In the mean time I quote a passage in which they set forth some of the difficulties of the subject; after which I will proceed to show in what way provision would be made for those difficulties in the general scheme of the Indian Law Commissioners.

"With reference to the proposal to blend the Courts into one Court of universal jurisdiction, it will be obvious, on considering the different subject-matters of which Courts of Law and Equity are ordinarily required to take cognisance, that there must be different modes of procedure with respect to some of these matters; a necessity which arises, not from any technical rules, but from an inherent difference in the nature of the subjects to be dealt with. For example, in the administrative branch of equitable jurisdiction, which is sometimes to be exercised in a hostile suit, but more frequently in a suit for protection and administration merely, the Court is called upon to take care of the person and property of an infant, and to make orders, and give directions during a long course of years; or is required to administer the estate of a deceased person, in doing which creditors are to be ascertained, assets to be got in, and orders are to be made, and directions given, from time to time, as to the property, and its distribution amongst various classes of parties having different interests. In matters of trust, the Court frequently has to ascertain the conduct and acts, as well of all the persons in a fiduciary position as of all their cestuisque trust, and to adjust the several claims and liabilities, making all just allowances under the special circumstances of every transaction. A machinery to effect these objects is required, and must therefore be retained or provided. It is obviously impossible that these cases can be resolved into one or more questions to be submitted to a jury. On the other hand, the machinery of a Court of Law is applicable where one party seeks to recover from another a sum of money or specific goods, or land, in which cases there is a simple judgment that the plaintiff recover, or that he fail, and the Court has no directions to give in the nature of a decree; again, in criminal cases, revenue prosecutions, the prerogative business of the Court of Queen's Bench, actions of tort, and actions for damages, cannot be satisfactorily dealt with in any other mode than by a Court employing the present or some similar machinery, and ascertaining matters-of-fact before a judge and jury.

"The principle of both these modes of procedure must be preserved, whether they are to be administered by distinct Courts, or by one Court proceeding in different modes, according to the

difference of the subject-matter. If the distinction in the procedure be preserved, the union of Equity and Common Law Courts would seem to effect a change more nominal than real."

But when you have, according to the recommendation of the Commissioners, rendered "each Court competent to administer complete justice in the cases which fall under its cognisance," or in other words, when you have made each Court a Court of Law as well as a Court of Equity (for that is what it comes to), it would surely be absurd to go on calling one a Court of Law and the other a Court of Equity, merely because one is to take cognisance of cases which can be resolved into one or more questions to be submitted to a jury, while the other is to take cognisance of cases in which it may have to make orders and give directions during a long course of years. Whatever else may be the proper mode of designating the distinction which the Commissioners think must be preserved, it is quite clear that to use the phrases "Courts of Law," and "Courts of Equity," is not the proper mode.

But waiving this question of nomenclature, I do not think with the Commissioners that, if the distinction in the procedure be preserved, the union of the last sort of Courts with the first sort would seem to effect a change more nominal than real.

I do not dispute that causes admit of classification not only theoretically for the purpose of making them distinct objects of contemplation to the mind, but likewise practically for the purpose of distributing them among the several Judges. This distribution, however, may be effected in various ways, and the problem is to find the way in which it may be effected with the least inconvenience to the public.

The

In the opinion of the Indian Law Commission there ought to be in every district a Court or Office of Justice. number of Judges in it must be decided by the quantity of judicial business to be transacted. In a thinly peopled agricultural district one Judge would probably be enough for the whole business, and no distribution of suits would be required. In a metropolitan district several Judges would be necessary. Each of these Judges would have in point of

Law jurisdiction over all classes of suits, and no proceeding taken in any suit before any one of these Judges, would ever be void on the ground that it was coram non Judice. No suitor would be called upon at his peril to select the right Judge, and punished by the nullity of his proceedings, if he happened to select the wrong one. The distribution of suits would be made by the Court itself, upon considerations of convenience, and every suitor entering the Court, whatever might be the nature of his demand, would have indicated to him the Judge before whom that demand ought to be enforced.

In this manner it appeared to us that all the advantages of classification might be obtained without the risk of the suitor being told at the end of sixteen years' litigation (as happened in a case before the Supreme Court at Calcutta) that he has come to the wrong Court, and must state and prove his whole case over again in a different form before the right

one.

