a duel. The Prince, too, again gave proof of the indecision he had shown at Bléneau, and he did not attempt to fall on Turenne. Illness-perhaps the result of malaria in Paris, perhaps of a life of unbridled vice-seems to have been the immediate cause of a want of energy inconsistent with his audacious character, which has provoked a sharp comment from the pen of Napoleon, and more guarded censure from that of Turenne.† The Bourbon monarchy, as the result, was once more saved from imminent peril. Turenne, exposed for weeks to his much stronger enemies, emerged from a situation almost as dangerous as that of Napoleon around Leipzig; the army of Lorraine again disappeared, and that of Condé, deprived of its chief, did nothing. The genius of the warrior and the errors of his foes had once more inclined Fortune to the side of France.

By this time Mazarin had quitted the realm, and the chief source of discord being removed, Paris became of one mind in insisting on peace. Part of the Parliament, which had repaired to the Court, and the part which had remained in the capital united in entreating the King to enter the city. The great mass of the townsmen sighed for repose, and loyalty revived in the hearts of thousands at the thought of the royal youth, now the hope of the nation. The light multitude shared in the universal sentiment, and paper, the badge of all true to the King, was seen as straw had been in the head gear of the crowd. Gaston and Mademoiselle made a hasty exit; De Retz found his occupation gone, and the turbulence of the Fronde and of its lawless noblesse passed away like a disagreeable dream. Condé angrily kicked against the pricks in vain; he tried negotiation, insults, and threats, and finally he marched away with a small armed force to join his Spanish allies on the frontier. Louis XIV., even now an imposing figure, entered his good town,' amidst an immense acclaim, at the close of October 1652, and Turenne read in the eyes of the now grateful Court that he had been the restorer of the House of Bourbon. for his great rival, his position had become defined.

เ

As

Napoleon, Corr.' 32, p. 118: Après sa jonction avec le Duc de Lorraine, ayant des forces si supérieures, on ne voit pas bien pourquoi il se contenta de se retrancher sur les hauteurs de Limeil au lieu d'attaquer l'armée du Roi. . . . Condé manqua ce jour-là d'audace.'

† Turenne, Mémoires,' p. 172: Certainement les diverses négociations et même les passe-temps de Paris empêchèrent M. le Prince de prendre beaucoup d'avantages qu'il n'aurait pas négligés en toute autre occasion.'

'Launched down the fatal slope, Condé drifts to unknown regions. He is no longer the rebel, the insurgent sustaining an unjust cause, well founded as may be his complaints, but contending, with the aid of French arms, on the natal soil; he is a soldier of fortune, who has no longer a home, who does not belong to France; the tales of the companions of Tilly, of Wallenstein, of Gustavus revive in his memory; we may recollect his intimate conversations with Lenet on the terrace of Dijon, when he was twenty years old. His irritated heart pants for revenge; fever-stricken, the imagination of the halfdistracted hero pictures to itself the exalted fortunes of those warriors who have carved out sovereignty for themselves on the frontiers of oldestablished States.'

Condé was made general-in-chief of the forces of Spain in the Low Countries after his flight from Paris, a choice as unwise as that which would have made Moreau the leader of the Allies in 1813; it provoked the jealousy of the haughty grandees who had been the chiefs of the Spanish army. At first, however, things went well with the Prince; co-operating with Fuensaldaña and Charles of Lorraine, he took several strong places in Champagne, and occupied a considerable part of Argonne. Turenne recovered some of these fortresses; but if Paris had been regained by the King, France had suffered great losses in 1652, and the kingdom was still torn by civil war and exhausted. Dunkirk had fallen, and Barcelona; rebellion still showed its head in the provinces; Guyenne remained largely under Condé's influence; the democracy of the Ormée, inspired by him, had hung out the red flag at Bordeaux, had clamoured for a republican free city, and had perpetrated atrocious deeds of blood; the arch-rebel had done his best to revive Huguenot disloyalty in La Rochelle, and the finances and all the services of the State were disorganised and in the worst condition. Spain and her allies were greatly superior to France in military strength in 1653-a campaign, in Napoleon's language, of the very highest interest.' Condé had resolved to take a daring offensive, to invade France by the valleys of the Aisne and the Oise, and, overbearing all resistance, to push on to Paris. He was, however, fore

*This is proved by one of Condé's letters, cited in this volume, p. 293: 'Vous me mandés que la cabale des huguenots va droit à la respublique; cela n'est pas si mauvais. Il est certain qu'elle ne pourra jamais arriver à ses fins; mais conservant toujours cette pensée de respublique, elle empeschera les autres de songer à l'amnistie et demander la paix.'

VOL. CLXXVI. NO. CCCLXII.

со

The

stalled by Turenne,* who seized Rethel, a strategic point of much importance in the wars of those days, for it closed the valley of the Upper Aisne, and he was compelled to confine himself to the line of the Oise, and to penetrate France by her northern frontier, a frontier difficult to pierce and master, as has been proved in a series of wars. movements that followed deserve the attention of thoughtful students of the military art. Turenne marched to make head against Condé. But the royal army was not 20,000 strong; that of the allies was more than 30,000; and the loss of a battle, such being the odds, would probably involve the fall of the capital. The Marshal's lieutenants urged him to retire behind the Oise, or even to throw his infantry into the adjoining fortresses; but either operation would have been disastrous, and the great warrior, rejecting timid counsels, adopted a course that proved completely successful. Turenne by this time had become fully aware that the objects of Spain and those of Condé were not only different, but even opposite; and he knew, as his own letters † prove, that the Spanish generals and the Prince disliked each other. He crossed the Oise and hung on the flank of the hostile army as it moved slowly down the valley of the river as far as Roye, not more than five or six marches from Paris, and Fuensaldaña and the Spanish commanders, who really were advancing against their will, took no heed of Condé and would not attack. The allies, evidently divided in mind and purpose, now turned westward from Roye, and approached the Somme, abandoning the direct roads to Paris; and, seeing their hesitation, their great antagonist formed a resolution characteristic of his strategic genius.

