separated into two main divisions, together 10,000 or 12,000 strong, lay encamped in a region of wood and morass between the Canal of Briare and the stream of the Loing, crowned by the hamlets of Rogny, Breteau, and Bléneau. The operations that followed are of peculiar interest, for they marked the first conflict between Condé and Turenne, and they have been admirably described by the Duc d'Aumale. Condé, who by this time had all his army in hand, from 14,000 to 15,000 men, fell at night on Hocquincourt's weak division, at a distance, we have seen, from Turenne, and in a short time had put it to flight. Turenne hurried forward to assist his colleague, and recognised his adversary by the vigour of the stroke:

It is no cavalry outpost beating up a mere detachment; it is an army which bas surprised, assailed, surrounded, and dispersed an enemy. This has not been done by Nemours. Turenne has recognised the unrivalled soldier. He stretches out an arm and exclaims, "The Prince is there!'

The Marshal had now to make a most difficult choice. Was he to rally Hocquincourt or try to stop Condé? The ordinary rules of war prescribed the first course, but Turenne most wisely adopted the second, and, if he risked much, he perhaps saved the monarchy. He marshalled his little army in a region of plain and marsh, and Condé exclaimed, as day broke, 'I will cut him to pieces if he makes ' a stand there; but I know him too well: that is not his 6 purpose.' The surmise of the Prince was correct. Turenne fell back and took a position flanked on either side by a small lake and a wood, and with a narrow defile in the near distance; and he marched his army behind the defile, guarding the approaches by a powerful and masked battery. Condé drew near in overwhelming force, but he could not deploy his lines in the enclosed ground, and Turenne made the attempt more difficult by sending a few squadrons to the head of the defile, which threatened to charge the advanced guard of the Prince †-an instance of exquisite tactical skill singled out by Napoleon for special praise. Condé, however,

Napoleon (Corr.' 32, p. 117) on the whole highly approves of Turenne's conduct, for it was a case of neck or nothing; but he significantly adds, 'Les règles de la guerre veulent qu'une division 'd'une armée évite de se battre seule contre toute une armée qui a 'déjà obtenu des succès; c'est courir le danger de tout perdre sans ' ressources.'

† Napoleon, Corr.' 32, p. 117: 'Cette circonstance ne paraît rien; cependant c'est ce rien qui est un des indices du génie de la guerre,'

eager not to be baulked, flung a part of his forces into the pass; this was smitten down by his adversary's guns, and the discomfited army was compelled to retreat.

'The van of the Prince is in danger of being caught as in a vice between the two bodies of the royal cavalry, and it is struck down in front by the artillery, which has free play and enfilades it. It recoils in disorder, is huddled together under the fire of eight pieces, well placed and well served. "The effect was great," Turenne says in his "Memoirs.""

This was one of Turenne's finest feats of arms; he had repulsed a victorious enemy threefold in number; but, as Napoleon has remarked,* Condé was not himself and did not display his wonted daring. This too, evidently, is the judgement of the Duc d'Aumale, and plainly 4,000 or 5,000 men ought not to have held more than 12,000 in check.

'Condé had reached his mark, and had annihilated one of the royal armies, when the lucky intervention of Turenne and his cool boldness and tactical skill changed the result of the day. . . . But if Condé had taken the offensive in his wonted fashion, he might, perhaps, have overwhelmed Turenne and found Louis XIV. in his hands. Was he afraid to go such lengths?'

After a check which was by no means decisive, and had been preceded by brilliant success, Condé left his army and set off for Paris, for reasons which have been never explained. He found the capital incensed against Mazarin, his own partisans lifting up their heads, and Gaston of Orleans watching the turn of events; but he had lost his influence and was not well received. The Parliament, indeed, distinctly inclined against him, and the mass of the citizens, though torn by factions and falling into disorder in the collapse of fixed rule, longed for peace to bring their troubles to an end. Meanwhile Turenne, making his superiority felt, had easily out-manoeuvred Condé's lieutenants left in command of the rebel forces. He had pushed forward to Fontainebleau, making for the capital by forced marches, and his baffled enemies fell back on Etampes, where they established themselves in strong positions. The Marshal, with true insight, entreated the Court to advance boldly on Paris and to proclaim the King; † and he has left his opinion on record that,

* Napoleon, 'Corr.' 32, p. 118: 'Le prince de Condé dans cette campagne n'a pas montré cette audace dont était animé le général de Fribourg et de Nordlingen; il ne devait pas se laisser imposer à Bléneau par des démonstrations.'

t'La cour vint à Melun, et M. de Turenne était fort d'avis qu'elle

in this instance, the daring course would have been that of wisdom. But Mazarin knew how detested he was, and probably feared for his personal safety; the Regent supported his faithful minister, and an occasion was lost that might have ended the war. Negotiations, too, had been set on foot, and the Cardinal seems to have hoped much from them; but these before long completely failed, Condé, with his accustomed arrogance, having insisted not only that he should be heard to make terms for himself, but that he should be named the plenipotentiary of France to conclude peace with Spain! The Duc d'Aumale, we must say, is hardly just, in view of the outrageous proposal, in not throwing the whole blame of the rupture on the Prince.

'All attempts to come to an agreement, efforts more or less sincere, concessions more or less well-meant, failed before insurmountable obstacles, the pride and violence of the Prince, the extravagance and vagueness of his designs, the unceasing and systematic duplicity of Mazarin, finally and especially the firmness of Anne of Austria, who will never allow the authority of the King to be degraded, or sanction compromises proposed-nay, solicited-by the most intimate and trusted of her counsellors.'