I propose, then, to have local Courts all over the country in which the suitor shall be sure of finding his remedy, whatever may be the nature of the wrong he complains of.

But it must not be supposed that I contemplate, still less that I desire, any such consequence as the destruction of Westminster Hall. An administration of law by local Courts would very soon degenerate into a mere system of Arbitration, if it were not preserved from that corruption by the antiseptic power of a general Court of Appeal. I know there are some who have been driven by contemplating the evils of our centralised and technical system, to believe that a general system of Arbitration is to be preferred to a general system of Law and Legal Procedure. But this is very far from being my opinion. To Westminster Hall I look for the preservation of the uniformity of Law and of Procedure. I would give to the great Court, whose seat should be in that venerable sanctuary,―Universal Appellate Jurisdiction, and universal supervision over the whole administration of justice. Neither the time nor the space at command permit me to enter into detail. I can only say in general that the above-mentioned high functions should be exercised partly at

Westminster, and partly on circuit. I believe that the English circuits, though mischievous in respect that they have superseded local tribunals, have in other ways conferred immense benefit upon the country.

To them, in a great degree, is owing the comparatively slight difference in civilisation between the remotest districts of England and its metropolis.

No doubt, the facilities of travelling must also be taken into account, but in this matter there has been action and reaction. The Metropolitan Judges and Bar have been able to visit the most secluded provinces because there have been passable roads. But it is also true, that roads have been made passable in order that these journeys might be accomplished. If great functionaries, and men of the highest and most cultivated intellect circulate twice a year through the provinces, and then return to their station at the capital, they learn the wants of the extremities and make them known at the centre; and they exhibit at the extremities the modes of conducting business, and even more generally the modes of thinking and behaving, which are approved at the centre. If ever the plans of the Indian Law Commission should find favour in the eyes of those who have power, I believe that Circuits performed by the Metropolitan Judges and Bar will play a conspicuous part in the civilisation of India. In England the work of general improvement is done. Cumberland and Cornwall can never be much behind Middlesex in all that contributes to the comfort and the adornment of life. But in the special field of Law and Procedure the desirable uniformity cannot be preserved, the desirable stimulus cannot be imparted, a national ambition cannot be substituted for a provincial ambition, otherwise than by Circuits. Local Judges instructed by Metropolitan Judges, both in the way of precept and example, will ever be the best administrators of justice. The Judges of Appeal, too, whose seat is at Westminster, require, for the sake of their own efficiency, to be engaged in the occasional exercise of original jurisdiction. Let them try, then, sitting singly, the few most important causes in London and Mid

dlesex, and let them try on Circuit the few causes which are fit to be reserved for them by reason of importance, and which can be so reserved for them without inconvenience to the parties. I am aware that the absorption of the original jurisdiction of the Courts at Westminster by the County Courts, is looked upon by a Committee of the Society for promoting the Amendment of the Law (a Society in which, since my return to this country, I have had the honour to enrol my name), as "a most disastrous, but not unlikely event." But the Committee look on the event as disastrous, because they look on it as a transfer of "the administration of justice to tribunals whose procedure is very imperfectly organised, and to Judges of whom it is no disparagement to say, that however competent they may be to discharge their present duties, they are quite unequal to the task of undertaking the summary administration of the whole Law of England."

If a sufficient number of Judges competent to this task could not be found, and if their tribunals could not be adequately organised, I should not only sympathise in the feelings of the Committee, but should give my assent to their conclusion. Believing, as I do, that both these conditions can be fulfilled, and therefore withholding my assent from the conclusion of the Committee, I nevertheless do sympathise with their feelings. I am convinced, however, that those feelings, notwithstanding the sympathy they excite in me, are but a vain yearning for the restoration of an irrevocable past – I therefore gladly avert my eyes from that retrospective view, that I may look forward with hopeful aspiration to a possible future for Westminster Hall, so full of utility and dignity, as to be no-wise unworthy of its ancient and wellearned renown.

If you care to know in what way it appears to me that the County Courts might be completely organised, and in what way a constant supply of competent Judges might be provided for them, I shall be happy to send you at some future time a communication on this subject. Even if I had not already trespassed too long on your indulgence, the