among the multitude comprehended under one name. Hence, arose a very useful and curious contrivance, for determining the individual object intended, by means of that part of speech called the article. The force of the article consists in pointing or singling out from the common mass, the individual of which we mean to speak. In English, we have two articles, a and the; a is more general; the, more definite. A is much the same with one, and marks only any one individual of a species; as, a lion, a king. The, which possesses more properly the force of the article, ascertains some known or determined individual of the species; as, the lion, the king. The Greeks have but one article, which answers to our definite article the. They supply the place of our article a by the absence of their article. The Latins have no article, but supply its place with the pronouns, hic, ille, iste. This, however, seems to be a defect in their language, since articles, certainly, contribute much to accuracy and precision.

To illustrate this remark, we may observe the different imports of the following expressions, depending wholly on the different employment of the articles: "The son of a king-the son of the king-a son of the king's." Each of these three phrases has an entirely different meaning, which is too obvious to be misunderstood. But in Latin, "filius regis," is wholly undetermined; and to explain in which of these three senses it is to be understood, for it may bear any of them, a circumlocution of several words must be used. In the same manner, "are you a king?" " are you the king?" are questions of quite separate import. "Thou art a man," is a very general and harmless position; but "thou art the man," is an assertion, capable of striking terror

and remorse into the heart.

Besides this quality of being distinguished by the article,

Hence, arose what contrivance, and in what does its force consist? In English, what articles have we; and what is observed of them? A is much the same with what; what does it mark; and what examples are given? What does the ascertain; and what are the examples? Of the Greeks and the Latins with respect to the article, what is remarked; and why does this, in the Latin, seem a defect? To illustrate this remark, what example is given; and of each of these three phrases, what is observed? Of the phrase 'filius regis,' what is remarked; and, in order to understand in what sense it is to be taken, what is necessary? What farther illustrations follow Besides being distinguished by the article, what affections belong to nouns?

three affections belong to substantive nouns; number, gender, and case, which require our consideration.

Number distinguishes them as one, or many of the same kind, called the singular and plural; a distinction found in all languages, and which must, indeed, have been coeval with the very infancy of language; as there were few things which men had more frequent occasion to express, than the difference between one and many. In the Hebrew, Greek, and some other ancient languages, we find not only a plural, but a dual number; the origin of which may very naturally be accounted for, from separate terms of numbering not being yet invented, and one, two, and many, being all, or at least, the chief numerical distinctions which men, at first, had any occasion to use.

Gender will lead us into a more extensive discussion than number. It being founded on the distinction of the two sexes, can, with propriety, be applied to the names of living creatures only. All other substantive nouns, ought to belong to what grammarians call the neuter gender, which is meant to imply the negation of either sex. Yet, in most languages, a great number of inanimate objects, have been ranked under the like distinctions of masculine and feminine. Thus, in Latin, gladius, a sword, for instance, is masculine; sagitta, an arrow, is feminine; and this assignation of sex to inanimate objects, appears, often, to be entirely capricious; derived from no other principle than the casual structure of the language, which refers to a certain gender, words of a certain termination. In the Greek and Latin, however, all inanimate objects are not distributed into masculine and feminine; but, many of them are also classed, where all of them ought to have been, under the neuter gender; as templum, a church; sedile, a seat.

In the French and Italian tongues, the neuter gender is entirely unknown, and all their names of inanimate objects are put upon the same footing with living creatures; and

Number distinguishes them in what manner; and why must this distinction have been coeval with the infancy of language? In what languages do we find a dual number; and how may its origin be accounted for? On what distinction is gender founded; and to what only can it be applied? To what should all other nouns belong; and what is it meant to imply ? Yet, in most languages, what is observed; what instances are mentioned; and from what is this assignation of sex derived? Of inanimate objects in the Greek and Latin, however, what is remarked; and what follows? In what languages is the neuter gender unknown; and what course do they pursue?

distributed, without exception, into masculine and feminine. But, in the English language, it is remarkable that there obtains a peculiarity quite opposite. In the French and Italian there is no neuter gender. In the English, when we use common discourse, all substantive nouns that are not names of living creatures, are neuter without exception. He, she, and it, are the marks of the three genders; and we always use it, in speaking of any object where there is no sex, or where the sex is not known. And ours, perhaps, is the only language in the known world, except the Chinese, in which the distinction of gender is properly and philosophically applied.

