I nifhment, has in this manner ftamped upon the human heart, in the ftrongest and most indelible characters, an immediate and inftinctive approbation of the facred and neceffary law of retaliation."

In treating farther upon this fubject, our Author obferves, that we do not thoroughly and heartily fympathize with the gratitude of one man towards another, merely because this other has been the cause of his good fortune, unless he has been the cause of it from motives, which we entirely go along with. Our heart muft adopt the principles of the agent, and go along with all the affections which influenced his conduct, before it can entirely fympathize with, and beat time to, the gratitude of the perfon who has been benefited, by his actions. If in the conduct of the benefactor there appears to have been no propriety, how beneficial foever its effects, it does not seem to demand, or neceffarily to require, any proportionable recompence,

But when to the beneficent tendency of the action is joined the propriety of the affection from which it proceeds; when we entirely fympathize and go along with the motives of the agent, the love which we conceive for him upon his own account, enhances and enlivens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of thofe who owe their profperity to his good conduct. His actions feem then to demand a proportionable recompence. We then entirely enter into that gratitude which prompts to beftow it. The benefactor feems then to be the proper object of reward, when we thus entirely fympathize with, and ap prove of, that sentiment which prompts to reward him. When we approve of, and go along with, the affection, from which the action proceeds, we must neceffarily approve of the action, and regard the perfon towards whom it is directed, as its proper and fuitable object.

Having confidered the origin and foundation of our judgments concerning the fentiments and conduct of others, in the two firft parts of his Theory, our very ingenious Author pro◄ ceeds, in the third, to confider the origin of thofe concerning our own; after which, he goes on, in the fourth, to fhew, the effect of utility upon the fentiment of approbation. No quali ties of the mind, the ingenious and acute Mr. Hume obferves, are approved of as virtuous, but fuch as are useful or agree able either to the perfon himself or to others.; and no qualities are difapproved of as vicious, but fuch as have a contrary y ten→ dency. Now, though nature feems to have fo happily adjusted our fentiments of approbation and disapprobation, to the conyeniency both of the individual and of the fociety, that after

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the ftricteft examination it will be found, our Author thinks, that this is univerfally the cafe, yet ftill he affirms that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness, which is either the first or principal fource of our approbation and difapprobation. These fentiments are no doubt enhanced and enlivened by the perception of the beauty or deformity which refults from this utility or hurtfulness; but ftill, he fays, they are originally and effentially different from this perception.

For firft of all,' continues he, it feems impoffible that the approbation of virtue fhould be a fentiment of the fame kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and • well contrived building; or that we fhould have no other reason for praising a man, than that for which we commend a chest of drawers.

And fecondly, it will be found, upon examination, that the usefulness of any difpofition of mind is feldom the first ground of our approbation; and that the fentiment of approbation always involves in it a fenfe of propriety quite diftinct from the perception of utility. We may obferve this with regard to all the qualities which are approved of as virtuous, both those which, according to, this fyftem, are ori< ginally valued as ufeful to ourselves, as well as those which are efteemed on account of their usefulness to others.

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The qualities most useful to ourselves are firft of all fupe⚫rior reafon and underftanding, by which we are capable of difcerning the remote confequences of all our actions, and of forefecing the advantage or detriment which is likely to refult from them and fecondly, felf-command, by which we are • enabled to abstain from prefent pleafure, or to endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleafure, or to avoid a greater pain, in fome future time. In the union of those two qualities confifts the virtue of prudence, of all the virtues that which is most useful to the individual.

With regard to the firft of thofe qualities, it has been obferved, upon a former occafion, that fuperior reafon and understanding are originally approved of as juft and right and acurate, and not merely as ufeful or advantageous. It is in the abftrufer fciences, particularly in the higher parts of mathematics, that the greatest and most admired exertions of human reafon have been difplayed. But the utility of <thofe sciences, either to the individual or to the public, is not very obvious, and to prove it requires a difcuffion which is not always very eafily comprehended. It was not, therefore, their utility which firft recommended them to the public 'admiration.

admiration. This quality was but little infifted upon, till it became necessary to make fome reply to the reproaches of those who, having themfelves no tafte for fuch fublime dif 'coveries, endeavoured to depreciate them as useless.

That felf-command, in the fame manner, by which we reftrain our present appetites in order to gratify them more fully upon another occafion, is approved of as much under the afpect of propriety, as under that of utility. When we ' act in this manner, the fentiments which influence our conduct feem exactly to coincide with those of the fpectator. The fpectator does not feel the folicitations of our prefent appetites. To him the pleasure which we are to enjoy a ⚫ week hence, or a year hence, is juft as interefting as that ' which we are to enjoy this moment. When for the fake of the present, therefore, we facrifice the future, our conduct appears to him abfurd and extravagant in the highest degree, " and he cannot enter into the principles which influence it On the contrary, when we abftain from prefent pleasure, in order to secure greater pleasure to come, when we act as if the remote object interested us as much as that which immediately preffes upon the fenfes, as our affections exactly • correfpond with his own, he cannot fail to approve of our ⚫ behaviour and as he knows from experience how few are 'capable of this felf-command, he looks upon our conduc ⚫ with a confiderable degree of wonder and admiration. Hence ⚫ arises that eminent esteem with which all men naturally re'gard a steady perfeverance in the practice of frugality, induftry, and application, though directed to no other purpose than the acquifition of fortune. The refolute firmness of

