goodness, perform a worthy action in silence, have, I confess, acquired more refined notions of virtue than those I have hitherto spoke of, yet even in these (with whom the world has never yet swarmed) we may discover no small symptoms of pride; and the humblest man alive must confess that the reward of a virtuous action, which is the satisfaction that ensues upon it, consists in a certain pleasure he procures to himself, by contemplating on his own worth; which pleasure, together with the occasion of it, are as certain signs of pride as looking pale and trembling at any imminent danger are the symptoms of fear."

From these passages, however, it is abundantly clear, that, in his theory of virtue, Mandeville admits the possibility of self-denial being exercised merely for the private gratification of the pride of the individual, without any regard to the opinions of other men. But in his com

mentary on the Fable of the Bees, he goes much farther, and attempts to show that there is really no self-denial in the world, and that what we call a conquest is only a concealed indulgence of our passions. To establish this point, he avails himself of the ambiguity of language. The passion of sex he, in every case, calls lust; every thing which exceeds what is necessary for the support of life he calls luxury; and thus confounding the innocent and reasonable gratifications of our passions with their vicious excesses, he pretends to show that there is really no virtue among men. "There are some of our passions,' says Mr. Smith, "which have no other names except those which mark the disagreeable and offensive degree. The spectator is more apt to take notice of them in this degree than in any other. When they shock his own sentiments, when they give him some sort of antipathy and uneasiness, he is necessarily obliged to attend to them, and is from thence naturally led to give them a name. When they fall in with the natural state of his own mind, he is very apt to overlook them altogether, and either gives them no name at all, or, if he gives them any, it is one which marks rather the subjection and restraint of the passion than the degree which it is still allowed to subsist in after it is so subjected and restrained. Thus, the common names of the love of pleasure and of the love of sex

denote a vicious and offensive degree of those passions. The words temperance and chastity, on the other hand, seem to mark rather the restraint and subjection in which they are kept under, than the degree which they are still allowed to subsist in. When he can show, therefore, that they still subsist in some degree, he imagines he has entirely demolished the reality of the virtues of temperance and chastity, and shown them to be mere impositions upon the inattention and simplicity of mankind. Those virtues, however, do not require an entire insensibility to the objects of the passions which they mean to govern. They only aim at restraining the violence of those passions so far as not to hurt the individual, and neither to disturb nor offend society.

"It is the great fallacy of Dr. Mandeville's book to represent every passion as wholly vicious, which is so in any degree, and in any direction. It is thus that he treats every thing as vanity which has any reference either to what are, or what ought to be, the sentiments of others; and it is by means of this sophistry that he establishes his favorite conclusion, that private vices are public benefits. If the love of magnificence, a taste for the elegant arts and improvements of human life, for whatever is agreeable in dress, furniture, or equipage, for architecture, statuary, painting, and music, is to be regarded as luxury, sensuality, and ostentation, even in those whose situation allows, without any inconveniency, the indulgence of those passions, it is certain that luxury, sensuality, and ostentation are public benefits, since, without the qualities upon which he thinks proper to bestow such opprobrious names, the arts of refinement could never find employment, and must languish for want of encouragement. Some popular ascetic doctrines which had been current before his time, and which placed virtue in the entire extirpation and annihilation of all our passions, were the real foundation of this licentious system. It was easy for Dr. Mandeville to prove, first, that this entire conquest never actually took place among men; and, secondly, that, if it was to take place universally, it would be pernicious to society, by putting an end to all commerce and industry, and, in a manner, to the whole business of human life. By the first of these

propositions he seemed to prove that there was no real virtue, and that what pretended to be such was a mere cheat and imposition upon mankind; and by the second, that private vices were public benefits, since without them no society could prosper or flourish." *

