Whether this diversity be owing to natural predisposition, or to early education, it is of little consequence to determine, as, upon either supposition, a preparation is made for it in the original constitution of the mind, combined with the circumstances of our external situation. Its final cause is also sufficiently obvious, as it is this which gives rise in the case of individuals to a limitation of attention and study, and lays the foundation of all the advantages which society derives from the division and subdivision of intellectual labor.

II. Neither Selfish nor Moral in itself.] These advantages are so great, that some philosophers have attempted to resolve the desire of knowledge into self-love. But to this theory the same objection may be stated which has already been made to the attempts of some philosophers to account, in a similar way, for the origin of our appetites; -that all of these are active principles, manifestly directed by nature to particular specific objects, as their ultimate ends; that as the object of hunger is not happiness, but food, so the object of curiosity is not happiness, but knowledge. To this analogy Cicero has very beautifully alluded, when he calls knowledge the natural food of the understanding. "Est animorum ingeniorumque nostrorum naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturæ." We can indeed conceive a being prompted merely by the cool desire of happiness to accumulate information; but in a creature like man, endowed with a variety of other active principles, the stock of his knowledge would probably have been scanty, unless selflove had been aided in this particular by the principle of curiosity.

Although, however, the desire of knowledge is not resolvable into self-love, it is not in itself an object of moral approbation. A person may indeed employ his intellectual powers with a view to his own moral improvement, or to the happiness of society, and so far he acts from a laudable principle. But to prosecute study merely from the desire of knowledge is neither virtuous nor vicious. When not suffered to interfere with our duties it is morally innocent. The virtue or vice does not lie in

the desire, but in the proper or improper regulation of it. The ancient astronomer who, when accused of indifference with respect to public transactions, answered that his country was in the heavens, acted criminally, inasmuch as he suffered his desire of knowledge to interfere with the duties which he owed to mankind.

III. But superior in Dignity and Use to the Appetites.] At the same time, it must be admitted that the desire of knowledge (and the same observation is applicable to our other desires) is of a more dignified nature than those appetites which are common to us with the brutes. A thirst for science has been always considered as a mark of a liberal and elevated mind; and it generally coöperates with the moral faculty in forming us to those habits of selfgovernment which enable us to keep our animal appetites in due subjection.

There is another circumstance which renders this desire peculiarly estimable, that it is always accompanied with a strong desire to communicate our knowledge to others; insomuch, that it has been doubted if the principle of curiosity would be sufficiently powerful to animate the intellectual exertions of any man in a long course of persevering study, if he had no prospect of being ever able to impart his acquisitions to his friends or to the public. "Si quis in cœlum ascendisset," says Cicero, naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore, quæ jucundissima fuisset, si aliquem cui narraret habuisset. Sic natura solitarium nihil amat, semperque ad aliquod quasi adminiculum annititur, quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.” * And to the same purpose Seneca : "Nec me ulla res delectabit, licet eximia sit et salutaris, quam mihi uni

*

De Amicitia, 23. Thus translated, or rather paraphrased, by Melmoth: :"Were a man to be carried up to heaven, and the beauties of universal nature displayed to his view, he would receive but little pleasure from the wonderful scene, if there were none to whom he might relate the glories he had beheld. Human nature, indeed, is so constituted as to be incapable of lonely satisfaction: man, like those plants which are formed to embrace others, is led by an instinctive impulse to recline on his species; and he finds his happiest and most secure support in the arms of a faithful friend."

sciturus sim. Si cum hac exceptione detur sapientia, ut illam inclusam teneam, nec enunciem, rejiciam: nullius boni, sine socio, jucunda possessio est." *

A strong curiosity, properly directed, may be justly considered as one of the most important elements in philosophical genius; and, accordingly, there is no circumstance of greater consequence in education than to keep the curiosity always awake, and to turn it to useful pursuits. I cannot help, therefore, disapproving greatly of a very common practice in this country, that of communicating to children general and superficial views of science and history by means of popular introductions. In this way we rob their future studies of all that interest which can render study agreeable, and reduce the mind, in the pursuits of science, to the same state of listlessness and languor as when we toil through the pages of a tedious novel after being made acquainted with the final catastrophe.