During these abortive attempts to make peace Turenne had defeated the rebels at Etampes, and had sat down to besiege the town. By this time Hocquincourt had been got rid of, and Mazarin, not a bad judge of war, had given a free hand to the great captain, who was becoming the best mainstay of the monarchy. Ere long a fresh danger threatened the royal cause, and gave Condé solid grounds of hope. Charles of Lorraine, driven out of his little realm, had long been one of those soldiers of fortune repeatedly seen in the Thirty Years' War, who knew no abiding-place but the camp, and were ready to sell to the best bidder the rude levies they had got together, their only stock-in-trade in the commerce of war. The vagrant prince had been in the pay of Spain, and looked on the King of France as an hereditary foe; and he agreed with Condé and other nobles of the Fronde to relieve Etampes with a large body of troops, and perhaps to attack the royal army. At the news of the approach of the new enemy Turenne, like Bonaparte

s'en allat droit à Paris, où Monsieur et M. le Prince étaient sans troupes, et ne pouvaient plus faire aucun fondement sur leur armée; d'ailleurs il y avait dans la ville de si grandes cabales contre eux que le peuple n'eût pas pris les armes contre le Roi appuyé de son armée' Memoires,' p. 145, ed. 1877).

before Mantua, raised the siege of Etampes without a moment's delay, and pressed forward to the Marne and the Seine, to place himself between Condé and the army of the Duke. Lorraine had taken a position of no ordinary strength at Villeneuve St. Georges, not far from the angle formed by the rivers as they converge on the capital; but Turenne fastened on his flank and rear, and, between menaces and parleying, contrived to induce the Duke to sign a treaty and to withdraw from France. The compact was hardly made when an advanced guard of the army of Condé appeared on the scene. Turenne had once more averted a peril so grave that, in Napoleon's judgement, the Court and the royal army must have taken refuge in the south had Lorraine and Condé's forces effected their junction. The Duc d'Aumale describes the incident vividly and well, and on this occasion does justice to Turenne.

*

"Turenne had vigorously maintained his daring offensive movement. He thoroughly understood the man he had before him, his habits, his engagements, and what these were worth. It was one of those moments when war becomes especially an art, and cannot be conducted upon arithmetical or geometrical rules. The Marshal draws near this enemy,

so superior in numbers, takes his final measures to attack this strong position, defended by good troops and very ably occupied. attempt is made to stop him; he still moves forward.

An

'If M. de Lorraine perceives a symptom of hesitation in the movements of his adversary, if he can be joined in time by the army from Etampes, he will fall upon Turenne and fight like a brave commander, and the army of the King must be destroyed. But if M. de Lorraine sees that he will be threatened by a sharp attack before the arrival of reinforcements gives him all the chances of the game, he will not expose to the hazards of war an army which is his only possession, and he will secure for himself the advantages guaranteed by the Court.

'Charles II. of England, who holds the powers given him by his brother of France, runs from one general to the other, gives pledges, answers in person for the word of Charles IV. There is no fighting. Turenne still advances. He is within cannon shot. The artillerymen are at their pieces, their matches are lit. Charles IV. orders them to fire. Almost immediately after he thinks better of it, signs the treaty, sends it with hostages to Turenne. The army of Lorraine begins to defile before that of France drawn up for battle. Within eight days the Lorrainers will have crossed the Marne; within fifteen they will be beyond the frontier of the kingdom.'

* Napoleon, Corr.' 32, p. 113: Si la jonction se fût faite avec le duc de Lorraine, la supériorité numérique des Frondeurs eût été telle, que la cour n'aurait plus eu d'autre partie que celui de se retirer sur Lyon, ne pouvant compter sur la Bourgogne,'

Paris meantime had been given up to anarchy, for even a semblance of government had ceased to exist. The Parliament was surrounded and hooted by mobs; Gondi, made at last the Cardinal de Retz, had lost the favour of the fickle citizens, and the noblesse of the Fronde were decried and denounced. Turenne, having shaken off Lorraine, was reinforced by La Ferté with a small body of troops; and the Marshal at once advanced on Paris, long the object of his well-conceived strategy. Condé encamped himself in the bend of the Seine of which St. Cloud and St. Germain may be called the base, with an army about 6,000 strong; and his adversary, twofold at least in number, bridged the river at Epinay, near the apex of the bend between St. Denis and Argenteuil. The Prince avoided the unequal conflict; crossed from St. Cloud to the northern bank of the river, believing that the royal army was on the southern bank, and made an attempt to pass through the capital, and to take a position around Charenton, at the confluence of the Marne and the Seine. The citizens, however, closed their gates; and, as far the greater part of Turenne's force was still lying on the northern bank, the Marshal came up with Conde's rear guard, and to reach Charenton had become impossible. Condé, all but brought to bay, seized his one chance of safety, and took a step worthy of a great commander. placed his little army, with the rear approaching the Bastille, within what, even in those days, was the mass of buildings known as the Faubourg St. Antoine; and having fortified his position as well as he could, he stationed his best troops on the three roads which led to Charonne, Vincennes, and Charenton, and by which only Turenne could attack. The roads converged as they drew near the Bastille; and they formed lines for defence or attack which an able soldier could turn to good account.

'This description of the configuration of the ground shows what advantages a clear-headed general could obtain from these three arteries starting from the same summit, furnished with obstacles, and connected by lateral communications; what facilities he would have to move his troops and shift their positions, and to compensate a great superiority of numbers, five or six against twelve thousand men ; while the assailant, forced to divide his attacks along a broad front and at very distant points, could only change the distribution of his troops by manœuvres, which would take time.'

The battle that followed-that of St. Antoine-fought on July 2, 1652, though hardly more than a combat in the streets, has some features, nevertheless, of interest. Turenne