VI. On the General Impression and Practical Tendency of such Speculations.] I shall not enter into a more particular examination of Mandeville's doctrines. I cannot, however, leave the subject without observing, that the impression which the author's writings produce on the mind affords a sufficient refutation of his principles. It was considered by Cicero as a strong presumption against the system of Epicurus, that "it breathed nothing generous or noble," nihil magnificum, nihil generosum sapit; and the same presumption will be found to apply, with tenfold force, to that theory which has been now under our discussion. If there be no real distinction between virtue and vice, if the account given by Mandeville of the constitution of our nature be a just one, why do his reasonings render us dissatisfied with our own characters, or inspire us with a detestation and contempt for mankind? Why do we turn with pleasure from the dark and uncomfortable prospects which he presents to us, to the delightful and elevating views of human nature which are exhibited in those philosophical systems which he attempts to explode? It will be said, perhaps, that all this arises from pride or vanity. When we read Mandeville, we are ashamed of the species to which we belong; while, on the contrary, our pride is gratified by those sublime but fallacious descriptions of disinterested virtue, with which the weakness or hypocrisy of some popular writers has flattered the moral enthusiasm of the multitude. But if Mandeville's account of our nature be just, whence is it that we come to have an idea of one class of qualities as more excellent and meritorious than another? Why do we consider pride or vanity as a less worthy motive for our conduct than disinterested patriotism or friendship, or a determined adherence to what we believe to be our duty? Why does

*

Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part VII. Sect. II. Chap. iv.

human nature appear to us less amiable in his writings than in the writings of Addison? or whence the origin of those opposite sentiments which the very names of Addison and of Mandeville inspire? We shall admit the fact with respect to the actual depravity of man to be as he states it; but does not the impression his system leaves on the mind demonstrate that we are at least formed with the love and admiration of moral excellence, and that virtue was intended to be the law of our conduct? The question concerning the actual attainments of man must not be confounded with the question concerning the reality of moral distinctions. If Mandeville is successful in establishing his doctrine on the first of these points, the dissatisfaction his conclusions leave on the mind is sufficient to overturn his doctrine with respect to the latter. remark of La Rochefoucauld, that "hypocrisy itself is a homage which vice renders to virtue," involves a satisfactory reply to all the arguments that have ever been drawn from the prevailing corruption of mankind against the moral constitution of human nature.

The

It is the capital defect of this system to confound together the two questions I have just stated, and to substitute a satire on vice and folly instead of a philosophical account of those moral principles which form an essential part of our frame. That there is a great deal of truth mixed with the sophistry it contains, I am ready to acknowledge; and if the author's remarks had been thrown into the form of satires, many of them might have been useful to the world, by the light they throw on human character, and by the assistance which individuals may derive from them in examining their own motives of action. Some apology might have been made, in this case, for the colorings which the author's facts have borrowed from his imagination. The object of the satirist is to reform; and for this purpose it may sometimes be of use to exaggerate the prevailing vices and follies of the time, in order to contrast more strongly what mankind are with what they might and ought to be. But the satirist who wishes well to his species, while he indulges his indignation against prevailing corruptions, will recollect, that, if his censures are just, they presuppose the reality of moral distinctions ;

and while he laments the depravity of the race, and chastises the follies and vices of individuals, he will reverence morality as the Divine law, and those essential principles of the human frame which bear the manifest signature of the Divine workmanship. To attempt to depreciate these can never answer a good purpose. On the contrary, it has a tendency to fill the minds of good men with a desponding skepticism, and to stifle every generous and active exertion; and if it does not actually increase the depravity of the world, it tends at least to strengthen the effrontery of vice, and to expose the wiser and better part of mankind to the impertinent raillery of fools and profligates.*

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II.

BENTHAM AND HIS FOLLOWERS.

I. Bentham's Ethical Writings and Doctrines.] Jeremy Bentham was born in London, in the year 1748, and at a very early age became a graduate of the University of Oxford. Whilst there, he directed his attention to the study of law and the cognate branch of ethics, and during the last year year of his stay in that city became an ardent admirer and investigator of the principle of utility, chiefly from reading Dr. Priestley's Essay upon Government. In 1776 he published a Fragment on Government, and in 1789 appeared his grand work, entitled Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. The moral system which Bentham advocated in this latter work, and which he expanded more and more during a long and laborious life, at length came forth, in the year 1834, in its most complete, and at the same time most popular form, as a posthumous production, edited by Dr. Bowring, under the title of Deontology; or the Science of Morality.

As the direct influence of the writings of La Rochefoucauld and Mandeville has passed away for the most part, I have taken the liberty slightly to abridge what was said of them in the text, in order to make room for some account of a more distinguished moralist of the selfish school, Jeremy Bentham. What relates to Bentham himself is taken from Morell's View of Speculative Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, Chap. IV.; what relates to his followers is taken from Mackintosh's Progress of Ethical Philosophy, Sect. VI.— Ed.