1746' (ii. 95) and 1741' (ii. 198), both for '1747;' '1710' for 1718' (iii. 308); and a hundred more, sometimes puzzling, and always irritating. , Mr. Armstrong's Life of Elizabeth, the Termagant' Queen of Philip V., comes opportunely as, to some extent, the complement of the larger work. Much of it is, indeed, overlapped by these and the previous volumes of the Études Diplomatiques; but, though gleaning after a writer such as the Duc de Broglie is a thankless task, the author's period having been longer, and his aim different, he has succeeded in presenting an important contribution to a history so little known in this country as that of Spain. The Duc de Broglie's volumes open with the account of a proposed invasion of England or Scotland, in the beginning of 1746. Of this scheme, as it never came to a head, English history, as such, knows but little, and that vaguely. It is, however, none the less certain that, in January 1746, some 11,000 men, detached from the army of Flanders, and collected along the coast of the Channel, under the orders of the Duc de Richelieu, were in readiness to embark to attempt a landing in Scotland, and to support the Pretender. The Marquis d'Argenson, the then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, asserts in his Mémoires' that he incurred much ill will by opposing the project; but the Duc de Broglie shows conclusively that this is altogether an afterthought, for that, at the time, he unquestionably favoured it, pushed it forward, and drew out-or rather outlined for Voltaire, who drew out a manifesto, addressed to the English 'people,' which was to be published by Richelieu as soon as he landed on British soil. In this it was stated that the King of France thought it his duty to assist a prince worthy of the throne of his ancestors, and now recalled by the most rational part of a noble-minded nation; he was sending his troops solely because their support had been applied for by the best of the English; the number was exactly what had been asked for, and he would withdraw them as soon as they should require him to do so. insists throughout on this reference to the will of the English people, as to which the Duc de Broglie aptly says: This respect for the rights of a nation, at a time when it was not usual to speak of any rights but those of kings, 'expressed, too, in the name of a sovereign who acknowledged no limits to his own power, is equivalent to the signature of the philosophical minister;' and he thinks that, among It those who were called on for an opinion on the subject, Marshal Saxe was the only one who admitted any fear or doubt as to the issue. It is very probable that the detaching men from his command just as he wanted them to ensure the success of his own schemes had something to do with Saxe's dislike of the proposed expedition; but, independently of any selfish motive, his objections are based on a good sense which seems to have been curiously wanting in the other advisers of the king. To Marshal Noailles, with whom he corresponded on terms of affectionate deference, he wrote on December 25, 1745: Are you not afraid that this embarkation at Dunkirk may engage us in a new adventure of no short duration? The Protestant party in England must always be strong, for the great nobles, having got possession of the Church property, dread any change. You will perhaps say, What business is this of mine? But I love the king and his kingdom, and the truth must out, even if I ought to ask for nothing better than the war.' It may be doubted whether under any of the actual circumstances during that year the French project could possibly have met with success; but at this time the conditions were distinctly adverse. Not only had the Pretender's army outlived its short burst of success and attendant popularity, but some points on the coast of Scotland, which had been favourable to the insurgents, had been recovered by the Government, notably Montrose, which the Duc de Broglie describes as the place most clearly designed by 'nature for the landing of an invading corps.' That this estimate of the strategic value of Montrose, and of the support which the invaders might count on there, is not excessive, appears from the facts that Lord John Drummond, with the 'Royal Scots' regiment, did actually land there, and that, during December, the fishing-boats of the neighbourhood were employed to look out for French transports and pilot them in. Some of these men boarded the Ludlow Castle,' an English frigate, commanded by Captain Rodney, when she hoisted French colours, and had afterwards the assurance to petition for redress on the score of their boats having been destroyed.* But it was not only that in January, 1746, the tide of insurrection was ebbing; it was also that, through the vanity of Richelieu and his officers, no secrecy had been observed. The staff had publicly boasted that their chief * Rodney to the Secretary of the Admiralty, May 6, 1746. would bring back a marshal's bâton from England; besides which 'to secure the means of transport, it had been necessary to requisition almost all the merchant shipping of the Channel ports. This stoppage of the ordinary traffic was, to the English Government, equivalent to an open warning to be on the look-out. It did not neglect it; and as, notwithstanding its domestic trouble, it retained the full power of disposing of its naval forces, when Richelieu arrived at Boulogne, the Strait was guarded by a fleet of some thirty-five ships ranging along the French coast.' On It did not now take long to convince Richelieu that the undertaking could lead to nothing but disaster. December 29 he wrote to D'Argenson: "Yesterday the wind was favourable, and if my artillery had been here, I 'could have crossed over to England with the greatest ease 'imaginable;' but on December 31, though still hopeful, he had begun to wish that he had not let his tongue run quite go fast. 