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LECTURE I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SKEPTICISM OF OUR OWN DAY.

THE Lectures which I had the honor of delivering from this place the last winter ended with a very brief view of the ordinary argument for the existence of God. They were intended to show, not only that this great dogma rests upon unimpeachable evidence, but that it harmonizes with the conclusions of modern physical science, and forms the only satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of nature and the mysteries of the universe. Without it, our knowledge of the facts themselves is imperfect, and the most obvious and significant questions which they suggest remain unanswered. The reasoning employed is that most familiar process of inductive logic which leads us, from the indications afforded by known and observed phenomena, to infer the existence of some other reality or fact, which lies beyond the direct observation of the senses. In science, no less than in religion, we sometimes pass from that which is seen and temporal to that which is unseen and eternal.

But the establishment of this truth alone, though it is the central doctrine of natural religion, and all the others depend upon it, still leaves us at the threshold of the subject. We have still to ascertain the character or attributes under which the Deity has manifested himself to mankind, and to learn if these are such as to create an obligation on our part to conform to his will. Obedience may be yielded either from involuntary awe, or blind submission to absolute and infinite power, or from veneration for

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perfect wisdom and holiness, and a mingled sentiment of duty, gratitude, and love. The prevalence of one or another of these motives will depend on the views which we may form of the Divine nature, and the peculiarity of the dominant motive will modify and shape the whole religious character.

It is but a part of the same inquiry to ask what the Divine will is, or what we are required to do, or to refrain from doing, from a regard to the relations in which we stand to God and to our fellow-man. Apart from direct revelation, with which at present we have nothing to do, the will of the Deity can be inferred only from a knowledge of his character, and this can be learned in no other way than by the study of his works. His moral attributes, with which we are now chiefly concerned, are made known to us almost exclusively through the constitution of our own moral nature; and accordingly, the study of this nature, or of the ethical constitution of man, must be our chief guide in the present inquiry. As the former Lectures related mainly to things physical, or to what is taught us of the being and agency of God by the phenomena of the outward universe, so, in the present course, the nature and functions of conscience, and the analysis of our sense of moral obligation, must enable us to frame our conceptions of religious duty. This will be the principal aim and tendency of the investigation; incidentally, as before, we must seek for illustrations of the will and character of the Deity from the outward and visible things that he has made.

It is true that some of the results of this inquiry respecting the attributes of God were obtained by anticipation in the former course. The same objects and occurrences which prove his existence manifest also his wisdom and power, his infinite goodness and eternal duration. But in a discussion not specially directed to these attributes, the various difficulties and objections which have been raised could not be fully considered; and a particular and thorough examination of these is needed before the character of the Deity can be made the groundwork of an undoubting religious faith. The evidences of his power and majesty, indeed, are around us on every side, and cannot but arrest

the attention and command the awe and reverence even of those who are least accustomed to observe and reflect. The Divine benevolence, also, appears thoughout the works of creation; but the deep and dark problem of the origin of evil here impedes our progress, and demands careful thought and inquiry, lest it should leave a shadow upon our hopes, or impair that perfect trust which alone can produce a childlike obedience. It is not always easy, even in observing the conduct of our fellow-men, to reconcile the claims of justice with those of absolute kindness and benignity, with the perfect law of love; how much more, in considering the moral government of God, may we expect to find this conflict of opposing qualities, and to hesitate between the demands of equity and right on the one hand, and of infinite mercy and benevolence on the other! There can be no limitation here; the defects and frailties of human nature may assist us in every case to judge charitably of our brethren; but we cannot admit either imperfect justice or imperfect love as an attribute of the Almighty. It behooves us to settle our own ideas of the comparative strength of these separate, if not conflicting, claims, before we attempt the solution of the problem.

What was attempted to be proved in the former Lectures will now be taken for granted; and this includes, you will remember, not only the existence of God, but his incessant and omnipresent action in the universe. Both the creation of things and the direction of events are his; the fashioning of our bodies, the constitution of our minds, and the endowment of our moral nature are alike the effects of his wisdom and appointment; and the reasoning from effect to cause, which was proved to be legitimate in the case already considered, must be applicable in all others. Even the attribute of free-will, in respect to which man alone is created in the likeness of his Maker, is his gift; and the possession of it is an indication of his will that it should be exercised. We are free to choose between the evil and the good; and this freedom presupposes opportunities for choice; it requires that the alternative should be presented to us, or it would be a delusion and a mockery. The promptings of conscience are as clear

an indication of the moral judgments of God, as the instincts of animals, the processes of vegetable life, and the structure of the heavens are of his being and his power. In both cases, we reason from the thing that is created and finite to the self-existent and infinite Cause.

But before entering upon the main subject, which I have here sketched out, I would ask your attention, for the remainder of this Lecture, to a preliminary inquiry into the nature and tendencies of the skepticism of our own day. This will place in a clearer light the reasons for entering into the discussion at all, and for adopting a particular kind of argument or line of reasoning as most appropriate for the times. Every age has its peculiar habits of thought, its favorite studies, and a liking for one class of reasonings and speculations rather than another. It has, consequently, not only its appropriate advantages, but its peculiar temptations and dangers. Nowhere is this more evident than in its religious faith and practice. Infidelity has its Protean forms, and religious belief, as it exists in the great majority of minds, its several points of weakness or exposure, and its propensity to lapse either into blind fanaticism or chilling indifference. Bigotry is the vice of one age, and the careless neutrality which simulates Christian toleration is the fault of another. Now the substance disappears under the form, or is buried under à load of ritual observances, from which the spirit has long since departed; and then the reaction from this extreme tends to destroy both form and substance together. Skepticism, also, appears at one time as the hardened advocate of recklessness and vice, throwing off at once every cover and veil of licentious speculation and practice, and assumes at another the garb of a refined philosophy, and the sentiments, if not the exercise, of an austere and Stoical morality. Natural religion needs to be guarded at all points; it is menaced alike by the insidious speculations of Hume, the blasphemous dogmatism of D'Holbach, the sneers of Voltaire, or the sentimental professions of Rousseau. To what dangers is it now specially exposed, or what opinions are generally prevalent in the community which tend to impair its credibility or to lessen its influence?

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