tals, on which they had fixed, were entirely incapable of dif charging this fervice, it seems never to have occurred to him to fufpect that poffibly nothing else was more capable of discharging it. He applied himself, on the contrary, with great zeal, to dif cover fomething to which this function might be affigned; and certainly was reduced to straits in the experiment. He could find nothing, either in heaven above, or in earth beneath, to answer his purpose. But being a bold man, even this did not reduce him to defpair. If he found no real ftandard, he found at least an imaginary one; if nothing in being could perform this fervice,, a nonentity, he seems to have thought, might certainly accom plish it.

As much of the confufion which has been introduced into this subject has arisen from the indiftinct notion of a standard of value, it may be useful, after having fhown how unfounded were the ideas which Mr Smith's predeceffors have entertained on the subject, to enter rather more fully into the expofition of his own notion, than its intrinfic merits might have required, that we may finally remove out of the way this stone of ftumbling and rock of offence.

The writers on money,' he says, had they only examined a little further than the precious metals, must have discovered that in every country, there exists another standard of value, a nominal or imaginary one, of which the coins, passing in circulation, are only symbols or tokens; and which standard, from its nature, is perfectly invariable. The nature of this standard may, at once, be explained by a quotation from Montesquieu, who says, "the blacks on the coast of Africa, have a sign purely ideal for fixing the value of their commodities; when they wish to make an exchange of them, they say, such an article is worth five macutes, and such another ten; and yet a macute can neither be seen nor felt; it is entirely an abstract term, and not applicable to any sensible object. Is it a coin? Is it a token? Is it à measure? It is neither a coin, a token, nor a measure; for they do not exchange their merchandise for. three, five, or ten macutes, but for some article worth the same number of macutes." This,' continues Mr Smith, is an exact description of what is meant by an imaginary standard. The only difference to be observed between the practice of these blacks and that of civilized nations, is, that in place of actually giving one commodity for another, the latter employ sensible objects, as tokens or symbols of the ideal sign. In doing this, these tokens or symbols, are not employed as articles of value themselves, but merely as representatives of the standard. The ideal standard,' he adds, or as it will in future be called, the standard unit, appears to be something of the same nature with the letter placed for the unknown quantity in algebra; it has no real value itself, but by it the relative value of all articles is fixed, all accounts are kept, and all exchange of property

is settled. Accordingly, in this country, the pound Sterling will be found doing all these offices, in every transaction, from the highest to the lowest.' He defines it, therefore, in the following terms: The pound Sterling is the standard of Great Britain, by which the relative value of all articles is ascertained; and the gold, silver, and copper coins, issued by government and circulating in the country, are just symbols or tokens of that standard. A standard unit,' he adds, appears to be absolutely necessary in all countries the least civilized; and, accordingly, it is to be found every where. In France, the livre Tournois has long been the standard; in Spain and Portugal, the millrea'; in Russia, the rouble; in America, the dollar; in the East Indies, the roupee,' &c.

6

Such is our author's doctrine in regard to the standard of value. To us, we will confess, it appears to involve absurdity in the very terms. He tells us, in the language of Montesquieu, that this measure is a mere abstract term; but how an abstract term should measure any thing, it would puzzle a conjurer to explain. If he reply that it is the abstract idea, represented by the term, which is the standard; what will he say to the doctrine, of which he probably never heard, but which, notwithstanding, appears to be very well established, that there is no such thing as an abstract idea; that there is nothing abstract but terms; and that, whenever the mind forms an idea or conception corresponding to an abstract term, it is the conception of an individual, which individual it contemplates as the representative of all the other individuals comprehended in the class which the abstract term denotes? If this doctrine be just, it is easy for Mr Smith to see how very different an operation takes place in the estimate of value, from what he has imagined. The mind must conceive some individual object, with the value of which it is acquainted, and that object it compares with the other objects whose value it desires to ascertain. Thus, suppose it is the pound Sterling with which a man is going to measure the value of any commodities, -it is surely not the word pound' with which he is going to measure them; for that can measure nothing. If it is with the idea of a pound, that can be nothing but the express idea of twenty shillings in silver. It is the value, therefore, of an individual commodity, with which he must measure the value of all other commodities.

But, even if we allow the existence of abstract ideas, Mr Smith's theory is in no better condition. Let any one but endeavour to imagine how an abstract idea, which is but a thought in the mind, can measure the value of external commodities. Were it not that we accustom ourselves so miserably to vague and indefinite ideas, such a proposition could not have been mentioned to any intelligent man, without exciting his ridicule. No one thing can measure another, but that which has

the

the qualities of that other. Thus, what measures weight must have weight; what measures extent must have the same quality. But what quality has an abstract idea by which it can measure the value of a horse, for example, or of a quarter of corn?

