pretenfions of the fchools, and the learned in particular, than against human knowledge in general.

It is more remarkable, though less known, that, in the fame country, a celebrated and profound Divine declared himself in favour of an almost unlimited Pyrrhonifm-M.de BEAUSOBRE, in his "Pyrrhonisme raisonable," called it rational, because he allowed certain probabilities, both in kind and in degree, and maintained certain first principles, which did not admit of doubt. The work is written in a lively sceptical humour, and affords pleasure in the perufal. It contains, indeed, many new and unexpected remarks; for it is an affault upon all systems, especially upon that of Wolf. " ARISTOTLE," the author fomewhere fays, "had numerous followers for many centuries. The “ time of his fall is now come; and DESCARTES has given him "the laft blow. The fame of the French philofopher was of "fhorter duration, because people now poffeffed more un“derstanding and lefs pedantry. LEIBNITZ came; Wolf was his fucceffor: At present philofophers are in a sort of "anarchy; they wait for a man who is bold enough to build

upon the ruins of former Syftems, new opinions, and confe"quently new errors." No where does Beaufobre attack religion and revelation, but rather respectfully affirms their certainty. The following paffage is worthy of attention: "Al"though it be difficult to prove the existence of God by the "light of reafon, yet even this light is fufficient to convince "us, that the proof of the contrary is impoffible. How can “we satisfactorily prove the oppofite, if we have no clear idea " of the subject which we wish to call in question? Although "I could bear in my mind no fufficient proof of the existence "of God, yet the advantage which attends the belief of this “truth, the impoffibility of comprehending the nature of an "infinite Being, and the reflection that this truth is both the "most rational and useful of all others, would be fufficient to "induce

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"induce any thinking person to give his affent, nay even to "determine me."

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But after this we are astonished to find him confidering all morality as uncertain. His chief reason is, "that the good"ness of actions depends upon their confequences, which man "cannot foresee, nor accurately afcertain." This argument, maturely confidered, is obviously shallow, because it proceeds upon falfe, ideas of morality: But the following objections are of greater importance: "That we are fo little acquainted "with the motives from which we act, and in general with our paffions, that we know not how far our prejudices, " and our weakness, can justify our actions; and that the in"terference and collifions of our different duties are inexpli"cable to most men, nay fome of them inexplicable to all." The remark at the end of this work is not less striking. “The "uncertainty of our knowledge fhould not render us diffatis"fied; its advantage, or difadvantage, will not thereby be "much affected. Certainty, with refpect to us, is not even "the most useful quality of our knowledge. The difficulty "of acquiring accurate knowledge, is an admonition of nature, "which reminds man of his weaknefs, and of the caution he "ought to obferve."

The inclination to Scepticism fhowed itself alfo in other parts of Germany, in different writings. It appeared manifeftly, for inftance, in the " Phyfical Causes of Truth," by Lossius, and in the first edition of PLATNER'S " Philofophical "Aphorifms." In the fyftems of Logic and elementary books also, much more regard was paid to it than formerly; in proof of which I shall only mention the excellent difcuffions in "LAMBERT's Organum," and in the elementary publications of FEDER.

But no author had, on the one hand, paid more attention to the objections of the Sceptics, and the distinguishing character

