❝and virtue must one day be united; it teaches us to believe ❝in the existence of that Being, who alone can establish this "harmony."

66

This imperfect account will, at least, serve the purpose of fhewing, how this fyftem, on the one hand, fets limits to the Scepticism of Hume; while it refutes and overturns Materialifm, Fatalifm, Atheism, as well as Fanaticifm and Infidelity. -Kant does not attack the dogmatical process of reason employed in pure (abstract) notions, but rather enjoins so far a more strict dogmatism than formerly prevailed, while he raises Metaphyfics to the rank and folidity of a science: he combats that arrogant dogmatism, which sets out with its hypothetical notions, without previous enquiries, whether, and how far reason is intitled, by its peculiar judging powers, either to admit, or to reject, these notions. "This critical work of mine," he fays," is not written with a view of encouraging prattling fhallowness, under the arrogant name of popularity, nor for the purpose of fupporting fcepticism which, as well 66 as the former, is rather an excrefcence, than an ornament of "the fciences. The Critique is the previous preparation for "the advancement of a well-founded fyftem of Metaphyfics, "as a science which, neceffarily dogmatical, and in the strict"eft sense systematic, must be formed according to scientific "rules, not merely adapted to the vulgar."-Upon Scepticism, its value, its limits, its relation to the Critical Philosophy, Kant, in another part of his inquiry, has made excellent remarks.-JACOB, another German Philosopher, has fince, in a more direct and comprehenfive manner than Kant himself, employed the Critical Philosophy for the confutation of Scepticism in general, and that of Hume in particular.

Not long after Kant's Critique, there appeared a work, by an ingenious and liberal author, " upon the doctrine of Spinoza, in Letters to Mofes Mendelffohn, 1785, which accidental

ly,

ly, in many inftances, confirmed the doctrines of the Critique. The author defined belief to be immediate certainty, which required no fupport by arguments, superseded all proofs, as it refted upon a revelation, and contained the elements of human knowledge; he maintained, that reafon only leads to doubts and errors in the most important objects of thought, that Spinozism is still the most coherent system of reasoning, but it eftablishes downright atheism; and that in general, according to the expreffion of PASCHAL," Reafon expofes the Dogmatist to shame, and nature itself refutes the Sceptic."-As little however, as his doctrines of belief agree with the principles of Kant, fo much were his opinions, of Scepticism and Spinozism, a ftrong corroboration of Kant's affertions; that Speculative reafon teaches us nothing, with demonstrative certainty, upon the existence of God, and the objects beyond the world of sense. -Soon after this, in 1787, the worthy son of a truly philofophical father, Joh. Albr. Heinr. REIMARUS of Hamburgh, published a work" upon the foundation of human knowledge, and natural religion," in which he examines the different doctrines of Jacob and Kant, and which here deserves honourable mention, as it contains many valuable hints, together with happy illuftrations of interefting, though abftruse, subjects. In the mean time Kant's fyftem, or rather his elementary Propedeutic for a system, acquired still greater reputation, and gained every where friends notwithstanding feveral accidents of so serious a nature, as to threaten its fubverfion. The system of Locke, that of Leibnitz, a species of Eclecticism, and finally the Philosophy of Common Sense, were alternately opposed to it. Some imagined they saw in it a concealed infidelity; others an over-credulous religious and moral Mysticism; a third party maintained, that it led to Scepticism; and a fourth, that it contained nothing new. All these obftacles could not retard the rapid progress it was daily making, almost without exception, in the Protestant Universities of Germany: in ma

ny of the Catholic Schools, too, it obtained decifive victories over the fyftems of Ariftotle and Defcartes.