He had been made aware, by an intercepted letter, that a large convoy was on the way from Cambray; and calculating that his enemy, already wavering, would rather endeavour to save this prize than attempt a hazardous march on the capital, he moved speedily northwards towards

Turenne was very proud of this exploit. He blames Condé, but truly remarks: Souvent les personnes les plus habiles font des fautes qu'il est plus aisé de remarquer que de prévenir' (Mémoires,' p. 185).

Turenne to Mazarin, cited in this volume, p. 594: Monsieur le Prince se voit à cette heure hors d'apparence de rien faire en France, et nous croyons que ses pensées et celles des Espagnols sont bien différentes.' And again, p. 595: M. le Prince tesmoigne grand empressement pour le comte Garcies et on dit qu'il vit froidement avec le comte de Fuensaldagne.'

Cambray, uncovering Paris for the time, but threatening the allied communications and rear. This fine movement was attended with success: Condé, bold and brilliant, in vain insisted on making a dash in force on Paris. Fuensaldaña looked after the convoy, and the allies fell back behind the Somme.

The first excellence of a general-in-chief is to estimate accurately the qualities of the army he commands-in what it is strong, in what weak-to comprehend, to judge rightly the character of his adversary, and always to keep this in mind. Forgetfulness of this essential principle has caused the ruin of great captains; a careful appreciation of it has occasionally raised to the first rank men apparently destined to stand in the second only. Turenne possessed this rare gift; he gave proof of it.

A great convoy, laden with provisions and munitions, and expected by the Spaniards, had left Cambray. The Marshal boldly abandons his flank position; he does not mind that he is exposing Paris, for he trusts in the council of the allies, whose hesitation will further his design: he hastens straight northward, in order to disperse or drive back the convoy. A debate is held at the head-quarters, near. Roye. Condé proposes to continue the march on Paris. "The convoy must be made safe," is Fuensaldaña's answer. He persists, he carries his point, and the army crosses the Somme. The convoy had already returned to Cambray; but Turenne had attained his end.'

This admirable manoeuvre saved Paris, but the Marshal narrowly escaped a great disaster. As he approached Péronne, on his returning march, he found himself in face of the enemy in largely superior force, and Condé urged his colleagues at once to attack him. Turenne, however, was always great in the stress of fortune. He fell back, and entrenched himself in a strong position, and once more Condé was baffled by the Spanish generals, who would not seize the occasion and fight. The Duc d'Aumale thus describes this passage of arms, but he does not place Turenne's fine conduct* in sufficient relief:

'As the Marshal, returning from his expedition, and thinking himself free from the enemy, is halting at Mont St. Quentin, near Péronne, without taking special precautions, M. le Prince debouches in his front with his cavalry. A glance is enough; he asks for infantry to begin the attack. Turenne acknowledges in his " Memoirs" that "the army of the King was in great danger." The pressing message of Condé does not move Fuensaldaña. "The troops are tired; men are in the rear. Let us wait until to-morrow."

'By the next day Turenne had entrenched himself. The position

Napoleon, Corr.' 32, p. 122, bestows the highest praise on Turenne for his attitude on this occasion.

of the Marshal is strong, but Condé still thinks an attack possible. There is no river to cross, no inaccessible slope; the ground gives facilities for turning movements, and the numerical superiority is so great! But Fuensaldaña will neither engage in a general action nor penetrate further into France; he is without the convoy, forced back into Cambray he fears that he may want munitions and food.'

Mainly owing to the discords of the allied camp, all the skill of Condé had been thrown away. Turenne had held a much stronger enemy in check, and had prevented the invaders from reaching Paris. At the close of the campaign the Prince had taken Rocroy, the scene of his first great victory; but Mouzon and St. Ménehould had fallen to the French, and the effort of Spain had altogether failed. But, though the prospects of France had distinctly brightened, she was still weaker than the foes on her northern frontier; and in the summer of 1654 a large army, commanded by Condé and the Archduke Leopold, sat down before the great fortress of Arras, the ancient chief town of Burgundian Artois. The Spaniards burned to regain a possession which had been one of the gems of the monarchy, and Fuensaldaña had collected all the appliances required for a siege of the first order. A double set of lines was drawn round the place, to keep off the garrison and an army of relief; the trenches were opened in the middle of July, and thousands of peasants lent willing hands to the army-perhaps 30,000 strong. Turenne and La Ferté hastened from Péronne, and were joined by Hocquincourt, who had taken Stenay; but the army of relief was weaker than that of the siege, and it was separated into masses considerably apart. Condé, angry at this boldness and seeming challenge, pressed for an immediate attack on the divided enemy; but Fuensaldaña again interfered.

"The Prince insisted that an immediate and vigorous effort should be made as a reply to each of these operations, to these dangerous movements-it may be said, to this bravado-especially that advantage should be taken of the strange distribution of the relieving army into two parts, placed the one at the east, the other at the west of the fortress, separated by a wide distance and by many obstacles, and incapable of giving the least support to each other. He was treated to slow half-measures only; a few squadrons, under Marsin and Ligniville, were allowed to set off, and when their chiefs returned, the one having been unable to do anything, the other not having made an attempt, their reports became the theme of interminable discussions, ending in no result. The council of war remained steady in its resolve. "We are not here to fight battles, but to take Arras," repeated Fuensaldaña. "Well, sir," retorted Condé, "well, we shall