gated, and had found several successful Commentators, at once a revolution in philofophy commenced. It foon met with numerous admirers and friends, and even its opponents could not with-hold their admiration from this masterly production. They faw themselves, every where, driven from their strong holds, and obliged to erect new fortifications for the defence of thofe philofophical tenets which they wished to maintain. Nay, many of the enemies of this fyftem became its friends; and the invaluable part of it, which treats of morals, met with an almost universal approbation. All the different branches of Philofophy were examined with greater ardour, and new fources of knowledge, which formerly had scarcely been conceived, were now expofed to view. The limits of the science were more accurately defined, and the laudable researches after stable and fimple principles, and after a rigid method, gave to philofophical inquiries a certainty, and an intereft, which for a long time they had not poffeffed. Long before this period doubts had arisen, in reflecting minds, concerning the fyftems of Leibnitz, Wolf and Locke; but these had never been unfolded with fufficient clearness, nor a better fyftem fubftituted in the place of that which was to be relinquished. Here all fyftems were examined with critical acumen, and a solid foundation was laid for a new one. This New Philofophy, in a short time, was attended with an almost magical influence upon all the Sciences. It found friends and adherents, even among ranks of people who had not devoted themselves to Science, or least of all, to Metaphyfics. It excited in Germany, a found, philofophic spirit of inquiry, of which the prefent age was fcarcely deemed capable. It contains fuch an immense store of new ideas and views that, hitherto, only a small part of these materials can be confidered as digested, and even, in a diftant age, new branches of knowledge may fhoot forth from it.

The

The work itself is arranged with a fyftematic fpirit, and written with a noble philofophic impartiality. The ftyle is fomewhat obfcure *, the construction and arrangement of the periods, in many places, ungraceful, heavy, and over-loaded; but a reader who has a tolerable understanding, and an intereit for truth, is fufficiently recompensed by the originality of thought, and by the new and striking images in which it abounds. The celebrated author difcovers all the talents requifite to a reformer of philofophy, especially in our age :-not merely an admirable acutenefs, and a rare talent of making himself the object of his reflection, but also a knowledge in Mathematics and Natural Philofophy, of which he had formerly given proofs: a nice fenfibility of the Beautiful and Sublime; and in general, a cultivated manly tafte, a thorough acquaintance with the different Systems of philosophy that prevailed before his time; and a refinement of feeling, which is truly honourable.

It is not my defign here, to describe minutely the system of this philofopher, which, befides the work already mentioned, is explained in the "Prolegomena to every future System of Metaphyfics," published in 1783; in the " Fundamental Principles of the Metaphyfics (Theory) of Morals," in 1785; in the " Metaphyfical Principles of Natural Philofophy," in 1786; in the "Critique on Practical Reafon," in 1788; in the " Critique on Judgment,” in 1790; and in the "Religion within the limits of Pure Reason," in 1793: And which Syftem has found in REINHOLD, SCHULZ, SCHMID, and others, friends and commentators,-men who themselves were quali

* "I am not very conscious," fays KANT, in his preface to the 2d edition of the Critique of Pure Reafon, p. 43." that I poffefs the talent of exhibiting an abstract philofophical fubject in a luminous point of view: I trust that the occafional defect of style will be further fupplied by the writings of thofe deferving characters` who, together with a folid judgment, are in the poffeffion of that talent. For, this being the cafe, there is no danger of being refuted, but rather of being misunderflood.

fied to advance science. The following abstract will be fufficient for our present purpose.

Kant begins with doubting, whether Metaphyfics, in general, be capable of being ftudied as a fcience. He remarked that, hitherto, this branch of knowledge could not lay claim to the appellation of a fcience; although it was older than all the others, and befides, by the intereft it excited, always obtruded itself upon our attention. Two circumstances led him to discoveries, which were to bring about a revolution in Metaphyfics, and fecure to them the rank of a science ;—the obfervation, by what means Mathematics and Natural Philofophy had become sciences; and Hume's inquiries concerning the idea of caufation. We begin with the latter, and fhall make Kant himself give the account of it.

