the diftribution of offices; of rank in the State; of Nobility. E. = Of criminal law, and a penal code; of the right of punishing and pardoning. $ 50. Of the relation of a citizen to his native and other countries, in point of right and obligation. $51. Of the different forms of government. § 52. Of the attainment of that rational form, which the fpirit of an original compact requires, which makes freedom alone the principle, i. e. the bafis, and condition of all force.-Of the reprefentative System.

Sect. II. Of the law of Nations, or international law. $53, 54. Nations, in their external relation to each other, are in a state of nature, not unlike lawlefs favages, among whom the right of the Atrongest is established; consequently, a confederacy of states becomes neceffary, in order to protect one another against external attacks, conformably to the idea of an original focial compact. $55-58. Of the right of making war, both with regard to the fubjects of a State, and foreign nations. § 59, 60. Of the right of peace. 61. Of the injustice of a state of warfare. "There fhall be no war, is the irrefiftible veto of morally-practical Reason."Of the mode of bringing nations, like individuals, from a state of nature to a juridical state.-Of the establishment and maintenance of a perpetual peace, by means of a permanent Congrefs of States. Sect. III. Of Cofmopolitical law, or the rights of the citizen of the world. § 62. Of the right of mutual intercourse and commerce, as belonging to all mankind.

Conclufion.

This union of the whole human race, under certain univerfal laws, it may be faid, is not the partial, but the total and complete attainment of the grand aim, the final purpose of Jurifprudence within the boundaries of mere Reafon. For, that the prototype of a juridical federation of men, according to public laws in general, must be derived from Reafon a priori, is now obvious; fince all the examples, taken from experience, can indeed ferve the purpose of illuftrating, but not of establishing, the neceffity of a metaphyfical decifion of this important question. Thofe very men, who smile at the novelty of this inquiry, incautionfly betray themselves, when

they

men."

they admit, and even make ufe of the common-place affèrtion, that that is the best conftitution, in which the laws govern, not And what, fays the author,' can be more fublime than this idea, which is evidently applicable to practice, and capable of being realized in experience, and which alone-provided it is not attempted to be brought about by means of revolutions, or the forcible overthrow of all erroneous establishments (for that would be the annihilation of all law and justice), but by gradual reform, according to fixed principles-leads by continual approximation to the fupreme political good, A PERPETUAL PEACE.

XXX. (12.) Metaphyfifche Anfangsgründe der Tügendlèbre. Metaphyfical Elements of Ethics. 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1797. With this publication Prof. Kant will probably conclude his fyftematic labours in the field of the Critical Philofophy. Though, on account of its very recent appearance, I have not yet obtained a copy of this work, among the books lately received from Ger many; I can in some degree fatisfy the curiofity fof the reader, by ftating the object of it, as abftracted from the general Introduc tion, which is premifed to the preceding "Elements of jurif prudence."

'Moral laws can only be fo far valid as rules, if they can be established a priori, fo that the neceffity of them becomes evident. For the conceptions and judgments, relative to our actions and o miffions, have no moral application at all, if they contain nothing further than what is learned from experience. And if we should even be misled to affume any data, from the latter fource, as moral principles, we cannot avoid falling into the groffett and most deftructive errors.

If the doctrine of morals had no other aim than that of per fonal happiness, it would be abfurd to fearch for principles a priori, in order to establish such a doctrine. For, however plaufible it may appear, that Reafon can perceive previous to expérience, by what means man may arrive at the permanent enjoyment of the true pleasures of life, yet every propofition of this kind, a priori, is either tautological, or it refts upon groundless hypotheses. Ex

perience

perience alone can inform us of what is attended with pleasure, The natural instinct for nourishment, the fexual impulse, reft, motion, and (after developing the difpofitions of nature) the struggles for honour, the enlargement of our knowledge, and the like, can intimate to every individual in particular, how he may eftimate his pleasures, and at the fame time inform him of the means, by which he is to attain them. All plaufible reafoning a priori is, here, in reality nothing else but experience, which, by induction, has received a general character. This generality, far from being univerfal, is fo very limited, that an indefinite number of exceptions must be granted to every individual, in order to adopt that choice in the mode of life, to his particular inclination, and to his fufceptibility of pleasures ;-so that, in the end, he can profit and grow wifer only from his own detriment, or that of others.

'The doctrines of morality, however, have a very different origin. They are imperative to every individual, without regarding his inclinations; for this reafon merely, because he is a free fubject, and is capable of reasoning practically. Inftruction, in the laws of morality, is not derived from reflection upon qurselves and our animal nature, nor from the obfervation of the courfe of the world, namely from events and actions; but Reason itfelf commands us, how to act, though we should find no analogy or example in experience, correfponding with the prefent cafe. Reafon, further, in this injunction, does not attend to the advantage or disadvantage, which may accompany our actions; for experience alone could give us any information upon this point. We are indeed entitled to purfue our advantage in every poffible manner, provided that we act eonfiftently with both Reafon and prudence; for the former enjoins, while the latter only advises that, upon the whole, we shall derive greater advantages, if we follow, than if we tranfgrefs the dictates of Reafon,?

The

The following Effays, written by Prof. Kant, were published in different periodical works of Germany, in the chronological order here flated.

1. Von den verschiedenen Ragen der Menschen. Of the dif ferent races of man. Published in ENGEL's Philofopher of the world; firft Edit. 8vo. Leipzig, 1777, from p. 125 to p. 164.

2. Briefwechfel zwifchen Kant und dem verftorbenen Lambert. Correfpondence between Kant and the late Lambert.Published in BERNOUILLI'S Literary Correspondence between learned Germans. Vol. I. from p. 333 to 368.-1781.

3. Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Abficht. Plan of a general history in a cofmopolitical view. Published in the Berlin Monthly Magazine, for November, 1784.

4. Beantwortung der Frage: was ift Aufklärung ?-Reply to the question, what is understood by illumination (of mind). Ibid. for December, 1784.

5. Ueber die Vulkane im Monde.On the Volcanos in the moon. Ibid. for March, 178 5.

6. Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks.-On the injustice of printing fpurious editions of books.-Ibid. for May, 1785.

66 a race of men."

7. Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menfchenrace.-Definition of the idea connected with the expreffion Ibid. for November, 1785.

8. Muthmafslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte.-On the probable Origin of Human Hiftory. Ibid. for January, 1786.

This Effay the author himself confiders as the most fuccefsful of his popular productions, or minor works. And though I have not been able to procure a copy of that number, in which it appeared in the Berlin Monthly Magazine, without ordering the whole fet for the year 1786, I can give the following character of this treatise, upon the authority of Prof. WILL of Altdorf, as extracted from his "Lectures on the Kantian Philofophy, 8vo. 200 pages; 1788," in which he fays, p. 32: This masterly perfor'mance contains a philofophical explanation, which certainly is better founded than upon mere conjecture (as the title modeftly ex'preffes). Though it apparently deviates from the Mosaic narrative, it nevertheless forms an useful addition to the Bible, and affords illuftrations of its historical truth.'

9. Was heifst fich im Denken orientiren ?—What is underftood by the expreffion, " to familiarize oneself in thinking;" i. e. to trace the ideas of our own mind to their fource.-Ibid. for October, 1786.

10. Abhandlung von dem Gebrauche teleologischer Principien in der Philofophie.-A Treatise concerning the application of teleological principles in philofophy.-Published in the German Mercury, for January and February, 1788.