'I think,' he wrote, 'that if the business had been kept as secret as it ought to have been, it would have been possible to cross over unobserved, with no further risk than that of a chance meeting with some of the English cruisers, for their large ships do not keep the sea during the night on account of the danger they would run in the dark.' And on January 5 he wrote: 'I don't know what to do, if the wind does not change, or some miracle is not worked in our behalf, as you may see by the detailed account of our condition. . . . I think men of great military talents are no more secure from ridicule than those of less. . . . If I knew any bold warrior of this sort, I should beg you to send him to me; for, happen what may, we must meet our fortune with a stout heart.' After this he commenced a series of proposals, all differing from the original, all quite vague, all apparently in the mere intention of putting off the attempt which he had undertaken to make. The Brest fleet, under the Duke d'Anville, was to throw some battalions-now on the coast of Wales, now on the coast of Cornwall, now on the coast of Ireland. Then he wished to clear himself of all responsibility for the failure which he saw to be inevitable. He wrote to D'Argenson : 'The idea of leading these reinforcements into England was none of mine, so that I have no passionate resolve to take them there, nor am I burning with Jacobite zeal. But having been appointed to command the forces which were to be carried across to England, I have deemed it my duty to lay before you the several ways which might possibly lead to success. The Duke of York and his friends will thus have nothing to reproach us with.' And at last, after delays innumerable, he wrote that he was sick, and asked for permission to leave the command to his lieutenant, Lord Clare. So, amid the hootings of the mob, he returned to Paris, to be the butt of street-ballads, as a rule, says the Duke de Broglie, 'assez peu décentes.' As a sample of one 'qu'il n'est pas impossible de citer,' he gives : 'Ce pilote ignore les vents De l'Angleterre : Ile ne sait qu'embarquer les gens The idea of the expedition was not officially given up, but it was very well understood that no further attempt would be made to carry it out. Failure as it was, however, the Duke de Broglie thinks that it was not useless; that it increased the anxiety of the English Government, compelled them to keep troops in London and the south, which they could ill spare from the north, in consequence of which they were defeated at Falkirk; and caused the ministerial crisis which, though it ended in smoke, did for some days increase the difficulty of the position and the alarm of the people. To some extent this was so, but it is easy to exaggerate the effect. The Duke of Cumberland, with some of his troops, was indeed recalled to the south from Carlisle; but the check at Falkirk may be attributed to the incapacity of Hawley, certainly not to any inferiority of numbers, and the ministerial crisis sprang out of personal rivalries and the likes or dislikes of the king, with which the action of the French had but little to do. But, meanwhile, a real success was gained in Flanders, where Saxe, complaining of his men being taken away and of his wretched health, which prevented his going to Paris, appeared to give himself up to making the best of the situation. His sister, the Princess of Holstein, came to Ghent to do the honours of his house; he had cocks brought over from England, and, suivant la mode britannique,' seemed to take the greatest pleasure in watching them fight. To all appearance he was so taken up with the quest for amusement that, far from being supposed to be hatching any secret design, he might very well have been accused of neglecting his duties for pleasures becoming neither his high position nor the care which his health demanded. In reality, he was meditating the capture of Brussels, which, though it could not be taken in regular course, might, he thought, yield to a surprise. And this was exactly what happened. The marshal had hoped to offer it to the king as a New Year's gift; but a spell of soft wet weather made all transport impossible. It was not till the middle of January that the frost set in again. On January 27 everything was ready, and on the 29th-30th Brussels was unexpectedly invested; the trenches were opened on February 8. The governor, Count Kaunitz, more favourably known afterwards as a diplomatist, had little experience as a soldier, and no confidence in the Dutch troops which formed his garrison. On February 11 he proposed to surrender the place conditionally on the garrison marching out free and with the honours of war. Saxe felt that he had the game in his own hands, and, in a letter that might be called comic, pointed out to Kaunitz that Brussels was not defensible, that it was impossible to bring together an army to relieve it, while he, for his part, had an adequate siegetrain and everything that was necessary. A little time and care, and the town would be compelled to surrender on conditions 'honnêtes, quoique un peu dures.' What he mainly feared, he added, was that he might not be able to restrain his own troops. French soldiers were such devils of fellows: they found out ways of getting into places, which nobody suspected; they swarmed in like ants, setting at defiance alike the fortifications of the enemy and the orders of their own officers. With the prospect of pillage before them, it would be more difficult than ever to keep them out. Once in, he should be obliged to support them. It would be a never-ending regret to him if his career should be marked by the destruction of such a city as Brussels. In all this the marshal was merely trying to 'bounce' his antagonist; for he was quite alive to the possibility of the Prince de Waldeck, the commander-in-chief of the Dutch army, advancing to relieve the city, and placing him in a dangerous position. He probably, however, knew his men: knew that Waldeck was not likely to hurry himself, knew also that Kaunitz had nerves to be worked on. The result was that on February 20 the garrison hoisted the white flag, and to the number of 15,000 surrendered at discretion, the only condition granted being that the arms should be stored and given back at the peace. In which, again, Saxe showed that intimate knowledge of detail which so often surprises us in a man of his presumed |