fyftems refpecting the conformation of nature. 73. None of thefe fyftems is fatisfactory. 74. The caufe of the impoffibility of treating this idea," that nature is technically arranged," in a dogmatical manner, lies in our incapacity of explaining the defign or aim of nature. 75. The idea of an objective conformation of nature is a critical principle of Reafon, belonging to the reflex Faculty of Judging. 76. Illuftrating remarks. 77. Of the peculiarity of the human understanding, from which the idea of the purposes of nature arifes. 78. On the principle of the univerfal mechanifm of matter, united with the teleologica! principle in the technical (architectonic) arrangement of na ture. APPENDIX. Methodical doctrine of the teleological Faculty of Judging. $79. Whether Teleology ought to be treated as a branch of - Phyfics. 80. Of the neceffity of claffing the principle of mechanifm under that of teleology, when we attempt to explain a thing as a design of nature. 81. On the affociation of mechanifm with the teleological principle, accounting for natural purpofes, as being the productions of nature, 82. Of the teleological fyftem in the external relations of organized beings. 83. Of the laft purpose (defign) of nature as a teleological fyftem. 84. Of the final purposes of the existence of a world, i. e. of the creation itself. 85. Of phyfico-theology. 86. Of ethico-theology, 87. Of the moral proof of the existence of God. 88. The validity of this moral proof is limited. 89. Of the ufe of the moral argument. 90. Of the manner of admitting things as true, in a moral proof of the existence of God. 91. Of the manner of confidering things as true, by means of a practical belief. " XXVI. Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle Critik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden foll. On a certain discovery, by means of which every (new) Critique of pure Reafon is faid to be rendered unneceffary by an earlier one. 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1799. We merely take notice of this publication, here, for the fake of completeness. It can fcarcely be confidered as forming a distinct Р part part of KANT's fyftematic works; it is neither mentioned as fuch, by the numerous German commentators upon the Critical Philofophy, nor has Mr NITSCH of London availed himself of this (apparently polemic) production, in his late view of the Kantian principles. For this reason, we do not hesitate to pass it over in filence, and to devote a confiderable degree of attention to the following work, on Religion, which is of infinitely greater import ance. XXVII. (10.) Die Religion innerhalb den Grenzen der bloffen Vernunft. Religion confidered within the bounds of mere Reafon. Koenigsberg. 1793. 2d Edit. enlarged. 1794, PP. 314, and xxvi pp. Preface. It cannot be a matter of indifference to a philofopher, to know what relation the prevailing religion of the age bears to the fpeculative notions of Reason, that are propagated in the philofophic fyftems of his cotemporaries. Although the inquiries of this nature be conducted independently of any pofitive religious creed, we may yet congratulate ourfelves upon the discovery, when that pofitive religion, which guides a very confiderable part of mankind, and which has produced fo many excellent moral effects, is not found to be altogether inconfiftent wirh the principles, maintained by the moft profound and eminent philofophers. We may at the fame time learn, to give a more practical explanation upon thofe fymbolical points, that have hitherto met with no useful ap plication, and that have occafioned many fruitless and bloody con tefts. No man of candour and impartiality will cenfure the defign of a writer, who employs his philofophic maxims (if they be otherwise well established upon a critical bafis), in order to ferve as principles, for explaining ambiguous doctrines and pofitive inftitutions. For, if the Deity has immediately intrusted man with so valuable a gift as religion actually is, it must have been corrupted by men themselves, who have delivered it to their pofterity, with fuch additions as are inconfiftent with the principles of Reason; and the true original fenfe of fuch traditions can be difcovered only through through the proper exercife of Reason. Every attempt, therefore, of restoring harmony between the pofitive tenets of Religion and those of philosophy, must be confidered as highly beneficial to mankind; because, in this manner only, the defign of that revelation can be confiftently attained. Our fatisfaction, too, must be the more complete, when we have an opportunity of obferving, that fuch a revelation has not only been preserved in its purity during the courfe of many centuries, but likewise has been the means of exercifing the rational facul ties of man, upon the most profound fübjects of inquiry.