perceptions, because it is itself a perception a priori, and it has fomething common with all notions a priori; because it is a Form of all Senfations and Representations a priori. The uniting of a pure Notion with an object is, therefore, poffible merely through time as its Schema.

4. Through means of this Schema, according to the Table given in the preceeding note, all synthetical axioms may now be exactly determined a priori, and they are the following : Axiom of Quantity, (or of perception). "All phenomena in perception are exhibited under the notion of extenfion."

Axiom of Quality, (or of the anticipation of obfervation), "In all phenomena, fenfation, and the reality which corresponds to it in the object, have intenfive quantum, or a degree; that is, every reality can, through infinite gradations, become lefs and lefs, till it be = o." Axioms of Relation, (or Analogies of experience).

a. "In all phenomena there is fomething perma

nent, i. e. Substance; and fomething fhifting, of accidents."

b. Every event has a cause.

c. All fubftances, so far as they are co-existent, stand in reciprocation with each other.

Axioms of Modality, (or Poftulates).

a. That which agrees with the form of experience (according to Perception and Notion) is poffible really, not merely logically.

b. That which is connected with the matter of experience, i. e, with fenfation, is actual.

c. That which is connected with what is actual, a

greeably to the universal conditions of experience, is (exifts) neceffary.

PROBLEM

PROBLEM FOURTH.

To determine by thefe means the true bounds of human reafon, confequently to explain pofitively, how far our reafon can reach through mere fpeculation, where; on the contrary, our proper knowledge ceafes, and nothing but faith and hope remain.

1. All the elementary notions, of which our Understanding is capable, are exactly thofe which the foregoing Table of them indicates, fo that there are neither more nor lefs of them in number.

2. All these elementary notions are applicable merely to fenfible objects, and hence they ferve only for determining the neceffary predicates of every poffible perception. From this the following confequences refult.

a. We cannot apply our notions to the most perfect Being; confequently we cannot prove that he has extenfion, or qualities; that he is a fubftance, a cause of other things; that he is poffible or actual, or neceffary. b. Even as to the objects of our fenfitive faculty, all our elementary notions can teach us none of the predicates that belong to them in themselves, that is, to their Effence; but all predicates which, through these notions, can be afcribed to them, concern merely their perception, and the union of the varieties in it, consequently the way merely, in which they appear to us. Things in refpect of what they are in themselves, are no objects, either of our senses or of our understanding.

c. Hence the three cofmological queftions are mere chimeras, viz.

Whether the world, in point of space, be finite or infinite?

Whether it has had a beginning, or has exifted from

eternity?

Whether the number of parts, of which matter con

fifts, be finite or infinite?

d. But as the understanding cannot affert, or prove, any thing of objects that come not under the cognizance of the fenfes, as little can it deny, or refute them, by any argument that has even the appearance of validity. And hence arifes the (fublime) presupposition and belief of a Supreme Being, and of an immortality of the Soul; because there are certain neceffary purposes of human nature, moral laws, which require this presupposition.

e. Yet though we have fufficient fubjective grounds for prefuppofing and determining certain fuperfenfible objects; we have not, through fuch grounds, the least knowledge, how these objects may be conftituted in themselves; but we try to determine them, only by analogy.

3. All the Synthetical Axioms of our Understanding, by means of which we are able to judge of objects, are exactly those which the foregoing Table of them indicates, and we know, therefore, a priori, the whole foundation of all the knowledge of which our Understanding is capable.

4. But all these axioms of our Understanding have objective validity, only fo far as the poffibility of experience depends on them; and they ferve merely to determine the neceflary connection of sensible things with each other. It may hence be juftly faid, that our Understanding, instead of first learning its axioms from nature, rather through them, a priori, prescribes laws to nature; and that on this account it is the true legislature of nature, fo that, without these axioms of our Underftanding, all regularity and order among the objects of sense, confequently the poffibility of experience itself, would cease, Hence, too, as foon as we wish to rife with the axioms of our Understanding to fuperfenfible objects beyond nature, we always make an unjustifiable use of them.

5. And as our Understanding can neither form a notion of superfenfible objects, nor judge of them; as little can our Reafon discover by inference any superfenfible object; consequently, no Syllogifm can lead us to new objects, which lie without the sphere of poffible experience.

6. All notions which our reafon can form of fomething, that is abfolutely unconditionate, are therefore mere Ideas, whofe objective validity can be proved through no fpecies of Syllogifm.

7. Hence the Axiom, "If the conditionate thing be given, the abfolutely unconditionate thing is alfo given," is nothing but a subjective logical Maxim of Reason, i. e. a Maxim which regulates the train of reasoning in the Mind itself.

8. As now the whole of fpeculative Cofmology, Pfychology and Theology entirely refts on this Axiom; these three Sciences, as far as concerns their fpeculative parts, are nothing but Syftems of fallacies *. Ontology, alfo, completely fails, and must be changed into a bare Analysis of the notions of our Understanding. The whole body of Metaphyfics, then, must be confined to the Metaphyfics of Nature.

PROBLEM FIFTH.

To folve the riddle, why our Reafon is fo irresistibly inclined to venture with its fpeculations beyond the bounds of poffible G 2 knowledge;

* From what is here faid, the reader may be led to fuppofe, that KANT altogether denies the poffibility of proving the existence of a Supreme Being, the immortality of the Soul, &c. This fuppofition, however, would be ill-founded; for Kant diftinctly and repeatedly admits the existence of these supersensible objects; but maintains, that we arrive at the knowledge of them through a process of practical, not speculative, Reason. This process he endeavours to vindicate and illustrate, by the most appropriate examples, in his Critique of Practical Reason, the contents of which the Reader will find in our CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.

knowledge; and hence to detect the fallacy, by which it is in this refpect involuntarily deceived.

1. The ground of this irresistible bias lies in the nature of of our Reason itself. Reafon cannot be fatisfied with the original Notions and Axioms of the Understanding alone; but through categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive conclufions, it attains to the Idea of a fimple fubftance, of an absolute Univerfum, of an abfolute existent perfection in the number of real parts of matter, of an abfolute perfection in the feries of causes, of an absolute neceffary Being, and of a Substance that poffeffes all realities.

2. Confequently the Idea of the abfolutely unconditionate thing has indeed perfect fubjective validity, and is in no manner an arbitrary fiction: Reason forces it on us neceffarily. But hence it does not follow, that this Idea has also objective validity. Reason commits a very concealed, indeed, but undeniable fophifm, when from mere Notions it forms the fynthetical Axiom, "that, if the conditionate thing be given, so must be alfo the abfolutely unconditionate." (

3. As the Idea of abfolutely unconditionate objects is indifpenfibly required by our Reason, it is very natural, that even the acuteft philofopher fhould not only feel in himself an unavoidable bias to fuch fallacious conclufions; but also, that it must be very difficult for him to difencumber himself from them completely, though he be fortunate enough to discover the deception.

Scholion.

Thus, through the CRITIQUE of KANT, all thefe five problems, concerning the poffibility and the limits of pure rational difcoveries, have been thoroughly folved, but in a way which perhaps no philofopher had fuppofed. According to the refult

of