Page images
PDF
EPUB

the most material rules of criticism; for as these rules are founded in nature, nature will often suggest them in practice.

Illus. It is more than probable that Homer was acquainted with no systems of the art of poetry. Guided by genius alone, he composed in verse a regular story, which all posterity has admired. But this is no argument against the usefulness of criticism as an art. For as no human genius is perfect, there is no writer but may receive assistance from critical observations upon the beauties and faults of those who have gone before him. No observations or rules can indeed supply the defect of genius, or inspire it where it is wanting. But they may often direct it into its proper channel; they may correct its extravagances, and point out to it the most just and proper imitation of nature. Critical rules are designed chiefly to show the faults that ought to be avoided. To nature we must be indebted for the production of eminent beauties. (See Corol. 1. p. 59.)

383. From what has been said, we are enabled to form a judgment concerning those complaints which it has long been fashionable for petty authors to make against critics and criticism.

Illus. 1. Critics have been represented as the great abridgers of the native liberty of genius; as the imposers of unnatural shackles and bonds upon writers, from whose cruel persecution they must fly to the public, and implore its protection. Such supplicatory prefaces are not calculated to give very favourable ideas of the genius of the author. For every good writer will be pleased to have his work examined by the principles of sound understanding and true taste.

2. The declamations against criticism commonly proceed upon this supposition, that critics are such as judge by rule, not by feeling. This is so far from being true, that they who judge after this manner are pedants, not critics. For all the rules of genuine criticism will be found to be ultimately founded on feeling; and taste and feeling are necessary to guide us in the application of these rules to every particular instance.

3. As there is nothing in which all sorts of persons more readily affect to be judges, than in works of taste, there is no doubt that the number of incompetent critics will always be great. But this affords no more foundation for a general invective against criticism, than the number of bad philosophers or reasoners affords against sound philosophy and logic.

384. An objection more plausible may be formed against criticism, from the applause that some performances have received from the public, which, when accurately considered, are found to contradict the rules established by criticism.

Illus. Now, according to the principles laid down in the last chapter, the public is the supreme judge, to whom the last appeal must be made in every work of taste; as the standard of taste is founded on the sentiments that are natural and common to all men. But with respect to this, we are to observe, that the sense of the public is often too hastily judged of. The genuine public taste does not always appear

in the first applause given upon the publication of any new work. There are both the great vulgar, and the small vulgar, who are apt to be catched and dazzled by very superficial beauties, the admiration of which in a little time passes away: and sometimes a writer may acquire great temporary reputation, merely by his compliance with the passions or prejudices, with the party spirit or superstitious notions, that may chance to rule for a time almost a whole nation. In such cases, though the public may seem to praise, true criticism may with reason condemn; and it will in progress of time gain the ascendant: for the judgment of true criticism, and the voice of the public, when once become unprejudiced and dispassionate, will ultimately coincide.

385. There are some works that contain gross transgressions of the laws of criticism, which, nevertheless, have acquired a general, and even a lasting admiration.

Illus. 1. Such are the plays of Shakspeare, which, considered as dramatic poems, are irregular in the highest degree. But then they have gained the public admiration, not by their being irregular, not by their transgression of the rules of art, but in spite of such transgressions. They possess other beauties which are conformable to just rules; and the force of these beauties has been so great as to overpower all censure, and to give the public a degree of satisfaction superior to the disgust arising from their blemishes.

2. Shakspeare pleases, not by his bringing the transactions of many years into one play; not by his grotesque mixtures of tragedy and comedy in one piece, nor by the strained thoughts, and affected witticisms, which he sometimes employs. These we consider as blemishes, and impute them to the grossness of the age in which he lived. But he pleases by his animated and masterly representations of characters, by the liveliness of his descriptions, the force of his sentiments, and his possessing, beyond all writers, the natural language of passion; beauties which true criticism no less teaches us to place in the highest rank, than nature teaches us to feel.

CHAPTER III.

OF GENIUS.

386. TASTE and GENIUS are two words frequently joined together; and therefore, by inaccurate thinkers, confounded. Taste consists in the power of judging; genius, in the power of executing.

Illus. 1. One may have a considerable degree of taste in poetry, eloquence, or any of the fine arts, who has little or hardly any genius for composition or execution in any of these arts; but genius cannot be found without including taste also. Genius, therefore, deserves to be considered as a higher power of the mind than taste.

2. Genius always imports something inventive or creative; which does not rest in mere sensibility to beauty where it is perceived, but

which can, moreover, produce new beauties, and exhibit them in such a manner as strongly to impress the minds of others. Refined taste forms a good critic; but genius is farther necessary to form the poet, or the orator.

3. Genius is a word, which, in common acceptation, extends much farther than to the objects of taste. It is used to signify that talent or aptitude which we receive from nature, for excelling in any one thing whatever. Thus we speak of a genius for mathematics, as well as a genius for poetry; of a genius for war, for politics, or for any mechanical employment.

387. This talent or aptitude for excelling in some one particular, is what we receive from nature. By art and study, no doubt, it may be greatly improved; but by them alone it cannot be acquired.

Illus. 1. As genius is a higher faculty than taste, it is ever, according to the usual frugality of nature, more limited in the sphere of its operations. It is not uncommon to meet with persons who have an excellent taste in several of the polite arts, such as music, poetry, painting, and eloquence, all together: but to find one who is an excellent performer in all these arts, is much more rare; or rather, indeed, such an one is not to be looked for.

2. A sort of universal genius, or one who is equally and indifferently turned towards several different professions and arts, is not likely to excel in any. Although there may be some few exceptions, yet in general it holds, that when the bent of the mind is exclusively directed towards some one object, there is the fairest prospect of eminence in that, whatever it be. The rays must converge to a point, in order to glow intensely. This remark is the more necessary, on account of its great importance to young people, in leading them to examine with care, and to pursue with ardour, the current and pointing of nature towards those exertions of genius in which they are most likely to excel.