⚫ the person who acts in this manner, and in order to obtain a great though remote advantage, not only gives up all prefent pleasures, but endures the greatest labour both of mind and body, neceffarily commands our approbation. That view of his intereft and happiness which appears to regulate his conduct, exactly tallies with the idea which we naturally form of it. There is the most perfect correfpondence between his fentiments and our own, and at the fame time, ⚫ from our experience of the common weakness of human na ture, it is a correfpondence which we could not reasonably have expected. We not only approve, therefore, but in fome meafure admire his conduct, and think it worthy of a 'confiderable degree of applaufe. It is the confciousness of this merited approbation and efteem, which is alone capable of fupporting the agent in this tenor of conduct. The plea'fure which we are to enjoy ten years hence interests us fo little in comparison with that which we may enjoy to day,

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⚫ the paffion which the firft excites is naturally fo weak, in comparison with that violent emotion which the fecond is apt to give occafion to, that the one could never be any balance to the other, unless it was fupported by the fense of propriety, by the confcioufnefs that we merited the esteem ⚫ and approbation of every body, by acting in the one way, and that we became the proper objects of their contempt ⚫ and derífion by behaving in the other.'

Our Author now goes on, in the fifth part of his Theory; to confider the influence of cuftom and fashion upon the fentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation.-As our sentiments concerning beauty of every kind, are fo much influenced by custom and fashion, it cannot be expected, he fays that thofe, concerning the beauty of conduct, fhould be entirely exempted from the dominion of thofe principles. Their influence here, however, he obferves, feems to be much less than it is every where else. There is no form of external objects, perhaps, how abfurd and fantastical foever, to which custom will not reconcile us, or which fashion will not render even agreeable. But the characters and conduct of a Nero of a Claudius, are what no custom will ever reconcile us to, what no fashion will ever render agreeable; but the one will always be the object of dread and hatred, the other of scorn and derifion. The principles of the imagination, upon which our Lenfe of beauty depends, are of a very nice and delicate nature, and may eafily be altered by habit and education: but the fentiments of moral approbation and difapprobation, are founded on the strongest and most vigorous paffions of human nature; and though they may be somewhat warpt, cannot be entirely perverted.

But though the influence of cuftom and fashion upon moral fentiments, fays he, is not altogether fo great, it is, however, perfectly fimilar to what it is every where else. When custom and fashion coincide with the natural principles of right and wrong, they heighten the delicacy of our fentiments, and increase our abhorrence for every thing < that approaches to evil. Those who have been educated in what is really good company, not in what is commonly called fuch, who have been accuftomed to fee nothing in the perfons whom they esteemed and lived with, but justice, modefty, humanity, and good order; are more fhocked with whatever seems to be inconfiftent with the rules which thofe virtues preferibe. Thofe on the contrary, who have had the misfortune to be brought up amidft violence, licen • tioufnefs, falfhood and injuftice; lofe, though not all fenfe

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of the impropriety of fuch conduct, yet all fenfe of its dreadful enormity, and of the vengeance and punishment that is due to it. They have been familiarized with it from their • infancy, cuftom has rendered it habitual to them, and they are very apt to regard it as what is called the way of the world, fomething which either may or must be practised to 'hinder us from being the dupes of our own integrity.

Fashion too, will fametimes give reputation to a certain ' degree of diforder, and on the contrary, discountenance • qualities which deferve efteem. In the reign of Charles II • a degree of licentiousness was deemed the characteristic of a liberal education. It was connected, according to the notions of those times, with generofity, fincerity, magnanimity, loyalty, and proved that the perfon who acted in this manner, was a gentleman, and not a puritan; feverity of 'manners, and regularity of conduct, on the other hand, ⚫ were altogether unfashionable, and were connected, in the 'imagination of that age, with cant, cunning, hypocrify, and low manners. To fuperficial minds, the vices of the great seem at all times agreeable. They connect them, not only with the fplendor of fortune, but with many fuperior virtues, which they afcribe to their fuperiors; with the fpi⚫rit of freedom and independency, with franknefs, generofity, humanity, and politenefs. The virtues of the inferior ranks of people, on the contrary, their parfimonious frugality, ⚫ their painful induftry, and rigid adherence to rules, feet to them mean and difagreeable. They connect them, both with the meanness of the ftation to which thofe qualities ⚫ commonly belong, and with many great vices, which, they fuppofe, ufually accompany them; fuch as an abject, cowardly, ill-natured, lying, pilfering difpofition.

The objects with which men in the different profeffions and states of life are converfant, being very different, and 'habituating them to very different paffions, naturally form in them very different characters and manners. We expect in each rank and profeffion, a degree of thofe manners, which, experience has taught us, belong to it. But as in ⚫ each species of things, we are particularly pleafed with the middle conformation, which in every part and feature agrees moft exactly with the general standard that nature seems to have eftablished for things of that kind; fo in each rank,

if I may fay fo, in each fpecies of men, we are particularly pleafed, if they have neither too much, nor too little of the character which ufually accompanies their particular condition and fituation. A man, we fay, fhould

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