The whole difficulty which is presented to us in the problem respecting the origin and continuance of evil relates to the infinity of Divine benevolence. That there is some evil in the world is an apparent indication that the Deity is not infinitely benevolent; but it is no indication whatever that he is not benevolent at all. It affords no presumption even against the doctrine that he is largely benevolent, — bountiful and gracious to man far beyond the measure of his absolute wants or rightful claims. This conclusion, therefore, that God wishes the happiness, not the misery, of his creatures, and has made rich provision to this end, remains to us unshaken, whatever may be our success in the subsequent part of the inquiry.

I insist strongly upon this point, because the nature of the difficulty occasioned by the presence of any evil in the world has been greatly misunderstood. Nearly all writers upon the subject have argued the matter as if the existence of sin and suffering in any degree, however small, or however overbalanced by virtue and happiness, afforded a presumption that the Deity was not benevolent at all, - nay, that he was malevolent, that he intended the misery of his creatures. But not so. It is one thing to prove that God is wise, powerful, and good; and another and quite a different thing to prove that he is infinitely wise, infinitely powerful, and infinitely good. The difference between these two lines of proof has sometimes (and very properly) been made a topic for discussion by itself; the infinity of the Divine attributes is to be made out by reasoning somewhat different from that which establishes the reality of the attributes themselves. Infinity is a metaphysical idea; our notion of it is confessedly inadequate. We have but a negative idea of it; it implies that certain qualities exist in an unknown perfection. To prove that the attributes are infinite, then, may be desirable for philosophical purposes, for the completeness of theory, and for rounding out with entireness a system of theology; but it is not essential either for religious faith or practice. For these latter purposes, it is enough to show that the qualities exist unlimited by the attributes of any other known being or thing, and in a degree which

challenges our wonder and adoration. This has been already done, and religious faith, properly so called, is sufficiently vindicated. It is proved that God exists, and that he governs the world in righteousness and with mercy, at once upholding the law which he has revealed through the conscience, and showing by manifold provisions his care for the happiness of his creatures.

It is observable, in the next place, that there are difficulties in the very conception of infinite goodness united with infinite power, which ought to warn us that the imperfection, after all, is more apt to be in our limited modes of thought than in the constituted nature of things. I borrow on this point the very clear and precise statement of Abraham Tucker.

"God," he observes, "is completely happy in himself, nor can his happiness receive increase or diminution from any thing befalling his creatures; wherefore his goodness is pure, disinterested bounty, without any return of joy or satisfaction to himself. Therefore it is no wonder we have imperfect notions of a quality whereof we have no experience in our own nature; for we know of no other love than inclination, which prompts us to gratify it in the same manner as our other inclinations. In the next place, let us examine our idea of infinite goodness taken in the abstract, before we inquire whether God be good or no,- and we shall find it incompatible with that of infinite power; for infinite goodness, according to our apprehension, requires that it should exhaust omnipotence, that it should give capacities of enjoyment and confer blessings until there were no more to be conferred; but our idea of omnipotence requires that it should be inexhaustible, that nothing should limit its operations so that it could do no more than it has done. Therefore it is much easier to conceive of an imperfect creature completely good than of a perfect being; for if he pursues invariably all opportunities of doing good to the utmost of his power and knowledge, he deserves that character; and if there are any injuries sustained which he cannot redress, any distress unrelieved which he knows not of, his weakness and ignorance are a full excuse for his omission. But where there is

almighty power, unlimited knowledge, and perfect wisdom, we can neither conceive that infinite goodness should extend to the utmost bounds of that which has no bounds, nor yet that it should stop until it can proceed no further. Since, then, we find our understanding incapable of comprehending infinite goodness joined with infinite power, we need not be surprised at finding our thoughts perplexed concerning them; for no other can be expected in matters above our reach; and we may presume the obscurity rises from something wrong in our ideas, not from any inconsistencies in the subjects themselves." In short, here as elsewhere, whenever we apply a purely metaphysical idea to matters of fact, we end in a contradiction or an absurdity.

You will not understand me, by these remarks, as holding forth the opinion, that the problem respecting the origin of evil is insoluble, or as evading the difficulty of solving it. On the contrary, I believe, and I shall attempt to show, that all events are ordered for the best, and that the supposed evils which we suffer are parts of a great system conducted by almighty power, under the direction of unlimited wisdom and goodness. I adopt the opinion maintained in all ages by the best and wisest philosophers, that the creation of beings endowed with free-will, and consequently liable to moral delinquency, and the government of the world by general laws, from which occasional supposed evils must result, furnish no solid objection to the perfection of the universe. This, I admit, is a system of optimism; but it is not the optimism of Leibnitz, grounded upon a denial of man's free agency, and as such justly ridiculed by Voltaire. And the general doctrine of the benevolence of God is in no wise accountable for or dependent upon the sufficiency of the argument in defence of this metaphysical system. That doctrine rests upon its own proofs, which are abundant, undisputed, and irrefragable. This question respecting the presence of any evil in the world is a collateral affair, which must be considered, indeed, before we can complete a scheme of theology, and about which theologians and metaphysicians may differ. But the religious man has no concern with it, and his faith, whether derived from the teach

ings of nature, or from express revelation, is not burdened with its doubts and intricacies. It is enough for him, that he can trace everywhere the footprints of a wise, just, and benevolent Ruler of the universe.

LECTURE VIII.

THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.

THE argument in my last Lecture for the benevolence of God was not founded upon metaphysical reasoning, or upon any consideration a priori of the Divine nature, but upon observation and the results of experience. It is because human life, on the whole, is a happy one, because its pleasures far exceed its pains, and because these pleasures were evidently designed, while the pains are only incidental or secondary to some great object, that we are enabled to pronounce with confidence, that the Deity wishes the happiness of his creatures. The sufferings which are the immediate consequence and punishment of vice, it was remarked, are properly left out of the account, since these evince the goodness of God no less than the happiness resulting from virtue, the object in both cases being to advance man's highest interests by the improvement of his moral character; just so the affectionate parent rewards the obedience and punishes the faults of his child, love equally constraining him to adopt either course. Now these sufferings constitute so large a portion of the misery that is in the world, that, when they are deducted, the balance inclines altogether on the side of happiness. Our enjoyments, also, proceed from steady and permanent causes; the performance of all the ordinary functions of life, when the body is in its normal state, being a source of pleasure. Sickness is an accident and an exception; health is the intended and usual condition.