I need not stay to point out how extremely arbitrary every part of this scheme is; and how complex its machinery would be, even if it did account for the facts. It may be sufficient to observe, as others have done, that the capacity of change, and of being influenced by external circumstances, such as we really find it in nature, and therefore such as in science we must represent it, is a tendency, not to improve, but to deteriorate. When species are modified by external causes, they usually degenerate, and do not advance. And there is no instance of a species acquiring an entirely new sense, faculty, or organ, in addition to, or in the place of, what it had before.

Not only, then, is the doctrine of the transmutation of species in itself disproved by the best physiological reasonings, but the additional assumptions which are requisite, to enable its advocates to apply it to the explanation of the geological and other phenomena of the earth, are altogether gratuitous and fantastical.

Such is the judgment to which we are led by the examination of the discussions which have taken place on this subject. Yet in certain speculations, occasioned by the discovery of the Sivatherium, a new fossil animal from the Sub-Himalaya mountains of India, M. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire speaks of the belief in the immutability of species as a conviction which is fading away from men's minds. He speaks too of the termination of the age of Cuvier, "la clôture du siècle de Cuvier," and of the commencement of a better zoological philosophy.* But though he expresses himself with great animation, I do not perceive that he adduces, in support of his peculiar opinions, any arguments in addition to those which he urged during the lifetime of Cuvier. And the reader may recollect that the consideration of that controversy led us to very different anticipations from his, respecting the probable future progress of physiology. The discovery of the Sivatherium supplies no particle of proof to the hypothesis, that the existing species of animals are descended from extinct creatures which are specifically distinct and we cannot act more wisely than in listening to the advice of that eminent naturalist, M. de Blainville.10 Against this hypothesis, which, up to the present time, I regard as purely gratuitons, and likely to turn geologists out of the sound and excellent road in which they now are, I willingly raise my voice, with the most absolute conviction of being in the right."

66

r

8 Lyell, B. II. c. iv.

" See B. XVII. c. vii.

Compte Rendu de l'Acad. des Sc. 1837, No. 3, p. 81. 10 Compte Rendu, 1837, No. 5, p. 168.

[2nd Ed.] [The hypothesis of the progressive developement of species has been urged recently, in connexion with the physiological tenet of Tiedemann and De Serres, noticed in B. XVII. c. vii. sect. 3;— namely, that the embryo of the higher forms of animals passes by gradations through those forms which are permanent in inferior animals. Assuming this tenet as exact, it has been maintained that the higher animals which are found in the more recent strata may have been produced by an ulterior development of the lower forms in the embryo state; the circumstances being such as to favor such a developement. But all the best physiologists agree in declaring that such an extraordinary developement of the embryo is inconsistent with physiological possibility. Even if the progression of the embryo in time have a general correspondence with the order of animal forms as more or less perfectly organized (which is true in an extremely incomplete and inexact degree), this correspondence must be considered, not as any indication of causality, but as one of those marks of universal analogy and symmetry which are stamped upon every part of the creation.

Mr. Lyell11 notices this doctrine of Tiedemann and De Serres; and observes, that though nature presents us with cases of animal forms degraded by incomplete developement, she offers none of forms exalted by extraordinary developement. Mr. Lyell's own hypothesis of the introduction of new species upon the earth, not having any physiological basis, hardly belongs to this chapter.]

Sect. 5.-Question of Creation as related to Science.

But since we reject the production of new species by means of external influence, do we then, it may be asked, accept the other side of the dilemma which we have stated; and admit a series of creations of species, by some power beyond that which we trace in the ordinary course of nature?

To this question, the history and analogy of science, I conceive, teach us to reply as follows:-All palætiological sciences, all speculations which attempt to ascend from the present to the remote past, by the chain of causation, do also, by an inevitable consequence, urge us to look for the beginning of the state of things which we thus contemplate but in none of these cases have men been able, by the aid of science, to arrive at a beginning which is homogeneous with the

known course of events. The first origin of language, of civilization, of law and government, cannot be clearly made out by reasoning and research; just as little, we may expect, will a knowledge of the origin of the existing and extinct species of plants and animals, be the result of physiological and geological investigation.

But, though philosophers have never yet demonstrated, and perhaps never will be able to demonstrate, what was that primitive state of things in the social and material worlds, from which the progressive state took its first departure; they can still, in all the lines of research to which we have referred, go very far back;-determine many of the remote circumstances of the past sequence of events;-ascend to a point which, from our position at least, seems to be near the origin; —and exclude many suppositions respecting the origin itself. Whether, by the light of reason alone, men will ever be able to do more than this, it is difficult to say. It is, I think, no irrational opinion, even on grounds of philosophical analogy alone, that in all those sciences which look back and seek a beginning of things, we may be unable to arrive at a consistent and definite belief, without having recourse to other grounds of truth, as well as to historical research and scientific reasoning. When our thoughts would apprehend steadily the creation of things, we find that we are obliged to summon up other ideas than those which regulate the pursuit of scientific truths;-to call in other powers than those to which we refer natural events: it cannot, then, be considered as very surprizing, if, in this part of our inquiry, we are compelled to look for other than the ordinary evidence of science.