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iftic of the poffible fyftems; and on the other, investigated more profoundly the faculties of the Human Understanding, and, indeed, of the whole Human Constitution, than TETENS, in his Philofophical Inquiries concerning Human Nature, and the "developement of it," which were published in two volumes, in the year 1777. It is not our bufinefs here to mark minutely the excellencies or defects of this work; we take notice of it on this account chiefly, because that profound philofopher was the first among the Germans, who examined some of the ideas of HUME, with an acuteness worthy of fuch an opponent; and he has investigated the doctrines of objective truth, and of the objective existence of things, more deeply and more precifely than had been done before. Against the explanation given by Hume, of the idea of Caufation, he objected with justice, that it did not exhaust the subject; for we understand by it not merely a connection, but also a dependence of one thing upon another. He remarked that we perceive in ourselves ideas in a neceffary fucceffion, and that this is properly our notion of a caufe, or connection: he pointed out inftances, in which the fubjective connection of ideas arises from a neceffary operation of the understanding, and, actually, has another foundation than the affociation of ideas formed by experience;-cafes where we explain a compound effect from compound caufes; and where the idea of the complex effect has never been before afsociated with that of the complex caufe, but where the connection is the work of reflection: in fine, he has pointed out the operations of the mind, by which we deduce one truth from another. He maintained, therefore, that the idea of Caufation is abftracted from certain associations of ideas, in which we remark fomething more than mere fucceffion and combination.

Although this explanation is not altogether fatisfactory, yet it, in a great measure, holds good against Hume's idea. Tetens

admits that fenfations afford the materials for all ideas but he contends that their form depends upon the mind, or the power of thinking. After having, in a very profound manner, illustrated the origin of our knowledge, from the objective exiftence of things, he next examines the truth of objective knowledge. According to his acceptation of the terms, our knowledge is called objectively true, in fo far as objects must be perceived by every other being, in the fame manner in which we represent them to ourselves ;-a being who has fuch a mind as we have: and in fo far as the relations, which we remark in our external perceptions, correfpond with those of every other being, whofe understanding is so constituted, that it thinks of the objects in queftion, as we do. The neceffary rules of thought, according to which the mind proceeds, are, with him, not only fubjective rules of our thinking faculty, but of every reflecting principle; and the general truths of reafon are not only truths with refpect to us, but to every reafoning being. We cannot conceive an understanding which is capable of thinking against the principle of contradiction, or in other words, of difputing the admiffibility of that principle: hence this is juftly confidered as an objective principle.

Tetens here contradicts what Loffius had laid down; and what Descartes had indeed, pretty diftinctly before explained: That truth is only a relation with refpect to the being who thinks of it, and that the contradiction is incapable of being an object of thought, only with refpect to our understanding. Thus Tetens, with many others, proceeded in reafoning upon fubjective neceffary principles. He appealed to the fact, that when we apply theories to real objects, we always fuppofe that the reality is fo conftituted, as the general ideas reprefent it. But here, argues he, the mind proceeds according to laws which we must confider as the laws of every reasoning

being;-confequently the truths which are here admitted, or fuppofed, are objective truths.

With respect to the objects of sense, the knowledge of them, indeed, is often only an objective appearance; but the neceffary laws of thought lead to this conclufion, that other thinking beings, in fimilar circumftances, represent these objects to themselves in a fimilar manner; that these objects, with certain conformations, exift without us, and that certain properties of the impreffions which we experience, are also the properties of the objects themselves.-A Sceptic, however, without going out of his way in quest of far-fetched arguments, might eafily find a good deal to object against this deduction.

The work of Tetens had not the effect of promoting a folid philofophic fpirit, and of bringing about a falutary revolution in the ftudy of philofophy, which might otherwise have been expected. But this was not merely the confequence of the circumstances of the times;-but alfo of a ftile, not fo much obfcure, as languid, prolix and affected; as well as of a flavish dependence upon the Empiricifm of Locke, which is infufficient for the explanation of the most important problems.

What this work did not accomplish, another did.—Kant, who by various compofitions upon philofophical fubje&s, had long ago announced himself as an original genius, and an excellent philofopher, published in the year 1781, the "Critique of Pure Reason," which promised a total and beneficial reform in every philofophical department. For a long time, however, after its publication, it had been unaccountably neglected, or, at least, misunderstood. This was furely not in confequence of the difficulties, with which the ftudy of it, as well as of every metaphyfical fubject, is neceffarily attended; but of a certain indifference to philosophy, and of a rooted taste for fhallow and popular difcuffions, which Kant directly oppofed. But as foon as the work was more ftudied and investi

gated