and restoration, the man alone remaining unchanged. This conclusion, far from being metaphysical in character, is a fact of universal and continuous observation, and as such is inwoven with our principles of conduct; it supports the idea of responsibility, and forms the basis of the social affections.

The fact which we have thus attempted to establish is one of the first class, as it relates to things which exist; a consideration of the second class, or of events which take place, brings us to the idea of cause, or the beginning of existence. The inquiry into the origin and nature of this idea is a fundamental one, as in the former case; for on its issue depends every reasonable anticipation of future events, and all real knowledge of those which have passed. The exact sciences relate exclusively to present existences; the mathematician studies the laws of number and of space, both of which are applicable to simultaneous phenomena. Events are successive phenomena, and the study of them carries us both into the past and the future, and depends in almost every case upon our notion of cause.

The law of causation may be stated thus:-Every event which takes place has a cause. This law is not applicable to things which exist, and much confusion and unsound reasoning have arisen from the attempt to extend it to them. I cannot infer merely from the present existence of a stone, a plant, or an animal, that it must have had a cause; for all I know, it may have existed for ever. But if already aware of the fact, that at some definite epoch it began to exist, that time was when it was not, then I say with absolute certainty that that beginning of its existence must have been caused by something foreign to itself; or, more loosely speaking, that the thing itself must have had a cause. If all things in the universe were motionless and unchangeable, if no event whatever broke the dread uniformity and monotony of time, though all objects should remain precisely as they are at this moment, there would be no foundation for reasoning from effect to cause. The presence of a world would not enable us to prove the existence of its Creator. But the instant a change occurs, as soon as a sound is heard, or a leaf falls, or only quiv

ers on its bough, we declare without hesitation, that some power or agency is at work, that the event must have had a cause. It may be a recondite one; the ingenuity of man may have been engaged ever since the foundation of the world in a vain attempt to discover it; still we say with perfect confidence, that it must have existed; there must have been a cause somewhere.

I speak now of causation in its absolute and literal sense, — not merely of an antecedent event, but of an efficient antecedent, of a cause in respect to which, if it were completely known, we could tell beforehand, or prior to all experience, what would be its effect. Those who are familiar with the speculations of philosophers upon this subject will tell me that I am here adopting the metaphysical notion of cause; I admit it, but I say that it is also the popular notion, the ordinary significance of a very common word, that people generally never think of attaching any other idea to it, and never find any difficulty in distinguishing the succession of cause and effect, properly so called, from an ordinary sequence, or from the accidental simultaneousness of two otherwise unconnected events. The falling of the spark, they say, is the cause of the explosion, meaning thereby the efficient cause; and they distinguish this case very clearly from that of two clocks striking the hour in immediate succession, never supposing, in this latter instance, that the one operates on the other, and obliges it to strike, though they may have kept exact time with each other for many years. This fact, that the popular acceptation of the word cause is also its strict and scientific meaning, it is important to remember, as will be seen hereafter.

Now, in ordinary physical inquiry, in the world of matter, are we able to perceive and recognize such causes? Admitting, as every rational being must do, that every event, change, or beginning of existence must have an efficient cause, can we discover this cause, and show beforehand that it must produce this particular event, and no other, and why it produces it? The answer may appear startling to some, but there is no doubt of its If there is any one conclusion at which both phys

correctness.

ical and metaphysical inquirers, after a long dispute, have at last arrived with almost complete accord, it is this:that we are not able to discern the real cause of any event or change in the outward universe, and that the search after such causes is hopeless; in the outward universe, or world of matter, I say, because the case of mind must be considered afterwards. We do not know that the falling of the spark was the cause of the explosion of the powder; most probably, it was not. We do not know that the man's taking poison was the cause of his death; most likely, it was not. This statement is not meant to be paradoxical, but simply explicit and clear; I hope to prove satisfactorily that it is well founded.