But however much, from conviction, enlightened minds were inclined to befriend this philofophy, yet with a moderate acquaintance with the hiftory of Ethics, it was easy to foresee, that even Kant's Syftem, notwithstanding all the evidence and strength of its principles, could fcarcely withstand the furious attacks of Pyrrhonism, or rather the pyrrhonic art, by which, without difcrimination, every thing is called in queflion; Mathematics and Natural Philofophy itself not excepted. Without doubt, many of the opponents of the New Philofophy, long ago remarked this; but they hesitated to make the pyrrhonic experiment with Kantianifm; because every other poffible fyftem, that could be fubftituted in the room of the Critical, might in like manner be rendered wavering and uncertain; and because fuch a pyrrhonism, in general, either leads to no end at all, or it is attended with confequences detrimental to morality and happiness.—Further, this attack would only have ferved to place the ftrength of the fyftem attacked, in a more ftriking point of view.-But a more moderate fcepticifm might have been eafily and advantageously employed against certain principles of the Critical Philofophy, if its opponents had been aware of denying, or calling in queftion, fome facts of consciousness, to which Kant neceffarily appeals. It was not, therefore, a matter of furprife that, after repeated attacks in our times, this fpecies of fcepticism alfo fhould be employed against the Critical Philofophy.

The author of " Aenefidemus,” or, on the foundation of the «Elements of Philofophy, published by Prof. Reinhold, in

Jena; together with a defence of Scepticism, against the pretenfions of the Critical Philofophers, 1792," has endeavoured to prove, that the fceptical doctrines of Hume are

not

not in the least confuted by the Critique of Pure Reason. The work, here mentioned, is written with uncommon perfpicuity, acutenefs, and refpect towards the Father of the Critical Philofophy. The anonymous author directs his objections against the chief pillars of Kant's System, the derivation of neceffary fynthetical judgments from the mind, and the reference of these to the perception of empirical objects. He allows, that there are neceffary synthetical judgments in human knowledge, that they form an indispenfible part in it, and that the neceffity which takes place in the connection of the predicate with the subject, in these judgments, can be derived neither from preexiftence, from frequent repetition, nor from the conformity of a certain number of facts. But he maintains, that, in the "Critique of Pure Reafon," the mind is held out as the real ground of thefe neceffary judgments, that from our being able to think only of the power of representation (or conception) as the foundation of neceffary fynthetical judgments, a conclufion is drawn, that the mind must actually be the foundation of these. Now, argues he, what Hume called in queftion, is here plainly taken for granted; namely, Ift, that for every thing we perceive, there is objectively pre-existing a real ground, and a really diftinct cause of it, so that the pofition of the sufficient ground, in general, depends not only upon the representations and their fubjective affociation, but also upon things in themselves, and their objective connection : 2dly, that we are intitled, from the conftitution of a fomething in our conception,. to form conjectures refpecting the conftitution of that something without us.-Kant, continues this Sceptic, has not proved, that our mind alone can be the ground of fynthetical judgments; for the consciousness of neceffity, which accompanies these judgments, is not an infallible criterion of their origin a priori, and from the mind. That we cannot now think of, or explain fomething otherwife but in a certain man

ner;

ner; this circumstance by no means proves, that we could not have thought of it in any other way. Another origin of these judgments is conceivable, than from the mind; namely, from the operation of real objects, and their various modes of affecting us. It might, therefore, be easily conceived, that representations and general ideas, which exist in us a priori, are ftill in another way referable to real objects, than merely by the circumstance, that they exhibit to us the conditions and forms of the objects. These representations and ideas a priori, might also relate to the objective conftitution of things without us, by means of a pre-established harmony between these, and the operations of our understanding; and agreeably to this harmony, fomething might be represented to the mind by means of perceptions and general ideas a priori, which should not only have objective validity in our understanding, but also correfpond with the constitutions of things in themselves, and be the means of reprefenting them.-The Critical Philofophy, he adds, proves the origin of neceffary synthetical judgments from the mind, by making fuch use of the principle of caufation, as is contrary to its own principles in the application of the Categories; whether we understand by mind a Noumenon, a thing in itself, or a tranfcendental idea. To these doubts, feveral of which were formerly propofed by FLATT and BRASTBERGER, the friends of the Critical Philofophy have already answered. Whether the scepticism of this author agrees with that of Hume, whether it does not contain in feme respects more, in others less than the last, I shall not venture to determine.

PLATTNER, that excellent Anthropologist, who, in a rare inftance, to a profound knowledge of medicine, joins extenfive erudition in philofophy, and peculiar penetration, and who deferves to be ranked among the first philofophers of Germany, has employed rational scepticism against the Kantian System,