—If we compare the principal tenets of the Chriftian Religion with the principles of the Kantian fyftem, we shall be agreeably surprised to find, that the former are perfectly confiftent with the latter, and that this author fatisfies all the claims, which can be made on philofophy, to establish a pure religious doctrine. For the refult of KANT's investigations, upon this head, is nearly the following: ift, That Chriftianity is throughout a moral Religion, fuch as Reafon requires of every religious eftablishment whatever. It is, among the numerous religions in the world, the only one, which derives its principles from pure morals, and which represents to man his destination as attainable only by moral means. It indeed prefuppofes, that he has the power and ability of doing, what the law of philanthropy commands him; though, at the fame time, Religion apprizes him of that refiftance, which natural inclinations or carnal defires oppofe to the exercise of Reason. It further appropriates to him, in exprefs terms, the capacity of overcoming thefe difficulties; and as the human understanding can arrive at no objective knowledge of fuch a power, Scripture lays the foundation of it in fomething beyond the reach of the fenfes, while it gives man the affurance, that the Deity may alfo endow him with faculties, which materially differ from thofe of mere fenfitive beings; in order to accomplish, by the power of his will, whatever he judges to be morally right and and falutary. In this manner alone, Reafon can form a complete and clear notion, that the moral power is a fuperfenfible agent, whofe origin or, in the language of KANT, whofe poffibility we cannot by any means conceive. 2d. The true deftination of man is, conformably to the principles of Chriftianity, not fought for in the fenfible, but in the superfenfible part of nature. Man muft acquire happiness by his moral conduct, but he ought not to expect the former in this world; not to derive his hopes of it from his fenfitive, but from his moral nature. For, according to the Chriftian doctrine, his fole bufinefs here confifts in preparing and making himfelf worthy of it, through a purely moral life. d. The Chriftian Religion throughout prefuppofes a moral government of the world, and the idea of the moral order of things ferves as its bafts: this order, however, can be realized or accompliflred only in relation to the whole existence of rational beings. Exactly in the fame manner is this propofition determined by our Reason. 4th. The Religion of Chrift enjoins us to confider good will to all mankind as the fupreme principle of all our actions. It enjoins us to unite felf-love, in equal proportion with univerfal benevolence, or rather to make the former fubfervient to the purposes of the latter and this is precifely the dictate of Reafon, and what Kant afferts to be the first moral precept. Through this practical law alone, the Chriftians determine the attributes of the Deity, fince they reprefent him as the moral creator, preferver, and ruler of the world. : 5th. Thus, in the religion of Chrift, morality is laid down as the cognofcible ground, on which we establish our knowledge of the Deity. We can boaft, indeed, of no perceptive cognition of that Being; yet we are not contented with a mere fpeculative notion of him, whofe attributes we can clearly exhibit in the idea of a moral intelligent power. Laftly, 6th. The whole aim of the Chriftian provement and perfection of man. ligion, when contemplated by Reafon, can be no other than to render man morally better, or to improve his moral worth. It must admit of being employed as the means of ftrengthening his moral faculties, of removing the obftacles that frequently occur in the practice of morality, and of fortifying the powers of Realon. Religion is the moral im- Even the dogmatical part of the Chriftian doctrine is of fúch a nature as to display, in the greater number of instances, a relative application to morals; and the principal tenets of it, have a manifeft tendency to folve moral difficulties. These appear at fo early a period among men, that attempts to account for them very foon follow. Such explanations, in general, are extremely ludicrous, especially in the infancy of Reason, when fancy fupplies its place, and before experience has been made our guide. Imagination fcarcely liftens to the fuggeftions of Reafon; and, in this fituation, men are easily pleafed with any plaufible anfwer, which their anceftors have contrived from the rich ftores of mythology. Though their knowledge of objects is not thereby increased, yet the hypothefes thus contrived are ufually ingenious, fo that they might afford fome fatisfaction, if they were founded upon any thing but fancy. This infant age of reasoning, if it may be called fo, is attended with the advantage, that it does not conceal the difficulties, for which it cannot account. Reafon, being gradually enlightened by philofophy, is conscious of this chimerical method of explaining things; but as it imagines any other explanation to be impoffible; it rather confiders the difficulty itself as fictitious, in order to fhow, that all attempts at explaining it must be difpenfed with. By gradual advances, Reafon difcovers that fuch difficulties really exist, and that ald sophistical disputes upon them are of no avail. At the fame time, we find that the former are of fuch a nature; as to admit of no other folution than that by practical ideas, and that thefe ideas are expreffed in thofe fanciful explana tions of mythology, by the reprefentation of fenfible objects. Now, fince every thing connected with morals, as well as every conclufion drawn from that fource, is justly denominated by the epithet divine; it is eafy to perceive, how thofe mythological objects, together with the fictitious productions of fancy, could be' called divine revelations. For there really is a moral text or meaning at the foundation of them, but which can be disclosed only in a more improved ftate of Reafon. From this deduction, it becomes perfectly evident, in what manner we meet with two very different explanations of fuch books, as contain |