"Since the Effays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather fince "the origin of Metaphyfics, as far as their history extends, no "circumftance has occurred, which might have been more "decifive of the fate of this fcience, than the attack which

David Hume made upon it. He brought, indeed, no light "into this department of knowledge, but he ftruck a spark "which, if it had fallen among combustible materials, and had "been carefully fanned, might have been eafily kindled in"to a blaze. Hume proceeded upon a fingle but important idea in Metaphyfics, the connection of cause and effect, and "the concomitant notions of power and action: he challenged reafon to answer him, what title fhe had to imagine, that any thing may be fo conftituted as that, if it be given, fomething "elfe is also thereby inferred: for the idea of caufe denotes "this. He proved beyond contradiction, that it is impoffible for reason to think of fuch a connection a priori, and out of “its own ideas; for it contains neceffity; but it is not pof"fible to perceive how, becaufe fomething is, fomething else

"muft

" must also neceffarily be; nor how the idea of fuch a con"nection can be introduced a priori."

"Hence he concluded, that reafon entirely deceives herself "with this idea, and that she erroneously confiders it as her own "child, when it is only the fpurious offspring of imagination, "which imagination, impregnated by experience, has brought "certain ideas under the law of affociation, and fubftituted a "fubjective neceffity, thence arifing, that is habit, for an ob"jective one derived from perception. Hence, again, he con"cluded that reafon had no title to think of fuch connections; " even in a general manner; because then all her general ideas "would be merely fictions, and all her pretended notions, ftamped a priori, would be nothing else than counterfeited "ordinary leffons of experience: which is just saying, there is "no science of Metaphyfics at all, and there can be none."

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"However hafty and unwarrantable Hume's conclufion "might appear, yet it was founded upon inveftigation, and this "investigation well deferved, that some of the philosophers of "his time fhould have united to folve more happily, if pof"fible, the problem in the fenfe in which he delivered it a

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complete reform of the fcience might have resulted from "this folution. But it appears to have been the unavoidable "definy of Metaphyfics, that he should not be understood by "his cotemporaries. For it is a mortifying reflection, that his opponents, REID, BEATTIE, OSWALD, and lastly PRIESTLEY "himself, totally misunderstood the tendency of his problem. Always admitting as granted, what he never had called in

queftion, they fo mifunderstood his aim at improvement, that "every thing remained in the fame ftate, as if nothing had been "done. The queftion was not, whether the idea of cause be in "itself proper, and indifpenfible to the illuftration of all natural

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knowledge; for this Hume had never doubted; but whe"ther this idea is an object of thought through reafoning a

"priori; and whether, in this manner, it poffefs internal evi❝dence, independently of all experience; consequently, whe

ther it be of fuch extenfive utility, as is not limited to objects "of fenfe alone. It was upon this point Hume expected an ❝ explanation,

"The opponents of this celebrated man, in order fatisfac"torily to folve his problem, would have been under the ne❝ceffity of penetrating more profoundly into the abstract na"ture of reason, in fo far as it is employed in pure thought; "an inquiry to which they were little, if at all, disposed.— "Hence they contrived a more convenient method of display❝ing their malignity, without fubjecting themselves to the "trouble of making further refearches; namely, the appeal "to the common fenfe of mankind. It is indeed a great gift of "Heaven, to poffefs a plain and unbiaffed understanding ;"but we must manifest it, and establish ourselves in this pof"feffion, by facts, by reflection, and by reason, by what we "do and fay; not by appealing to it as an oracle, when we

can produce no rational arguments to justify the claim.— "When obfervation and science are put to the last shift, then, ❝ and not sooner, is it time to appeal to common sense.— "This is one of the subtle contrivances of modern times, by "which the shallow prattler affumes a right, boldly to chal"lenge a man of profound erudition, and frequently main"tains the conteft. As long, however, as there is any room " left for discovery, we shall do well to beware of having re"courfe to this laft expedient. And, in truth, this appeal is "nothing elfe than a fubmiffion to the judgment of the mul❝titude, a reference at which the Philofopher blushes, but in "which the filly witling triumphs and exults.—I should "think, too, Hume might have laid claim to a found underftanding, as well as Beattie; and befides, to what the latter certainly did not poffefs, to a critical acquaintance with

"that