Even the fact on which Mr Smith grounds his whimsical notion, is incorrect, and is one of those erroneous statements of ill-informed and superficial travellers, to which Montesquieu too readily lent his ear. Our own more intelligent countryman, Park, whose fate there is so much reason to deplore, has given us a most satisfactory account of this supposed phenomenon. • In thus bartering,' says he, (see Travels in Africa, p. 27.) one commodity for another, many inconveniences must necessarily have arisen at first, from the want of coined money, or some other visible and determinate medium, to settle the balance or difference of value between different articles; to remedy which, the natives of the interior make use of small shells, called cowries. On the coast, the inhabitants have adopted a practice which I believe is peculiar to themselves. In their early intercourse with Europeans, the article that attracted most notice was iron. Its utility in forming the instruments of war and husbandry, made it preferable to all others; and iron soon became the measure by which the value of all other commodities was ascertained. Thus, a certain quantity of goods, of whatever denomination, appearing to be equal in value to a bar of iron, constituted, in the trader's phraseology, a bar of that particular merchandise. Twenty leaves of tobacco, for instance, were considered as a bar of tobacco; and a gallon of spirits (or rather half spirits and half water) as a bar of rum; a bar of one commodity being reckoned equal to a bar of another commodity. As, however, it must unavoidably happen, that, according to the plenty or scarcity of goods at market, in proportion to the demand, the relative value would be subject to continual fluctuations, greater precision has been found necessary; and, at this time, the current value of a single bar of any kind, is fixed by the whites at two shillings Sterling. Thus, a slave, whose price is 15, is said to be worth 150 bars.'

It thus appears, that the ideal standard of the blacks is, in reality, an ascertained quantity of a particular commodity, the value of which they compare with that of all other commodities; nor should we have thought of going further into the subject, had this notion of an ideal standard been peculiar to the author before us. But, as it has haunted the brains of all speculators on money from the time of Law downwards, we think it may be worth while to investigate somewhat more carefully the origin of so strange an illusion.

The fallacy which, in this case, seems to be the source of mis

apprehension,

apprehension, is curious, and of a species hitherto but little explained; a fallacy not arising from the double meaning of a word, but from an ambiguity, if such it may be called, between a name, and the thing which it signifies. There are two operations which we perform with money,-and confusion has arisen from losing sight of the difference between them. First, we go to market with money. Secondly, we account by means of it.

In regard to the first operation, money, they tell us, is an abstract term, or an abstract idea.-But let them go to market with an abstract term, or an abstract idea. Will they find any body ready to sell them what they want to purchase, for these airy commodities? No, says Mr Smith; we go not to market with these commodities, but with symbols or tokens which are the representatives of these commodities. Worse and worse: An abstract idea is good for nothing in purchasing; but its representative, which one would wonder should be more valuable than the thing represented, is all-powerful! But what does this representative pass for? Is it valued solely because it represents an abstract idea? Or, when you go to market with a guinea, does it not purchase in proportion to the value of the metal in the guinea? If so, you purchase not with an abstract idea, but with a real commodity. If you go to market with a bank note, which is an obligation to receive a known quantity of gold and silver; this is the same thing, in reality, as going to market with gold and silver.

Abstract ideas, or ideal standards, therefore, are of no use in going to market. Men always go to market with real commodities; and they are able to purchase only as far as the value of those commodities extends. Next, we account by means of money. Now, what is the operation of accounting? We first state, in denominations of money, the value of any article, or accumula➡ tion of articles; and this statement we can manage in various ways. We can add it to another similar statement, to see how much they make in conjunction; or we can subtract it, to see how much they differ. We can multiply it; we can divide it; and discover various relations which it bears to other statements, In all these operations, the terms, pounds, shillings, and pence, exactly resemble algebraic symbols; and the letters x, y, and z might be employed for them. Operations of account, therefore, are undoubtedly carried on by abstract terms or symbols; and it is impossible that it should be otherwise. These operations, accordingly, predominating in the mind when men think of mo ney, have led some ingenious inquirers to regard all money operations in the same light; and will incline most people, till they examine the matter, to think that there is more subtlety in the illusion of the ideal standard than there really is. For, what is

it

it that gives to these operations of account a meaning or a use? It is the ultimate reference of the symbols to real objects. We might add and subtract, multiply and divide, pounds, shillings, and pence, to all eternity, without an idea, but of certain relations of number, if we did not set out with affixing an object to the terms, if we did not conceive an individual something, of which the term pound, for example, is-not the representative-but the name. Now the term pound is, undoubtedly, the unambiguous name of a certain quantity of coined gold or silver. When a man has determined that the value of a certain article, or certain articles of property, is any multiple of this value, he sets them down as worth so many pounds, and, after that, proceeds no doubt to perform all his operations of account with abstract terms merely. But does this render the abstract term the measure, or the standard, or the money? Surely not. If this were the case, the name would be the primary object, and the thing signified only the symbol of its own name: a most singular and incredible inversion, when terms are on all occasions the symbols of things! Suppose it were not customary to keep our accounts in denominations of money, but in denominations of oorn,-which would certainly be the case, if it were as convenient to make our purchases with corn as with money; then we should state the value of our property, not by naming so many pounds, shillings, and pence, but so many quarters, bushels, and gallons. After this, however, was done, all operations of account would be performed exactly on the same principles as before. But would this render the term quarter our ideal standard? Would not the simple fact be, that a quarter of corn would in this case be, not the ideal, but the real value, assumed as a known quantity,-and with its multiples or divisors made use of, to denote or express other estimated values?

Such of our readers as are conversant with the philosophical doctrine of abstract terms, would do well to consider what it is that the word value really stands for. Is there any abstract idea of which it is the representative; and which abstract idea, or some modification of it, becomes our standard of valuation? It is demonstrated, that there can be no such thing as an abstract idea; and, if any one is unacquainted with the demonstration, let him read the elegant and philosophical reasonings of Mr Stewart in his chapter on Abstraction, in the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind; and the original and important illustrations on the formation of abstract terms, in the second volume of Mr Horne Tooke's Diversions of Purley. As every existence is an individual, so, every conception in the mind must be of an individual; and nothing is general but language. Thus, speech is a

general