Hence arises a very great and signal advantage of the English tongue, which it is of importance to remark. Though in common discourse we employ only the proper and literal distinction of sexes, yet the genius of the language permits us, whenever it will add beauty to our discourse, to make the names of inanimate objects, masculine or feminine, in metaphorical sense; and when we do so, we are understood to quit the literal style, and to use one of the figures of discourse. For instance; in speaking of virtue in the course of an ordinary conversation, we refer the word to no sex or gender: We say, "virtue is its own reward;" or, it is the law of our nature.” But if we choose to rise

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into a higher tone; if we seek to embellish and animate our discourse, we give a sex to virtue; we say, "she descends from heaven;""she alone confers true honor upon man;" "her gifts are the only durable rewards." By this means we have it in our power to vary our style at pleasure; and this is an advantage which, not only every poet, but every good writer and speaker in prose, is, on many occasions, glad to seize and improve; and it is an advantage peculiar to our own tongue. For, in other languages, every word has one fixed gender; masculine, feminine, or neuter, which can, upon no occasion, be changed. It deserves, however, to be farther remarked, that, when we employ the liberty

In the English language, however, what peculiarity obtains; and how is this fully illustrated? Of our language, what is farther remarked? Hence arises, what great and signal advantage of the English tongue? How is this remark illustrated from the sentence, 'virtue is its own reward; or, 'it is the law of our nature? By this means what have we it in our power to do; and of this advantage what is remarked; and why? On this subject, however, what deserves to be farther re

marked?

which our language allows, of ascribing sex to any inani, mate object, we have not the liberty of making it of what gender we please; but are, in general, subject to some rule of gender, which the currency of language has fixed to that object. The foundation of this rule is supposed to be laid in a certain resemblance, or analogy, to the natural distinction of the two sexes. Thus, we commonly give the masculine gender to those nouns used figuratively, which are conspicuous for the attributes of imparting or communicating; which are by nature strong and efficacious, either to good or evil; or which have a claim to some eminence, whether laudable or not. On the other hand, those are generally made feminine, which are conspicuous for the attributes of containing, and of bringing forth; which have more of the passive in their nature, than of the active; which are peculiarly beautiful, or amiable; or which have respect to such excesses as are rather feminine than masculine.

Having discussed gender, we proceed next to another peculiarity of substantive nouns, which is their cases. Cases, in declension, express the state, or relation, which one object bears to another, denoted by some variation made upon the name of that object; generally, in the final letters, and by some languages, in the initials. All languages, however, do not agree in this mode of expression. The Greek and Latin use declension; but in the English, French, and Italian, it is not found, or, at most, it exists in a very imperfect state. These languages express the relations of objects, by means of the words called prepositions, which are the names of those relations, prefixed to the name of the object. English nouns have no case whatever, except a sort of genitive, usually formed by the addition of the letter s to the noun; as when we say "Pope's Dunciad," meaning the Dunciad of Pope. Our personal pronouns have likewise a case, which corresponds with the accusative of the Latin; I, me; he, him; who, whom. This, however, is but a slight resemblance of that declension which is used in the ancient languages.

Where is the foundation of this rule supposed to be laid; and what illustration follows? Having discussed gender, to what do we next proceed? What do cases express; and how are they denoted How does it appear that all languages do not agree in this mode of expression; and how do the latter languages express the relation of objects? What case, only, have English nouns; and what illustration is given? Of our personal pronouns, likewise, what is remarked; but of this, however, what is observed ?

Whether the moderns have given beauty or utility to language, by the abolition of cases, may, perhaps, be doubted. They have, however, certainly rendered it more simple, by removing that intricacy which arose from the different forms of declension, of which the Romans had no less than five; and from all the irregularities of these several declensions. By obtaining this simplicity, it must be confessed, we have filled language with a multitude of those little words called prepositions, which are perpetually recurring in every sentence, and seem to have encumbered speech by an addition of terms; and by rendering it more prolix, to have enervated its force. The sound of modern languages has also become less agreeable to the ear, by being deprived of that variety and sweetness, which arose from the length of words and the change of terminations, occasioned by the cases in Greek and Latin. But, perhaps the greatest disadvantage we suffer by the abolition of cases, is the loss of that liberty of transposition in the arrangement of words, which the ancient languages enjoyed.

Pronouns are the class of words most nearly related to substantive nouns; being, as the name imports, the representatives of them. I, thou, he, she, and it, are only an abridged way of naming the persons, or objects, with which we have immediate intercourse, or to which we are obliged, frequently, to refer in discourse: accordingly they are subject to the same modifications with nouns, of number, gender, and case. We may observe, however, that the pronouns of the first and second person, I and thou, have had no distinction of gender in any language; for, since they always refer to persons who are present to each other when they speak, their sex must be evident, and therefore needs not to be distinguished by a masculine or feminine pronoun. But, as the third person may be absent, or unknown, the distinction of gender there becomes requisite; and, consequently, in English, it has all the three genders belonging to it; he, she,

What may, perhaps, be doubted; and how have they rendered it more simple? By obtaining this simplicity, however, what have we done; and of them, what is remarked? How has the sound of modern languages, also, become less agreeable to the ear? But what, perhaps, is the greatest disadvantage we suffer by the abolition of cases? Of pronouns what is remarked; and how is this illustrated? To what are they, consequently, subject; but of the first and second person, what may we, at the same time, observe; and why? But why does the distinction of gender, in the third person, become requisite; and what, consequently follows?