It would contribute greatly to the culture and the guidance of this principle of curiosity, if the different sciences were taught as much as possible in the order of the analytic rather than in that of the synthetic method; † a plan, however, which I readily admit it is not so practicable to carry into effect in a course of public as of private instruction. Such a mode of education, too, would be attended with the additional advantage of accustoming the student to the proper method of investigation; and thereby preparing him in due time to enter on the career of invention and discovery. Nor is this all. It would impress the knowledge he thus acquired, in some measure by his own ingenuity, much more deeply on his memory than if it were passively imbibed from books or teachers; in the same manner as the windings of a road make a more lasting impression on the mind when we have once travelled

*

-

Seneca, Epist. VI. "Nor, indeed, would any thing give me pleasure, however excellent and salutary it might be, were I to keep the knowledge of it to myself. Were wisdom offered me under such restriction as to be obliged to conceal it, I would reject it. No enjoyment whatever can be agreeable without participation."

↑ Analytically we discover, by a sort of decomposition, the simple laws which are concerned in the phenomenon under consideration; synthetically, taking the laws for granted, we determine à priori what the result will be of any hypothetical combination of them. - ED.

it alone, and inquired out the way at every turn, than if we had travelled along it a hundred times trusting ourselves implicitly to the guidance of a companion.

I am happy to be confirmed in this opinion by its coincidence with what has been excellently remarked on the same subject by Miss Edgeworth, in her treatise on Practical Education; a work equally distinguished by good sense and by originality of thought. The passage I allude to more particularly at present is the short dialogue about the steam-engine, as improved by Mr. Watt.*

SECTION II.

THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY.

I. An Instinctive Principle.] Abstracted from those affections which interest us in the happiness of others, and from all the advantages which we ourselves derive from the social union, we are led by a natural and instinctive desire to associate with our species. This principle is easily discernible in the minds of children long before the dawn of reason. "Attend only," says an intelligent and accurate observer, "to the eyes, the features, and the gestures of a child on the breast when another child is presented to it; both instantly, previous to the possibility of instruction or habit, exhibit the most evident expressions of joy. Their eyes sparkle, and their features and gestures demonstrate, in the most unequivocal manner, a mutual attachment. When further advanced, children who are strangers to each other, though their social appetite be equally strong, discover a mutual shyness of approach, which, however, is soon conquered by the more powerful instinct of association."+

In the lower animals, too, very evident traces of the same instinct appear. In some of these we observe a species of union strikingly analogous to political associations among men in others we observe occasional unions among individuals to accomplish a particular purpose, to repel, for

* Essays on Practical Education, Chap. xxi.

† Smellie's Philosophy of Natural History, Chap. xi.

example, a hostile assault; but there are also various tribes which discover a desire of society, and a pleasure in the company of their own species, without an apparent reference to any further end. Thus we frequently see horses, when confined alone in an inclosure, neglect their food and break the fences to join their companions in the contiguous field. Every person must have remarked the spirit and alacrity with which this animal exerts himself on the road, when accompanied by another animal of his own species, in comparison of what he discovers when travelling alone; and, with respect to oxen and cows, it has been asserted, that even in the finest pasture they do not fatten so rapidly in a solitary state as when they feed together in a herd.*

What is the final cause of the associating instinct in such animals as have now been mentioned it is not easy to conjecture, unless we suppose that it was intended merely to augment the sum of their enjoyments. But whatever opinion we may form on this point, it is indisputable that the instinctive determination is a strong one, and that it produces striking effects on the habits of the animal, even when external circumstances are the most unfavorable to its operation. Horses and oxen, for example, when deprived of companions of their own species, associate and become attached to each other. The same thing sometimes happens between individuals that belong to tribes naturally hostile; as between dogs and cats, or between a cat and a bird.

If these facts be candidly considered, there will appear but little reason to doubt the existence of the social instinct in our own species, when it is so agreeable to the general analogy of nature, as displayed through the rest of the animal creation. As this point, however, has been controverted warmly by authors of eminence, it will be necessary to consider it with some attention.

II. The Theory of Hobbes stated and refuted.] The question with respect to the social or the solitary nature

*One of the best accounts of the social principle in animals is found in Swainson's Habits and Instincts of Animals, Chapters IX. and X.

ED.