Geology, forming one of the palætiological class of sciences, which trace back the history of the earth and its inhabitants on philosophical grounds, is thus associated with a number of other kinds of research, which are concerned about language, law, art, and consequently about the internal faculties of man, his thoughts, his social habits, his conception of right, his love of beauty. Geology being thus brought into the atmosphere of moral and mental speculations, it may be expected that her investigations of the probable past will share an influence common to them; and that she will not be allowed to point to an origin of her own, a merely physical beginning of things; but that, as she approaches towards such a goal, she will be led to see that it is the origin of many trains of events, the point of convergence of many lines. It may be, that instead of being allowed to travel up to this focus of being, we are only able to estimate its place and nature, and

to form of it such a judgment as this;-that it is not only the source of mere vegetable and animal life, but also of rational and social life, language and arts, law and order; in short, of all the progressive tendencies by which the highest principles of the intellectual and moral world have been and are developed, as well as of the succession of organic forms, which we find scattered, dead or living, over the earth.

This reflection concerning the natural scientific view of creation, it will be observed, has not been sought for, from a wish to arrive at such conclusions; but it has flowed spontaneously from the manner in which we have had to introduce geology into our classification of the sciences; and this classification was framed from an unbiassed consideration of the general analogies and guiding ideas of the various portions of our knowledge. Such remarks as we have made may on this account be considered more worthy of attention.

But such a train of thought must be pursued with caution. Although it may not be possible to arrive at a right conviction respecting the origin of the world, without having recourse to other than physical considerations, and to other than geological evidence; yet extraneous considerations, and extraneous evidence, respecting the nature of the beginning of things, must never be allowed to influence our physics or our geology. Our geological dynamics, like our astronomical dynamics, may be inadequate to carry us back to an origin of that state of things, of which it explains the progress: but this deficiency must be supplied, not by adding supernatural to natural geological dynamics, but by accepting, in their proper place, the views supplied by a portion of knowledge of a different character and order. If we include in our Theology the speculations to which we have recourse for this purpose, we must exclude from them our Geology. The two sciences may conspire, not by having any part in common; but because, though widely diverse in their lines, both point to a mysterious and invisible origin of the world.

All that which claims our assent on those higher grounds of which theology takes cognizance, must claim such assent as is consistent with those grounds; that is, it must require belief in respect of all that bears upon the highest relations of our being, those on which depend our duties and our hopes. Doctrines of this kind may and must be conveyed and maintained, by means of information concerning the past history of man, and his social and material, as well as moral and spiritual fortunes. He who believes that a Providence has

ruled the affairs of mankind, will also believe that a Providence has governed the material world. But any language in which the narrative of this government of the material world can be conveyed, must necessarily be very imperfect and inappropriate; being expressed in terms of those ideas which have been selected by men, in order to describe appearances and relations of created things as they affect one another. In all cases, therefore, where we have to attempt to interpret such a narrative, we must feel that we are extremely liable to err; and most of all, when our interpretation refers to those material objects and operations which are most foreign to the main purpose of a history of providence. If we have to consider a communication containing a view of such a government of the world, imparted to us, as we may suppose, in order to point out the right direction for our feelings of trust, and reverence, and hope, towards the Governor of the world, we may expect that we shall be in no danger of collecting from our authority erroneous notions with regard to the power, and wisdom, and goodness of His government; or with respect to our own place, duties, and prospects, and the history of our race so far as our duties and prospects are concerned. But that we shall rightly understand the detail of all events in the history of man, or of the skies, or of the earth, which are narrated for the purpose of thus giving a right direction to our minds, is by no means equally certain; and I do not think it would be too much to say, that an immunity from perplexity and error, in such matters, is, on general grounds, very improbable. It cannot then surprise us to find, that parts of such narrations which seem to refer to occurrences like those of which astronomers and geologists have attempted to determine the laws, have given rise to many interpretations, all inconsistent with one another, and most of them at variance with the best established principles of astronomy and geology.

It may be urged, that all truths must be consistent with all other truths, and that therefore the results of true geology or astronomy cannot be irreconcileable with the statements of true theology. And this universal consistency of truth with itself must be assented to; but it by no means follows that we must be able to obtain a full insight into the nature and manner of such a consistency. Such an insight would only be possible if we could obtain a clear view of that central body of truth, the source of the principles which appear in the separate lines of speculation. To expect that we should see clearly how the providential government of the world is consistent with the unvarying laws