388. A genius for any of the fine arts, always supposes taste; it is clear, that the improvement of taste will serve both to forward and to correct the operations of genius.

Illus. 1. In proportion as the taste of a poet, or orator, becomes more refined with respect to the beauties of composition, it will certainly assist him to produce the more finished beauties in his work. Genius, however, in a poet, or orator, may sometimes exist in a higher degree than taste; that is, genius may be bold and strong, when taste is neither very delicate, nor very correct.

2. This is often the case in the infancy of arts; a period when genius frequently exerts itself with great vigour, and executes with much warmth; while taste, which requires experience, and improves by slower degrees, hath not yet attained to its full growth.

3. Homer and Shakspeare are proofs of what is here asserted. In the admirable writings of those two great poets are found instances of rudeness and indelicacy, which the more refined taste of later writers, of far inferior genius, would have taught them to avoid.

4. As all human perfection is limited, this may very probably be the law of our nature, that it is not given to one man to execute with vig

our and fire, and, at the same time, to attend to all the lesser and more refined graces that belong to the exact perfection of his work: while, on the other hand, a thorough taste for those inferior graces is, for the most part, accompanied with a diminution of sublimity and force.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SOURCES OF THE PLEASURES OF TASTE.

389. HAVING now explained the nature of taste, the nature and importance of criticism, and the distinction between taste and genius; we are now to consider THE SOURCES

OF THE PLEASURES OF TASTE.

Obs. Here opens a very extensive field; no less than all the pleasures of the imagination, as they are commonly called, whether afforded us by natural objects, or by the imitations and descriptions of them. But it is not necessary to the purpose of this Grammar, that all these should be examined fully; the pleasure which we receive from discourse, or writing, being the main object of them, so far as rhetoric is concerned. All that is proposed, is to give some openings into the pleasures of taste in general; and to insist more particularly upon sublimity and beauty.

Illus. 1. It is difficult to make a full enumeration of the several objects that give pleasure to taste; it is more difficult to define all those which have been discovered, and to reduce them under proper classes; and, when we would go farther, and investigate the efficient causes of the pleasure which we receive from such objects, here, above all, we find ourselves at a loss.

2. For instance; we all learn by experience, that certain figures of bodies appear to us more beautiful than others. On inquiring farther, we find that the regularity of some figures, and the graceful variety of others, are the foundation of the beauty which we discern in them; but when we attempt to go a step beyond this, and inquire what is the cause of regularity and variety producing in our minds the sensation of beauty, any reason we can assign is extremely imperfect. These first principles of internal sensation, nature seems to have covered with an impenetrable veil.

3. Although the efficient cause be obscure, the final cause of those sensations lies in many cases more open: and, in entering on this subject, we cannot avoid taking notice of the strong impression which the powers of taste and imagination are calculated to give us of the benignity of our Creator.

4. By endowing us with such powers, he hath widely enlarged the sphere of the pleasures of human life; and those too of a kind the most pure and innocent. The necessary purposes of life might have been abundantly answered, though our senses of seeing and hearing had only served to distinguish external objects, without conveying to us any of those refined and delicate sensations of beauty and grandeur, with which we are now so much delighted.

5. This additional embellishment and glory, which, for promoting our

entertainment, the Author of Nature hath poured forth upon his works, is one striking testimony, among many others, of His benevolence and goodness.

6. This thought, which Mr. Addison first started, Dr. Akenside, in his poem on the Pleasures of the Imagination, has happily pursued.

[blocks in formation]

390. First, then, we begin with considering the pleasure which arises from sublimity or grandeur.

Illus. It is not easy to describe, in words, the precise impression which great and sublime objects make upon us when we behold them, but every one has a conception of it. It produces a sort of internal elevation and expansion; it raises the mind much above its ordinary state; and fills it with a degree of wonder and astonishment, which it cannot well express. The emotion is certainly delightful; but it is altogether of the serious kind; a degree of awfulness and solemnity, even approaching to severity, commonly attends it when at its height; very distinguishable from the more gay and brisk emotion raised by beautiful objects.

391. The simplest form of external grandeur appears in the vast and boundless prospects presented to us by nature; such as wide extended plains, to which the eye can see no limits; the firmament of heaven; or the boundless expanse of the ocean. All vastness produces the impression of sublimity.

Illus. It is to be remarked, however, that space, extended in length, makes not so strong an impression as height or depth. Though a boundless plain be a grand object, yet a high mountain, to which we look up, or an awful precipice or tower, whence we look down on the objects which lie below, is still more so.

2. The excessive grandeur of the firmament arises from its height, joined to its boundless extent; and that of the ocean, not from its extent alone, but from the perpetual motion and irresistible force of that mass of waters. Wherever space is concerned, it is clear, that amplitude or greatness of extent, in one dimension or other, is necessary to grandeur. Remove all bounds from any object, and you presently render it sublime.

Corol. Hence, infinite space, endless numbers, and eternal duration, fill the mind with great ideas.

392. But vastness, or amplitude of extent, is not alone the foundation of all sublimity; because many objects appear sublime, which have no relation to space at all.

Illus. Such, for instance, is great loudness of sound. The burst of thunder or of cannon, the roaring of winds, the shouting of multitudes, the sound of vast cataracts of water, are all incontestibly grand objects. In general we may observe, that great power and force exerted, always raise sublime ideas; and perhaps the most copious source of these is derived from this quarter. Hence the grandeur of earthquakes and

« PreviousContinue »