Observe, then, that all which we discern in any case is the events themselves, and not the connection between those events. I see the falling of the spark, I see and hear the explosion which immediately follows. I have sensible evidence only of this, that two events happened simultaneously and in rapid succession. Recollecting other instances, or learning them from the testimony of others, I may have reason to believe that these two events have always taken place together, or that the one has never occurred without being immediately followed by the other. Believing, also, that the course of nature is uniform, it seems very probable that this succession will always take place in future. I perceive nothing but the events; I know that they are simultaneous, or nearly so; and this is all that I know. I do not see any necessary connection between them, and if I hastily infer that there must be such a connection, because the two always happen in close succession, the case of the two clocks reminds. me that invariable antecedence and consequence do not prove any connection whatever. Cause implies power or force, which is never directly perceived; but we infer that it exists, because the event happens, or the effect is produced. It is often loosely said, that one event is the cause of another, when the two are in fact separated by quite a long succession of intermediate causes. Thus, it is said that the stroke of the hammer on the bell is the cause of the sound which we hear; strictly speaking, how

ever, this stroke produces only an agitation of the particles of which the bell is composed; this agitation, again, causes a vibration in the elastic medium, the air, which extends to our ears; this vibration has an effect, or produces a change, in the auditory nerve; which is followed, probably, by some affection of a part or of the whole mass of the brain; and then comes at last our sensation of sound. In this final sequence, which involves the conection between mind and matter, we are ready to admit that we know only the fact, that the affection of the brain is followed by a sensation, and do not know the cause of this fact, or the reason why it is thus followed. We are led to make this admission, because our power of detecting intermediate sequences stops here; we cannot point out any links of connection between the effect on the brain and the sensation, as we did between the stroke of the hammer and the agitation of the nerve. The former sequence, then, is admitted to be an ultimate fact, or, what is the same thing, we say that the cause of it is inexplicable. Yet it is certain that we ought to make the same admission as to the preceding sequences, each one of which, taken by itself, is an ultimate fact, and equally inexplicable. Why should a blow from a hammer be diffused over a considerable surface, so as to throw all the particles of a large bell, made of solid metal, into agitation? We do not know. But this is one instance out of a large class of similar ones; we are accustomed to perceive concussion followed by agitation of the parts of the two bodies which strike together, and this familiarity of the fact makes it seem less inexplicable; it is not wonderful or strange, because we know a vast number of similar cases, and therefore we suppose it is not difficult to be understood. In truth, we know nothing about it, except that one event is invariably followed by the other; and this knowledge of constant succession, as we have seen, is very different indeed from a perception of the efficient cause.

What is meant, then, when we speak of the success of the physical inquirer- the chemist, the meteorologist, or the mechanist, for instance - in pointing out the causes of material phenomena? We mean, that he has succeeded in detecting some of

these intermediate sequences, and in showing that they are of the same character with a class of other well-known facts, all of which are supposed to have a common cause, though we have never thought of asking what that cause is. A phenomenon which formerly appeared to be anomalous, or the only specimen of its class, is in this manner reduced to the same rank or class with a great number of familiar events. The discovery, then, consists in finding out the proper classification of the fact, not in ascertaining its cause. And further, when we have a great number of phenomena so similar in character that it is reasonable to believe they are all produced by one cause, though we know not what that cause is, yet we give a name to it. And afterwards, should any fact apparently anomalous, or of a different order, be reduced to this class, then the name becomes applicable to this fact also, and we say, in ordinary parlance, that the cause of it is discovered. Let me illustrate this a little further.

When Newton discovered that the planets circle round the sun in the same manner in which a stone thrown by the hand describes a curve before reaching the earth, he may be said to have explained the former phenomenon by bringing it into the same class with certain results which have long been familiar to us. But the explanation was only relative, not absolute. The latter phenomenon is, in reality, no more explicable than the former; he did not pretend to know the cause of the stone's falling to the ground, any more than of the revolution of the planets. It was something to be able to arrange these apparently heterogeneous results in the same class, and gravity was a convenient name to apply to the whole. But the supposition that gravity was an occult cause, inherent in matter, Newton earnestly repelled, declaring that it was inconceivable, and that the motions. "must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws." So Franklin showed that a thunder-cloud and the charged conductor of an electrical machine manifested the same phenomena, and might therefore be classed together; sparks were obtained from both; Leyden jars were charged from them; light bodies were attracted and repelled in the same way by both

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