Butler.†

With respect to Dr. Butler, I shall take this opportunity of remarking, that in his sermons On Human Nature, in the Preface to his Sermons, and in a short Dissertation on Virtue annexed to his Analogy, he has, in my humble opinion, gone farther towards a just explanation of our moral constitution than any other modern philosopher. Without aiming at the praise of novelty or of refinement, he has displayed singular penetration and sagacity in availing himself of what was sound in former systems, and in

* Minos. "Right itself is a royal law."

See his Advice to an Author, Part I. Sect. ii.